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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Peer Interactions in Decision Making
by
Yijun Chen
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Washington University in St. Louis, 2021
Professor Tat Y. Chan, Chair
The broad research topic of my dissertation is individuals decision making in the presence of
peer interactions. I focus on empirical settings where individuals are connected with others
in the peer network, and through peer interactions, their decisions are interdependent. Peer
network structures in terms of who is connected with whom and the mechanisms of peer
interactions convey valuable information on the decision making process. I employ quantitative empirical methods to uncover the information embedded in peer networks, provide
insights on the mechanisms of peer interactions, and generate peer-network based managerial
implications.
Chapter 1 studies how participants collaborate to compete in an online crowdsourcing competition platform. Participants have heterogeneous abilities and incomplete information on
peer participants private abilities. We develop a structural matching model captures the
decisions on forming collaboration, in which participants form beliefs on each other and
face competitive pressure from peer participants. We provide implications on how platforms
could better align individual incentives to improve collaboration eﬃciency.
Chapter 2 focuses on peer eﬀect in workplace misconduct in the empirical setting of server
theft in restaurants. We utilize the coworker network structure to employ an instrumental

xii

variables model that accounts for endogeneity in peer influence. We show that although
servers are more likely to steal when working with high-theft peers, they steal less as peers
steal more on a given day. We also show that this negative correlation in daily peer theft
is higher under an IT system that increases managerial oversight by reporting likely theft
to managers. Our results suggest that the costs of employing unethical workers is higher
than the direct cost of those workers’ misconduct because their behavior spills over into
coworkers’ actions and amplifies through reflection eﬀects, yet this contagion can be mitigated
by managerial oversight.
Chapter 3 addresses the endogeneity in social connections in empirical measurement of peer
eﬀect in customer churn. We first model the process of social network formation, which is
based on observed consumer interactions during product use, and then model the consumers’
choice to churn under peer influence. Modeling peer network formation allows us to recover
the unobserved individual-specific parameters that might aﬀect both peer network formation
and decision to churn. We apply the model on data from the popular massively multiplayer
online game World of Warcraft, where gamers form social groups to progress through the
game content. Our results show that a significant amount of peer ties is explained by the
latent gamer characteristics. Based on the estimated model, we run policy experiments to
investigate how churn dynamics is aﬀected by the structure of the generated peer network.
We provide recommendations to firms on how they could induce formation of networks that
suﬀer less from peer influenced churns.
Chapter 4 studies the consumption and subscription decisions of users in the gym under peer
influence. We develop a structural model to empirically study how the attrition of a user in
a gym influences not only her direct but also indirect peers, allowing the eﬀects to spread
within a social network. We utilize exogenous attritions of gym members in data to tackle the
identification challenge. Estimation results help quantify how the social customer life-time
xiii

value of a user varies depending on her position in the social network, after taking account
of the interactive peer eﬀects among users. We then use the estimated model to explore how
the gym can prevent user attritions by oﬀering individually-targeted membership discounts.
Our results show that the gym can eﬀectively mitigate the negative eﬀects by utilizing
the information of the network structure among members. Our results demonstrate the
importance of understanding the role of individual users in the social network for customer
relationship management.
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Chapter 1
Collaborate to Compete: An Empirical
Matching Game under Incomplete
Information in Rank-Order Tournaments
Co-authored with Tat Y. Chan and Chunhua Wu

1.1

Introduction

Collaboration is ubiquitous. It plays a critical role in enhancing productivity among academic
researchers. For example, co-authorship among economists has been found to be growing
over years, which helps increase the number of publications for individual economists (e.g.,
Hollis 2001, Ductor 2015). Collaboration also helps accelerate business innovations and
new product development in various industries. Bamford et al. (2004) documented that
more than 5,000 joint ventures, and many more contractual alliances, have been launched
worldwide in the past five years of 2004. Yet they also found that only about half of the

1

joint ventures could achieve returns greater than the investment cost. They argued that
having incompatible partners is an important reason for the failures. Collaboration is also an
important determinant of employee performance within firms, as numerous industry studies
have shown that workplace collaboration is a key factor for a companys success.1
There are multiple benefits from collaboration, including the facilitation of the economy
of scale, complementarity of knowledge and skills, and division of labor, that help tackle
complicated work tasks. Other factors may facilitate or impede collaborations. In particular,
potential participants in collaboration may have heterogeneous abilities and skills that are not
fully observed by other participants. Such lack of information can lead to adverse selection
and other ineﬃciencies, as identified in the economics literature. Another important factor
is competition. Because the payoﬀ for being the first can be much higher than being in other
ranks, academic researchers race to find a breakthrough for scientific problems, firms seek to
launch new products earlier than their competitors, and employees compete to be the best
among peer workers. Under such competitive pressure, the collaboration of other parties
may force an individual also to collaborate. When there are a large number of participants
with heterogeneous abilities and skills competing in the market, whether and with whom to
collaborate becomes a very intricate problem.
We develop a structural one-sided matching model in this paper to study how individuals
collaborate to compete. The model has several unique features. First, participants compete
against each other in the market, and the success of their collaboration eﬀort can reduce the
returns of other participants in the market. Second, there is a large number of participants
with heterogeneous abilities in the matching game. Their abilities are partially reflected
by the imperfect, public information. Finally, our model allows potential collaborators to
negotiate how rewards and costs are shared. Collaboration will only be successful if all of
1

Source: https://www.smartsheet.com/how-workplace-collaboration-can-change-your-company.
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the involving parties agree on the sharing rule. To analyze the properties of this model,
we focus on the market equilibrium, which is characterized by each participants optimal
choice regarding whether to collaborate and with whom to collaborate, under two constraints.
The first constraint is that each individual makes rational inferences on the true ability of
other participants based on the public information and their collaboration decisions, using
a Bayesian updating framework. The second constraint imposes that the sharing of rewards
and costs agreed by collaborators will clear the market. That is, the number of one type
of participants, defined by the public information, who want to match with another type of
participants, is equal to the number of the latter type who want to match with the former.
This equilibrium concept is first developed in the theory paper of Becker (1973) who studied
the marriage market. We extended his model to allow for incomplete information on the
ability of other parties, and competition among collaborations. We prove the existence of
such an equilibrium in a large-scale, one-sided matching game.
We use this matching model to study how collaborations aﬀect the individual performance
and competition outcomes. We also investigate what is the role of incomplete information
and competition in the formation of collaborations and, based on the results, what policies
a firm can use to enhance the eﬃciency of collaborations. Given the prevalence of collaborations among firms and individuals, the answers to those questions are of high economic
importance. We apply our model to a dataset we collect from Kaggle.com, a leading data
science competition platform. There are several reasons why the empirical context is suitable
for our study. First, Kaggle connects firms that provide data and sponsors competitions with
participants (i.e.,data scientists) who provide solutions in order to win competitions. Monetary and non-monetary rewards from competitions are based on the ranking of the team
performance, a format equivalent to rank-order tournaments (Lazear and Rosen (1981)).
Second, each competition typically attracts hundreds or even thousands of participants. To

3

improve their performance, participants may form teams (i.e.,collaborations) to compete
against the others. Third, there is a fixed policy on how Kaggle points are allocated to each
participant in collaborations. How to split the monetary reward and how to share the workload, on the other hand, are negotiated by the participants when forming teams. Finally,
as repeated interactions across competitions are rare (only 9% of all team interactions in
data), a participant is unlikely to have full information regarding the true ability or skills of
potential collaborators. Kaggle makes the information on the tier status and Kaggle points
accumulated from past competitions of each participant publicly available on its website;
however, such information is not perfectly aligned with the true ability. This last feature
makes it challenging to incentivize participants to collaborate. Kaggle makes the information
on the tier status and Kaggle points accumulated from past competitions of each participant
publicly available on its website; however, these information are not perfectly align with the
true ability. This last feature makes it challenging to incentivize participants to collaborate.
We find from data only about one-fourth of participates collaborated in competitions, even
after Kaggle changed its policy of awarding Kaggle points to encourage collaborations.
Estimating the structural matching model is challenging because of two issues: first, due to
the competition nature the likelihood for an individual to form teams is a function of the
likelihoods that other participants will form teams. Second, how team members split the
monetary reward and workload is unobserved to researchers. Because of these two reasons,
the likelihood function cannot be evaluated analytically. To tackle this problem, we propose
a two-level estimation procedure. Conditional on a given set of parameters at the outer level,
we impose the equilibrium constraints in the inner level. This methodology can be applied
to estimate other types of large-scale matching games when competition or other forms of
spillovers exist, sharing-rule is not predetermined, or imperfect information exists.

4

Estimation results show that the tier status of a participant, a piece of publicly available
information, can reasonably reflect her true ability. However, there is a large variation in
ability across participants who belong to the same tier, suggesting that the information is
a noisy signal. Non-monetary rewards, including Kaggle points and other benefits from
forming teams, are highly valued by participants. We also find that participants in general
perform much better by forming teams. However, for high ability participants the gains
from collaborating with teammates with lower ability are negative, implying the risk of
collaborations that is due to the lack of complete information. Finally, we recover the
market clearing sharing rule between participants when the market is at equilibrium. We
find that participants at a lower tier have to pay a positive (monetary and non-monetary)
transfer to teammates at a higher tier. This explains why a significant proportion of high
tier participants are willing to form teams with participants from lower tiers in data.
After recovering the model primitives, we conduct counterfactual analyses to investigate
how the incomplete information and competition aﬀect collaborations and their outcomes,
as well as what policies Kaggle may use to enhance the eﬃciency of collaborations. In the first
counterfactual, we manipulate the informativeness of the tier status regarding the true ability
of individuals. We find that, in comparison to the case when the tier status is uninformative,
improving the informativeness will increase the maximum performance from all teams, a
performance measure that the sponsoring business for the data science competition care
most, and the expected payoﬀ of participants. The increases in participants performance
and expected payoﬀs are critical for Kaggles business because, as a platform, its success
heavily relies on the ability of attracting sponsoring businesses and top talents on both
sides.
The second counterfactual studies how the extent of competition aﬀects collaboration outcomes. Specifically, Kaggle can manipulate the degree of competitiveness by changing how
5

its non-monetary Kaggle points are allocated to teams at diﬀerent ranks. Fixing the aggregate number of points in each competition, the competitive pressure increases when more
points are awarded to high-ranked teams at the expense of teams at lower ranks. When
points are equally allocated, there will be no competition (except for the monetary reward).
We manipulate the point allocation function in the counterfactual, and find that increasing
the competitive pressure for Kaggle points will boost collaboration among participants, as
well as improve the best performance of all teams. It also has positive eﬀect on the payoﬀs
of top participants; however, the eﬀect on the payoﬀ of general participants is negative.
Combining results from the two counterfactuals, we conclude that, to attract talents and
improve team performances, Kaggle should focus on providing more information about the
true ability of participants. Whether Kaggle should make the point allocation more competitive depends on the objectives of the platform. If the platform wants to improve the best
performance, a high competitive pressure for points is preferred. However, if attracting more
participation in competitions is the priority, Kaggle should avoid awarding points to the top
few teams only.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. From the methodology perspective, we develop
an empirical matching model that explicitly accounts for incomplete information and competition. These two factors have not been taken into account in the traditional matching
literature. Our matching model also allows for unobserved sharing rules between agents,
a factor that is not accounted for by the previous literature of coalition games. We also
develop a method for estimating our matching game. The method could be easily applied
to other empirical settings where collaborations are critical for the success in market competition. It can be adopted to study other markets where incomplete information exists and
matching has spillover eﬀects. For substantive contributions, this paper provides insights on
how collaborations aﬀect the individual performance and competition outcomes, and how
6

information and competition aﬀect the collaboration eﬃciency. Our counterfactuals generate
implications on what policies firms may use to enhance collaborations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature in Section 1.2,
then describe the empirical context and provide some summary statistics in Section 1.3.
Section 1.4 develops the matching model. Detailed model specification, identification and
the estimation are presented in Section 1.4. Estimation results and counterfactual analyses
are presented in Section 1.7. Finally, we discuss the model limitations and outline future
research directions in the conclusion section.

1.2

Related Literature

Our study is closely related to the large stream of literature on matching. Theoretical works
on matching games have been developed for decades. The Gale-Shapley algorithm has been
applied to solve problems for college admissions (Gale and Shapley 1962), dating markets
(Becker 1973), and business and plant locations (Bayus 2013). While most of the works
assume complete information in the matching game, a few recent papers have explored the
properties of the matching game when agents have incomplete information. Liu et al. (2014),
for example, study a matching game with one-sided incomplete information and show that
the set of stable outcomes is nonempty and is a superset for the set of complete information
stable outcomes.
Empirical works on matching are rather recent. Fox (2008) proposes using the maximum
score estimator to estimate the matching game. In a later paper (Fox 2010), he discusses the
identification conditions for using observed matching outcomes for model estimation. The
maximum score estimator has been applied in several recent studies in diﬀerent industries
(e.g., Fox and Bajari 2013, Yang et al. 2009, Wu 2015). A few recent papers study the
7

vertical matching between insurance networks and hospitals using the matching model. Ho
and Lee (2017), for example, uses a Nash-in-Nash framework as the equilibrium concept in
the matching game. A similar modeling approach is also adopted in Ghili (2018). Ni and
Srinivasan (2015) uses a two-sided matching model to study the matching between marketing
firms and manufacturers in the sourcing market. Our matching model assumes that there
is a sharing rule, under which each party is making the optimal choice in matching and the
market is cleared, between collaborators depending on their attributes. This approach is first
developed in Becker (1973), and is later adopted in the empirical work of Choo and Siow
(2006) that studies marriage market. These two papers, as well as other empirical studies
mentioned above, do not consider the issue of incomplete information. In this sense, our
paper is close to Chan et al. (2015), who use a matching model to study how individuals,
fully aware of the costs associated with being infected, engage in risky sex behaviors. Agents
in their model have uncertainty regarding the health status of their partners. They also make
the market clearing assumption so that they can estimate the model using the maximum
likelihood estimator with equilibrium constraints. Our model diﬀerentiates from theirs by
incorporating competition among collaborations, under which the payoﬀ of one collaboration
is aﬀected by the performance of the others.2
Collaborations are typically modeled as a coalition game (for example, see Pycia 2012, Farrell and Scotchmer 1988). An agents payoﬀ is usually assumed to be determined by the
coalition she belongs to. In a more complex setting, the payoﬀ can be determined by other
coalitions, and the agent thus will react to other agents coalition decisions under the competitive pressure (Yi 1997, Wilson et al. 2010). Our study fits into the framework of a coalition
2

A few other empirical studies consider either incomplete information or competition. Ackerberg and
Botticini (2002), for example, relax the assumption of perfect information, and estimate the determinants
of contracts by explicitly embedding an endogeneous selection in the matching process. Wilson et al. (2010)
extend the matching literature by incorporating externalities from network eﬀects in facultys oﬃce choice.
Uetake and Watanabe (2017) study firm entry decisions in the bank industry, allowing for potential spillovers.
The modeling approach in these papers is diﬀerent from ours.
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game when externality exists. We contribute to this stream of literature by relaxing the
perfect information assumption and allowing for unobserved sharing rule for the coalition
formation. Our study incorporates externality by directly modeling the payoﬀ of a coalition
as a function of other coalitions.
The empirical context of our paper is aligned with the growing literature on crowdsourcing. Given the emergence of crowdsourcing platforms in the past decade, researchers have
explored various phenomena in crowdsourcing. Burtch et al. (2013), for example, study the
content contribution of users for a digital journal and test several economic theories using
substitution models and reinforcement models. In another study, Bayus (2013) studies individual ideators contribution in Dells IdeaStorm community over time, and finds that past
success has a negative eﬀect on the current contribution. Huang et al. (2014) study the
learning process of participants on the same Dell platform and show that individuals learn
quickly about their ability for generating high potential ideas, but they are relatively slow for
learning the cost of implementation. The above research on crowdsourcing has treated collaborations on platforms as exogeneously given. We contribute to the literature by studying
how participants of Kaggles competitions collaborate and how their outcomes are aﬀected
by collaboration.
Finally, the way that Kaggle awards participants Kaggle points and monetary prizes makes
the competitions equivalent to rank-order tournaments (Lazear and Rosen (1981)). This
stream of literature studies how rewards based on ranking could motivate hard work and
improve performance. For example, Eriksson (1999) uses the compensations for executives
to test the tournament theory. Kini and Williams (2012) finds that higher tournament incentives will motivate risk-taking behaviors for senior managers in order to increase the chance
of being promoted. Lazear (1989) shows that while tournaments motivate worker eﬀort,
excessive competition for rewards may reduce collaborations. Our study diﬀers from these
9

previous works by investigating how collaborations can enhance the team performance, and
thus how the competitive environment in rank-order tournaments can increase the incentive
to collaborate.

1.3

Background and Data

In this section, we discuss the empirical context, describe the data, and explore some data
patterns that are related to our empirical matching model.

1.3.1

Empirical Setting

Our empirical setting is Kaggle.com, a leading global crowdsourcing platform for predictive modeling and analytics competitions. Founded in 2010, Kaggle bridges the connection
between the demand for and supply of data science talents. On the demand side, firms
provide data for the business problems they want to solve or opportunities they want to
explore. On the supply side, data scientists, researchers and students who have the talents
and tools to solve the problems crave for the opportunity to prove their ability and earn
rewards. Kaggle connects the two sides by holding sponsored crowdsourcing competitions
in which participants compete to provide the best solutions and win awards set up by sponsoring businesses. By the end of 2017, Kaggle has hosted 248 competitions, attracted more
than 60 thousand participants, and awarded over 9 million US dollars. These competitions
have resulted in significant scientific advancements including furthering the state of art in
HIV research, improving predictive technologies and algorithms, and uplifting operational
eﬃciency in business applications.3
3

Source:
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/22/the-kaggle-data-science-community-is-competing-toimprove-airport-security-with-ai/ and https://www.kaggle.com/c/passenger-screening-algorithm-challenge.
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For most competitions, the sponsoring business first specifies the winning rules and monetary
prizes. Depending on the business background, type of analytics required and the amount
of the prize, each competition attracts a distinct set of participants. They can compete
alone or form teams. It is very common that thousands of participants register in the same
competition, making it very diﬃcult to win the prize.
To incentivize participation, Kaggle awards Kaggle points to each participant based on her
final ranking in the competition. The typical policy is to allocate most points to a few
best performers, and the awarded points decline as a convex function with lower ranks.
This point allocation creates an additional competitive pressure among participants, on the
top of the competition for the monetary prize. Kaggle also uses a tier system to classify
individuals, under which participants who have the highest Kaggle points accumulated from
past competitions are awarded the Master status, followed by Expert and then Contributor
tiers. Participants who compete for the first time are recognized as Novices.4 The tier
status and points can be an important part of the non-monetary reward for participants.
As Kaggle has gradually established its reputation in the data science community, showing
the tier status or points is a useful way to strengthen the resume of data scientists. During
an interview with Wired Magazine, Gilberto Titericz, a top Kaggle player, claimed that job
opportunities that flow from a good Kaggle ranking are generally more bankable than money
prizes.5
Collaborations can be important for participants to achieve good performance and win competitions. To make sure that winners from competitions can provide high-quality solutions to
4

For a more detailed description on the points allocations and tier progressions, see an article at:
https://www.kaggle.com/progression. Some of the terminologies has changed in 2016. We use the ones
before the change in this paper.
5
Source:
https://www.wired.com/story/solve-these-tough-data-problems-and-watch-job-oﬀers-roll-in/.
Accessed January 20, 2018.

11

sponsoring businesses, Kaggle designs rules for participants that not only allow, but also encourage participants to collaborate. Indeed, the formal unit of participation is a team, where
a participant competing alone is just a single-member team. Collaborations on Kaggle are
formed in a decentralized way, in which participants decide whether to form teams and with
whom to form team by themselves, usually through an invitation-and-acceptance/rejection
procedure. Mutual agreements among team members are needed but, once the team is
formed, it is not allowed to change throughout the competition.
Despite of the potential benefits of collaboration, there are many factors that may deter team
formation. The first factor is the lack of information about other participants. Kaggle tries
to solve this problem by making the tier status of each participant publicly available on the
website. The information nevertheless is an imperfect measure. For example, the abilities
for new participants (who are all Novices) are not well distinguished, and participants who
have participated in more competitions are more likely to belong to a high tier. Furthermore,
the sharing rule for the monetary and non-monetary rewards may discourage high ability
participants to collaborate with others whom they are not familiar with. The monetary
prize if a team wins has to be split between members in a way that is negotiated in advance.
Kaggle points will also be allocated based on the number of participants in a team (more
details are below). Finally, free riding and moral hazard can create ineﬃciencies and conflicts
among team members. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ for each participant in a team may
not be higher than that from competing alone.
To encourage collaboration, Kaggle changed the point allocation policy in 2016. Before
the change, the points a member could get is equal to what her team wins divided by the
team size. The new policy divides the points of the team by the square root of the team
size.6 Simultaneously, Kaggle also reduced the number of points a team can win at each
6

Source: http://blog.kaggle.com/2015/05/13/improved-kaggle-rankings.
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rank. Single-member teams therefore can win fewer points under the new policy. This could
increase the incentive for participants to form teams.

1.3.2

Data and Summary Statistics

We use the Meta Kaggle data provided by Kaggle.com7 for the empirical application. The
dataset includes information on competitions, participants, teams and the final score, ranking, and rewards for each team. We observe 315 competitions that cover a time span of 7
years from 2010 to 2016. We exclude competitions that do not award Kaggle points, which
are designed to let participants have fun and familiarize with the competition. We also exclude competitions that have less than 100 participants. These are mostly competitions at
the very early stage of Kaggle when it launched in 2010. Since the value of Kaggle points were
not well recognized by the data scientist community, the incentives for participants could
be very diﬀerent from the competitions in later stage when Kaggle points are highly valued.
After excluding these two types of competitions, we are left with 102 competitions and 32,362
unique participants in the model estimation. In the sample 87% are single-member teams.
For teams with multiple members, 63% have two members. The dimensionality of team
options will become much higher and the matching problem too complex if we model team
formation with more than two members. For the simplicity of analysis, we assume that, for
teams with more than two members, the formation is driven by multiple, separate one-on-one
matching between the member with the highest cumulative Kaggle points and each of the
other members. The rationale for this assumption is that the presence of the member with
the highest tier status is the most important determinant for the team performance, which
we will show later.
7

Source: https://www.kaggle.com/kaggle/meta-kaggle.
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Table 1.1 provides the summary statistics on several key variables at the competition level.
The total monetary prizes in our data is US $25,000 averaged across competitions, with the
highest at US $500,000. A competition attracts 643 participants on average. In general,
competitions with higher monetary rewards attract more participants.

Table 1.1: Monetary Rewards And Participants Across Competitions
Rewards Quartile

Rewards (USD)
min

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

mean

Participants

max

min

0
360
950
1000 4675
9000
10000 11283 17500
20000 67621 500000

27
26
32
97

mean

max

226 779
463 1883
627 4151
1374 6260

Table 1.2 shows how participants of the 4 Kaggle tiers diﬀer in their Kaggle points. We
report the average points per competition that a participant joined before, and the total
accumulative points. Novices have not participated in any competition and thus have 0
points. As a participants tier moves up, both dimensions of Kaggle points also increase. The
last column of the table shows that more than 50% of participants are Novices. Masters are
an elite group, as only 10% of participants belong to this tier.

Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Participants’ Tier and Kaggle Points
Player Tier

Mean Average Points per Competition

Novice
Contributor
Expert
Master

0.00
845
1702
4371

Mean Total Points No. of Participants
0.00
1425
5876
22179

34929
10924
6679
5721

Note: Participants may join multiple competitions, so the total number of participants in this table
is larger than 31,246(unique participants across competitions).
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Table 1.3 reports how participants with diﬀerent tiers choose to form teams. Two clear
patterns arise: first, Novices and Masters are more likely to form teams, probably because of
diﬀerent reasons. Novices form teams in order to learn and prove her ability by collaborating
with others. Masters, on the other hand, are well recognized in the community for their high
abilities, and thus they are highly demanded for collaborations. Second, there is a pattern
of sorting, as participants tend to match with other participants from the same tier. This
is especially true for both Novice and Master tiers. The proportion of teams formed with
Novices is large across tiers because Novices are the majority in most competitions.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Participants’ Team Choices
Team
Tier/Choice

Single

Novice
Contributor
Expert
Master

54%
78.0%
75.6%
53.2%

Novice

Contributor

Expert

Master

39.7%
10.8%
7.5%
8.7%

3.2%
8.3%
2.9%
1.4%

1.4%
1.9%
9.7%
4.1%

1.6%
0.9%
4.0%
32.5%

Note: Rows represent participant tier and columns represent participants’ choices. Numbers represent percentage of choices for each option.

We now look at how collaborations impact the performance. In almost all of the competitions, performance is measured by the predictive accuracy on hold-out samples, but the
criteria used for calculating the accuracy diﬀers from competition to competition.8 Since
the measure is unique for each competition, we create a standardized score from the original
performance measure in each competition. We first calculate the mean and standard deviation of the original performance measure for single-member teams. We deduct the original
performance of each team by the calculated mean and then divide it by the calculated standard deviation. The idea of the standardization is that the mean and standard deviation of
8

Some of the most commonly used evaluation algorithms are Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE), Root
Mean Squared Errors (RMSE), Root Mean Squared Logarithmic Error (RMSLE), Area Under Receiver
Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC), and Log Loss.
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single-member teams capture the benchmark diﬃculty and variation in performance using
the original measure. After the standardization, the scores of all teams could be compared
across competitions.
The average and the standard deviation of the standardized score across diﬀerent types
of teams are reported in Table 1.4. Several interesting patterns arise. First, conditional
on a participants tier, her performance when forming team is in general better than when
she competes alone. Since the performance provides value for sponsoring businesses, this
result suggests that Kaggle should encourage more collaborations, a policy it seems to have
long adopted. A natural question one may ask is, if this is the case, why there are still
a large percentage of participants who stay single, as shown in first column of Table 1.3?
One of the major reasons could be that, since participants have to split the monetary prize
and Kaggle points and face the potential conflicts due to moral hazard and free-riding, the
expected payoﬀ of each member when forming team could be lower than if she competes
alone. Another data pattern is that teaming with a participant with a higher tier status
will perform better than teaming with another with a lower status. Specifically, the average
performance is the highest when teaming with a Master. Finally, there is a large variation
in performances within each type of single- or multiple-member teams, suggesting that there
is a large diﬀerentiation in the ability of participants even belong to the same tier. This
is especially interesting for Novices. The average performance of those who team up with
Experts and Masters is very high, but the performance of those who team up with other
Novices or Contributors are relatively lower. This implies that the ability of Novices is
very heterogeneous. The heterogeneity in participants ability brings uncertainty in expected
payoﬀ in teams and these may deter participants team formation.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics on Team Type and Performance Outcomes
Team
Tier/Choice

Single

Novice

0.64
(0.79)
0.61
(0.61)
0.82
(0.62)
1.03
(0.83)

Contributor
Expert
Master

Novice

Contributor

Expert

Master

0.77
(2.7)

0.76
(0.74)
0.83
(0.75)

0.95
(0.87)
0.95
(1.07)
1.13
(0.89)

1.32
(0.89)
1.07
(0.76)
1.19
(0.81)
1.43
(0.90)

Note: Each row represents a participants tier and each column represents the participants team
choice. Each number represents the mean score for a team type, and the standard deviation is
in parentheses.

1.4

Model

In this section, we develop a structural matching model, explicitly incorporating the incomplete information and competition, to study the outcomes of the matching when the market
is at equilibrium. We model an agents team formation decision as a one-sided matching
game with a large number of individuals, and apply this model to the Kaggle competition.
Our modeling approach can be easily generalized to a broader setting where collaborations
are important in order to compete with other agents.
Below, we will formalize the model in four steps. First we describe the information set and
the payoﬀ function of a participant when she forms team with another participant. Next,
we discuss how we model the expected monetary and non-monetary rewards. We then
explain how participants form expectations conditional on the information set. Finally, we
introduce the equilibrium concept and explain how the equilibrium can be represented by
the participants optimal choice of whether and with whom to form team under the rational
expectations and market clearing constraints.
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1.4.1

Model Setup and the Payoﬀ Function

For each competition, define the set of participants in the competition as N , and the number
of participants as N . Also define the set of teams formed as M, and the number of teams
as M . A team ⟨i, j⟩ ∈ M indicates that the focal participant i forms team with a target
participant j. As a special case, ⟨i, ∅⟩ denotes that participant i competes solo instead of
teaming with another individual.
We assume that the matching outcomes, including teams that are formed and the performance (i.e., the standardized score) of each team, come from the market equilibrium. To
make the model tractable, we made a few additional assumptions. First, we assume participants when forming teams will negotiate how the monetary reward and team work should
be divided. The agreement cannot be broken once the team is formed. Potential issues from
forming teams, including moral hazard and resulted personal conflicts that can aﬀect the
team performance, are captured in a reduced-form way in the model. Second, the pool of
participants is treated as exogenous in the model. This helps us abstract away from the
complicated participation problem, but in the model estimation we approximate how the
pool of participants may change in diﬀerent competitions. Third, we treat each competition
as a static game, so that we can focus on the determinants of team formation within games
and ignore the strategic dynamic interactions between participants across games. Finally,
we also treat the monetary and non-monetary rewards pre-specified in the competition as
exogenous.
Each participant is represented by two attributes: Ai is the true ability of the participant
which is private information, and Ri a noisy signal (i.e., tier status on Kaggle) about her ability that is a public information. We assume Ai and Ri are discrete variables, and use A and R
to represent the number of possible types for Ai and Ri , respectively. We further use A and R
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to represent the collection of abilities and signals of all participants in the competition. The
informativeness of the signal Ri is represented by the conditional probability P r (Ai = a|Ri )
for all types of abilities. For a ̸= a′ , if P r (Ai = a|Ri ) is close to P r (Ai = a′ |Ri ), Ri is not
informative for other participants to identify the focal participants true ability. However, if
P r (Ai = a|Ri ) is close to one while the probabilities for other abilities are close to zero, Ri
is a very informative signal. The distribution of signals is informative for the abilities of the
participant population if, for any two participants i and j, P r (Ai = a|Ri ) ̸= P r (Aj = a|Rj )
for Ri ̸= Rj . The conditional probability is also assumed to be common knowledge.
The performance of team ⟨i, j⟩ is determined by the abilities Ai and Aj , denoted as Y⟨i,j⟩ (Ai , Aj ).
We assume that, first, team performance independent from the ordering of i and j, i.e.,
Y⟨i,j⟩ (Ai , Aj ) = Y⟨j,i⟩ (Aj , Ai ). Second, team performance does not depend on the abilities of
participants in other teams. However, the rank of Y⟨i,j⟩ will depend on the performance of
all teams. We use YM to denote the collection of performances of all teams under M, and
Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM ) to represent the rank of team ⟨i, j⟩. For the sponsoring business, the performance
of the best team, i.e., max (YM ), brings the most value as the algorithm can be applied to
solve its business problem. Participants, on the other hand, care about the ranking since it
determines how much the monetary reward, denoted by M oney(Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM , and how much
the non-monetary reward (i.e., Kaggle points), denoted by P oint(Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM , the team can
earn from the competition (details are in Section 1.4.2).
Kaggle decides how the Kaggle points awarded to a team should split between its members, and members negotiate by themselves how to share the monetary reward and the
team work. Since the abilities Ai and Aj are unobserved by the other team member, the
sharing rule will be determined based on the public information Ri and Rj . When the
market is at equilibrium, the sharing will also be determined by R, the distribution of
signals of all participants in the competition (more details are in Section 1.4.3). Because
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of this reason, we use γ M (Ri , Rj , R) to represent is share of the monetary reward. For
team ⟨i, j⟩, the share of each member is positive and the sum of shares is equal to one, i.e.,
γ M (Ri , Rj , R) + γ M (Rj , Ri , R) = 1. If competing solo, all of the monetary reward will belong to the participant, i.e., γ M (Ri , ∅, R) = 1, where ∅ indicates that the target participant
does not exist in team ⟨i, ∅⟩. For the share of team work, we use τ (Ri , Rj , R) to denote
the transfer of workload from i to j (relative to equal share of the work). As a participants
agreement to handle more of the workload implies the other participant will have less work,
we impose the restriction that τ (Ri , Rj , R) + τ (Rj , Ri , R) = 0. This assumption is similar to the model in Becker (1973), in which the transfer of the man and the woman in a
marriage is sum up to zero. The transfer of a single-member team is normalized to zero,
i.e.,τ (Ri , ∅, R) = 0.
Finally, there are additional benefits from team works, including the economy of scale and
specialization in job tasks, as such the workload of each member can be reduced. There are
also additional costs, such as moral hazard and potential personal conflicts, when working
as a team. Note that these are the benefits and costs on the top of how team works can
impact the performance in the competition; such impact has been captured in Y⟨i,j⟩ (Ai , Aj ).
We cannot separately identify these additional benefits and costs from data; therefore, our
model only incorporates the net benefit from the above factors. To allow for the heterogeneity
of the net benefit across teams, we assume that it is determined by the types of the team
members defined by the public signals. That is, the net benefit is represented by a function
α (Ri , Rj ). To simplify the analysis we assume the function is independent from the ordering
of the abilities, i.e., α (Ri , Rj ) = α (Rj , Ri ). We also normalize the net benefit of competing
solo to zero, i.e., α (Ri , ∅) = 0.
Combining the above components, we assume that, when the focal participant i is considering
the collaboration with the target participant j, she will form expectation of her payoﬀ relative
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to all of the other team formation options. When making the decision, her information set
is (Ai , Ri , Rj , R), which also represents the state variables in the expected payoﬀ function.
The expected payoﬀ is the following:
[
(
)
]
U (Ai , Ri , Rj , R) = θiM · γ M (Ri , Rj , R) · E Money Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM ) |Ai , Ri , Rj , R +
[
(
)
]
θiP · γ P · E Point Z⟨i,j ⟩ (YM ) |Ai , Ri , Rj , R + τ (Ri , Rj , R) + α (Ri , Rj ) + εi,Rj

(1.1)

In the above function, parameters θiM and θiP represent the participants marginal utility for
the monetary and non-monetary reward, respectively. γ P captures how Kaggle allocates team
points to each participant. As discussed in Section 1.3, under the original policy γ P = 1/2,
√
where 2 is the team size; after the policy change, the new γ P = 1/ 2. Finally, the random
component εi,Rj captures other unobserved factors that will aﬀect the participant decision
of whether and with whom she will form team. We assume that it is the same if two target
participants j and j share the same public signal. That is, εi,Rj = εi,Rj′ if Rj = Rj ′ .9
Under the normalization assumptions for working solo, the expected payoﬀ function of forming a single-member team is
[
(
)
]
U (Ai , Ri , ∅, R) = θiM · E Money Z⟨i,j ⟩ (YM ) |Ai , Ri , ∅, R +
[
(
)
]
θiP · E Point Z⟨i,∅⟩ (YM ) |Ai , Ri , ∅, R + εi,∅

(1.2)

The participant makes decision on which type of individuals she should team up with. Assuming that εi,Rj is distributed as Type-I extreme value distribution with scale parameter
9

This is based on the assumption that, other than the public signal Rj , the focal participant cannot
observe other attributes of the target participant. Therefore, she is indiﬀerent in teaming with j or j if
Rj = Rj . Relaxing this assumption makes the matching problem more complicated without direct bearing
on our main results. The same assumption is made by Becker (1973), Choo and Siow (2006) and Chan et al.
(2015).
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µ. Given a sharing rule γ M and a transfer rule τ , the probability that the participants optimal choice is teaming with a participant with signal r (including single-member team with
r = ∅), can be calculated as:

PrM

(

( (
) )
exp V Ai , Ri , r , R; γ M , τ /µ
Ai , Ri , r , R|γ , τ = ∑
′
M
r ′ ∈(R∪∅) exp (V (Ai , Ri , r , R; γ , τ ) /µ)
M

)

(1.3)

(
)
where the subscript M on the left side denotes the matching probability, and V Ai , Ri , r, R; γ M , τ
on the right side is the expected payoﬀ in equation (1.1) (or equation (1.2) if r = ∅) without the random component εi,Rj . Furthermore, Rj in the equation is replaced by r, and
γ M (Ri , Rj , R) and τ (Ri , Rj , R) by γ M and τ , respectively.
Note that, first of all, γ M and τ are unobserved by researchers. To evaluate the choice
probability we will have to back out these variables from equilibrium conditions. Second,
the expectations of the monetary and non-monetary rewards in equations (1.1) and (1.2) are
over the true abilities of the target participant as well as that of all other participants in the
competition. The focal participant will make inference on the abilities of other participants
based on the public signals,as well as their decisions on how to form teams with other types
of participants, when the market is at equilibrium. These two issues will be discussed in
Section 1.4.3.

1.4.2

Performance and Rewards

The ranking of team ⟨i, j⟩ depends on the performances, which are the standardized scores
discussed in the previous section, of all teams. With abilities Ai = a and Aj = a′ , we specify
we specify the performance function is specified as
Y⟨i,j ⟩ (a, a ′ ) = λ′aa + ξij
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(1.4)

where λaa′ is a model parameter to be estimated representing the predicted performance of
a team with ability a and a. By definition λaa′ = λa′ a .10 The stochastic term ξij captures
other unobserved factors that aﬀect the final performance, and is assumed to distribute as
(
)
N 0, σξ2 . Participants know the distribution but not the exact value of ξij when making
the team formation decisions.
The collection of performances of all teams under team structure M is YM . The expected
monetary and non-monetary rewards of team ⟨i, j⟩, as equation (1.1) shows, depend on the
(
)
rank of Y⟨i,j⟩ in YM , i.e., Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM ). Let P r Aj = a|Rj , Ri , R; γ M , τ be the probability
that the true ability of target participant j, whose signal is Rj , conditional on the focal
participants signal is Ri , the collection of signals of all participants in the competition denoted
by R, and sharing rule γ M and transfer τ . This conditional probability also represents the
updated belief of participant i over js ability, which diﬀers from the prior belief of js ability,
denoted by P r (Aj = a|Rj ), that depends only on Rj . We will specify such conditional
probability or updated belief in the next sub-section.
Assume that the top P th teams in the competition will receive monetary prizes, denoted
by P rizep for the pth place. Given γ M and τ , the expected monetary reward for the focal
participant can be specified as
P
[
(
)
] ∑
[
(
)]
E Money Z⟨i,j ⟩ (YM ) |Ai , Ri , Rj , R; γ M , τ =
Prize p × Pr Z(ij ) (YM ) = p

=

P
∑
p=1

p=1

[
Prize p ×

∑

(
)
(
)
Pr Aj = a|Rj , Ri , R; γ M , τ × Pr Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM |Ai , a, M) = p

] (1.5)

a∈A

10

The benefits and costs of collaborations cannot be separately identified from our data, as such λaa′
captures the net benefit in a reduced-form way.
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In the above equation, the probability on the right side in the first line denotes the probability
that the rank of team ⟨i, j⟩ is at the pth place. This probability is the sum of the conditional
probability that Aj is equal to a specific level a multiplied by the probability that, given Ai
and a as the true abilities of the two team members and team structure M, the rank of the
team is at the pth place. This is expressed mathematically in the second line of the equation.
Similarly, the expected non-monetary reward (i.e., Kaggle points) for team ⟨i, j⟩ can be
specified as
M
[
(
)
] ∑
[
(
)]
M
E Point Z⟨i,j ⟩ (YM ) |Ai , Ri , Rj , R; γ , τ =
Point p × Pr Z⟨i,j ⟩ (YM ) = p

=

M
∑
p=1

p=1

[
Point p ×

∑

(

)

(

Pr Aj = a|Rj , Ri , R; γ M , τ × Pr Z⟨i,j ⟩ (YM |Ai , a, M) = p

)

] (1.6)

a∈A

Note that the first summation on the right side of the equation is up to M , the total number
of teams. This is because under Kaggles policy every team will receive certain number of
points.
The challenge of evaluating the expected monetary and non-monetary rewards is to compute
(
)
the probability of the order, Pr Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM |Ai , a, M) = p in equations (1.5) and (1.6). The
computation is complicated because it involves a rank order distribution. We use the asymptotic normality of the order statistic distribution to approximate the distribution of the performance of the pth -place team. The asymptotic distribution mimics the actual probability
very well when the number of participants is large in the competition. Using this distribution
(
)
function, we then use numerical method to compute Pr Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM |Ai , a, M) = p . Details
are in Appendix 1.9.1.11
11

In other empirical settings the payoﬀs for individual or firm collaborations may depend on the performance instead of the ranking. This will make the computation of the payoﬀs much easier without relying on
order statistics as in rank-order tournaments. For example, when firms compete for market share, the payoﬀ
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1.4.3

Updated Beliefs and the Market-Clearing Condition

Given signal Rj for participant js ability, participant is prior belief regarding js ability is
P r (Aj = a|Rj ). Suppose j agrees to collaborate with i and let her take γ M share of the
monetary reward and transfer τ . We assume that i will update her belief with this new
information, using the Bayes rule as the following:
(
)
M
Pr
a,
R
,
R
,
R|1
−
γ
,
−τ
× Pr (Aj = a|Rj )
M
j
i
Pr Aj = a|Rj , Ri , R; 1 − γ M , −τ = ∑
′
M
′
a ′ ∈A Pr M (a , Rj , Ri , R|1 − γ , −τ ) × Pr (Aj = a |Rj )
(1.7)
(
)
where PrM a, Rj , Ri , R|1 − γ M , −τ is js choice probability given that her true ability is a,
(

)

as defined in equation (1.3). Note that, since γ M and τ are what i takes from the team, j
will receive 1 − γ M share of the monetary reward and −τ as transfer. Also, equation (1.7)
implies rational expectation in the updated belief because the belief is based on js optimal
choice.
Until now the probability of i choosing a teammate with signal Rj and the resulted expected
monetary and non-monetary rewards are all conditional on a specific sharing rule γ M and
transfer τ (and 1 − γ M and −τ for j). Researchers do not observe γ M and τ . When the
market is at equilibrium, the number of participants with signal r ∈ R who wants to match
with participants with signal r′ ∈ R is equal to the other way round. γ M and τ have to
satisfy this market-clearing condition. As γ M and τ cannot be separately identified, we
normalize γ M to be 1/2, and focus on solving for the market-clearing τ . This normalization
does not aﬀect the results because, assuming that the true sharing rule is γ
eM =
̸ 1/2 and
)
( M
e − 1/2
the true transfer is τe. One can simply set γ M = 1/2, and re-specify τ as τe plus γ
multiplied by the expected monetary reward. The choice probability will remain unchanged.
can be approximated by a multinomial logit market share function which is a function of the performances
of the focal collaboration and other collaborations. In such case the payoﬀ can be evaluated in an analytical
way.
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With the normalization, let P rM (r, r′ |R, τ ) be the probability that a participant with signal
r chooses to collaborate with another participant with signal r′ , conditional on the collection
of all participants signals R and transfer τ . The probability can be derived as
Pr M (r , r ′ |R, τ ) =

∑

)
(
Pr M a, r , r ′ , R|γ M = 1/2, τ × Pr (A = a|r )

(1.8)

a∈A

where P rM (a, r, r′ , R|γ M = 12, τ ) is defined in equation (1.3). The market-clearing condition
states that the transfer from the participant with signal r′ to the participant with signal r,
represented by τ (r, r′ ), has to satisfy the following equality:
Pr M (r , r ′ |R, τ (r , r ′ )) × Pr R (r ) = Pr M (r ′ , r |R, −τ (r , r ′ )) × Pr R (r ′ )

(1.9)

where P rR (r) and P rR (r′ ) represent the proportions of participants with signals r and r,
respectively.
Substitute equation (1.8) into (1.9), and further plug equation (1.3) into the equation, then
apply logarithmic transformation and move terms, we can derive that
)
(
∑ exp(V (a, r′ , r, R; γ M = 1/2, τ (r, r′ )) + τ (r, r′ )/µ)
µ
′
′
∑
× P r(A = a|r )
τ (r, r ) = · [ln P rR (r ) + ln
′
M = 1/2, −τ (r, r̃))/µ)
2
r̃∈(R∪∅) exp(V (a, r , r̃, R; γ
a
(
)
∑ exp(V (a, r, r′ , R; γ M = 1/2, τ (r, r′ )) − τ (r, r′ )/µ)
∑
− ln P rR (r) − ln
× P r(A = a|r) ]
M = 1/2, τ (r, r̃))/µ)
r̃∈(R∪∅) exp(V (a, r, r̃, R; γ
a
′

(1.10)

This expression helps us to prove the existence of the market equilibrium, which is in the
next sub-section.
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1.4.4

Market Equilibrium

{
}
The matching game in our model is characterized by the preference parameters θiM , θiP , α (Ri , Rj )
for every participant (see equations (1.1) and (1.2)), the monetary and non-monetary rewards
{P rizep , P ointp } for every rank (see equations (1.5) and (1.6)), and how the non-monetary
rewards are split, i.e.,γ P in equation (1.1). The market is at equilibrium when the marketclearing condition in equation (1.9) is satisfied for every (r, r′ ) pair. In addition, the probability that a participant with ability and signal (Ai , Ri ) matches with another with signal r
has to be the participants optimal choice. That is, equation (1.3) has to be satisfied when
γ M = 1/2 and τ = τ (r, r′ ). The market equilibrium is represented by the choice probability
P rM and transfer τ .
∗
Let P rM
be a AR (R + 1)×1 vector that represents the collection of the choice probabilities

of all ability and signal types (including single-member team choice), and τ ∗ be a (R2 + 1)×1
vector that represents the collection of transfers from one to another signal type within a
team (the transfer in single-member team is fixed to zero). We can combine equations (1.3)
and (1.10) into a system of equations H : (P rM , τ ) → (P rM , τ ):


 P rM = h 1 (P rM , τ ),
 τ = h (P r , τ ),

2

(1.11)

M

∗
Market equilibrium (P rM
, τ ∗ ) is the solutions of the equation system H.

Proposition 1. For each competition characterized by

}
{ M P
θi , θi , α (Ri , Rj ) for every par-

ticipant, {P rizep , P ointp } for every rank, and γ P for every competition, market equilibrium
defined as the solution of the equation system H in equation (1.11) exists.
The proof is in Appendix 1.9.2.
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1.5

Model Estimation

When estimating the model using data from Kaggle, we discretize ability into three types,
i.e., A = {Low, M edium, High}. We use the tier status to proxy the noisy signal. That is,
R = {N ovice, Contributor, Expert, M aster}. Although other signals, such as a participants
accumulated Kaggle points, are available, they are highly correlated with the tier status.
The tier is also the most highlighted part when checking a participants profile. Therefore, it
should be the most important signal for a participants ability.
For model parameters, we normalize the marginal utility of the monetary reward θiM to 1,
and allow the marginal utility of the non-monetary reward θiP to diﬀerentiate based on the
P
P
P
P
participants tier status. That is, θP = {θN
ovice , θContributor , θExpert , θM aster }. Such heterogene-

ity captures the fact that a participants need for Kaggle points may diﬀer at diﬀerent tiers.
We also allow θP to change before and after Kaggle adjusted its point allocation system. It
reflects the fact that we find from data the points a participant can earn from a competition
are significantly diﬀerent after the policy change.
We allow α(Ri , Rj ) in equation (1.1) to diﬀer across each unique combination of (Ri , Rj ), but
assume that α(Ri , Rj ) = α(Rj , Ri ). Consequently, there are 10 αs to be estimated (as αs
for single-member teams are normalized to zero). Since we do not observe the actual ability,
the probability P r(Ai = a|Ri ) in equation (1.7) is estimated from data. This probability is
specific for every unique combination of ability and tier; therefore, the number of probabilities
is 4 × 3 − 4 = 8. As a reduced-form way of capturing how competitions with various prize
levels may attract diﬀerent pools of talents to participate, we also allow the probabilities to
be diﬀerent for competitions with small and large monetary rewards.
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For the team output function in equation (1.4), we estimate the λ for each unique combination
of (ai , aj ), as well as the λ for single-member teams of each ability level. Therefore, there
are 9 λs to be estimated. Finally, we also estimate the variance δξ2 and the scale parameter
µ in equation (1.3).

1.5.1

Maximum Likelihood under Equilibrium Constraints

The outcomes of the matching game we observe from data include team structure M as well
as the performance Y⟨i,j⟩ of every team. Given a transfer τ from i to j, the probability of
team formation ⟨i, j⟩ is
L(⟨i, j⟩|Ri , Rj , R, τ ) = P rM (Ri , Rj |R, τ ) × P rM (Rj , Ri |R, −τ )
∑
=(
P rM (a, Ri , Rj , R|γ M = 1/2, τ ) × P r(Ai = a|Ri ))×
a∈A

(

∑

(1.12)

P rM (a′ , Rj , Ri , R|γ M = 1/2, −τ ) × P r(Aj = a′ |Rj ))

a′ ∈A

The equation indicates that the team will only be formed if it is optimal for both participants.12
Let ϕ(y, λ(a, a′ ), δξ2 ) be the (normal) pdf of the performance of the team when the abilities
of the participants members are a and a′ , defined in equation (1.4). The likelihood that the
team performance is Y⟨i,j⟩ is
L(Y⟨i,j⟩ |Ri , Rj , R, τ ) =

∑∑

P rM (a, Ri , Rj , R|γ M = 1/2, τ )·

a∈A a′ ∈A

P rM (a′ , Rj , Ri , R|γ M = 1/2, −τ ) · ϕ(Y⟨i,j⟩ , λ(a, a′ ), δξ2 )
12

For a single team ⟨i, ∅⟩, the second component on the right side is fixed to 1.
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(1.13)

The likelihood function we use in model estimation is the sum of the log likelihood of the
observed teams and their performance in every competition in data. That is,

l(Θ) =

∑ ∑
g

[l(⟨i, j⟩|Ri , Rj , R, τ ) + l(Y⟨i,j⟩ |Ri , Rj , R, τ )]

(1.14)

⟨i,j⟩∈Mg

where Θ denotes the set of model parameters, subscript g a competition and Mg the collection of all teams in the competition. In addition, l(⟨i, j⟩|Ri , Rj , R, τ ) and Y⟨i,j⟩ |Ri , Rj , R, τ )
are the log functions of the likelihoods in equations (1.12) and (1.13), respectively.
The challenges of evaluating equation (1.14) are two-fold. First, τ is unobserved to researchers; it has to be recovered from the market-clearing condition. Second, the matching
probability P rM in equations (1.12) and (1.13) comes from equation (1.3). Because of competition, the payoﬀ function of forming teams depends on how other teams in the competition
are formed. This means that the matching probability is a function of the matching probabilities of other teams in the competition, as the first line oﬀunction h1 in equation (1.11)
suggests. Because of these two issues, the likelihood function cannot be evaluated analytically.
We propose a two-level estimation procedure to tackle this problem. In the inner level,
conditional on trial parameters Θ we search for the matching probabilities and transfers
∗
∗
∗
∗
(P rM
, τ ∗ ) for every competition such that P rM
= h 1 (P rM
, τ ∗ ) and τ ∗ = h 2 (P rM
, τ ∗ ).
∗
That is, we find (P rM
, τ ∗ ) that satisfy the equilibrium constraints. In the outer level,

we search for Θ that maximizes the likelihood function in equation (1.14). The detailed
algorithm is the following:

1. Start with initial value Θ0 . For any trial parameters Θ,
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0
(a) Assume initial value H(P rM
, τ 0 ) . Calculate the expected payoﬀs, using numer-

ical methods;
0
′
, τ 0)
(b) Calculate (P rM
, τ ′ ) = H(P rM
′
0
(c) Replace H(P rM
, τ 0 ) by (P rM
, τ ′ ). Repeat the above procedure until (P rM , τ )

converge. They represent the market equilibrium under model parameters Θ0
2. Calculate the likelihood function value in equation (1.14) under parameters Θ. Search
for Θ such that the likelihood function is maximized.

∗
Note that Proposition 1 proves the existence but not the uniqueness of (P rM
, τ ∗ ). The

potential multiple equilibria are a concern when we estimate the model and conduct counterfactuals. During the estimation, we test whether this is an issue by varying the starting value
0
∗
(P rM
, τ 0 ) in the inner level. We find that they always converge to the same (P rM
, τ ∗ ),

suggesting that the equilibrium is unique in our empirical application.

1.5.2

Identification

The identification of the unobserved team ability distribution (λ, δξ2 ), and the public tier to
private ability conditional distribution P r(A|R), comes from how team score changes under
diﬀerent combinations of Ri and Rj , as equation (1.13) suggests. In the likelihood function,
L(Y⟨i,j⟩ ) can be treated as a latent class regression, with P r(A|R) represents the size of latent
classes.
The proportions of teams collaborated by diﬀerent types of public tiers identify the net
benefits of team formation, α. Conditional on the expected Y⟨i,j⟩ and thus the monetary
and non-monetary rewards, the larger the proportion of teams formed by tiers ⟨Ri , Rj ⟩
indicates the larger the value of α⟨Ri , Rj ⟩, relative to α⟨Ri , ∅⟩ that is normalized to zero.
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The identification of preferences for Kaggle points, θP , comes from the proportions of teams
formed across types of tiers and across competitions. If, for example, collaborations increase
the points expected to win more than competing solo, a large number of collaborations across
competitions will indicate a high θP . After the policy change, the share of Kaggle points a
participant can obtain from forming teams increases, relative to competing solo. Therefore,
participants with higher θP will be more likely to form teams. This policy change also helps
the identification of the parameter.
Finally, conditional on monetary prizes and Kaggle points, the variation in the proportions of
teams formed by diﬀerent types of participant tiers identifies the scale parameter µ. Suppose,
for example, as the monetary prize increases across competitions, the proportions only vary
slightly. Since the marginal utility of the monetary prize is normalized to one, the lack of
variation will imply a high value of µ.
∗
At the inner level of the model identification, we also treat the equilibrium (P rM
, τ ∗)

as model parameters. The identification of these parameters comes from the equilibrium
constraints, represented by equations (1.3) and (1.10).

1.6

Result

In this section, we first report the estimation results. Based on the results, we then use
counterfactuals to explore how Kaggle can increase the value for both sponsoring businesses
and individual participants on both sides, through providing better information about participants ability and manipulating the competitive pressure through the point allocation
policy.
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1.6.1

Estimation Results

Estimated marginal utilities for Kaggle points (θP ) are reported in Table 1.5. As the marginal
utility for the monetary prize is normalized to one, the estimates in the table represent how
much a participant is willing to pay for one Kaggle point. Because of the change in the
point allocation policy we described in Section 1.3, the value of Kaggle points may adjust
correspondingly; therefore, we estimate the marginal utilities before and after the policy
change separately.

Table 1.5: Parameter Estimates of Preferences for Kaggle Points
Public Tier

Parameter

Novice Contributor
θP : before policy change 0.36 (0.11)
θP : after policy change
2.02 (0.04)

Expert

Master

1.53 (0.18) 0.82 (0.05)
8.11 (0.06) 4.98 (0.26)

0.41 (0.12)
3.77(0.02)

Note: Numbers represent the point estimates; numbers in parentheses are the
standard errors of the point estimates.

There is an inverted-U shaped relationship between the marginal utility for points and tiers.
The marginal utility increases as participants progress from Novice to Contributor, then
decreases as they further progress to Expert and Master. The result is probably due to the
way Kaggle determines tier status. Novices are new entrants to the platform who have not
participated in any competitions. In data, more than 80% of Novices only participated in one
competition. Their marginal utility for points thus may be low. The rest 20% progress to the
Contributor tier when they participate again. They are those who self-select to continue to
compete; therefore, they may have a much higher marginal utility for points. The decreasing
marginal utility for points from Contributor to Master probably reflects that the value of
gaining additional points is lower, as participants have accumulated more points. Still, the
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marginal utilities of Experts and Masters are significantly positive. Another interesting
result is that marginal utilities for Kaggle points increase after the policy change. One of the
possible reasons is that, as more and more participants are attracted to join competitions
in later periods, it has become more diﬃcult to win Kaggle points The result also explains
why collaborations have dropped after the policy change as Kaggle points are valued more,
participants are more reluctant to form teams lest they have to split points with the others.
The results suggest that Kaggle points are very valuable for participants. Use the estimates
multiplied by the average number of points a participant wins in competitions, the average
value of Kaggle points earned in each competition is $7,600 before and $4,900 after the policy
change. As a benchmark, the expected monetary reward for an average participant is just
$39. The comparison suggests that for most participants the non-monetary payoﬀ dominates
the monetary payoﬀ.
Table 1.6 reports the estimated net benefits, on the top of gaining more Kaggle points and the
monetary reward, from forming teams (i.e., α(R, R′ )) All of the estimates are significantly
positive, implying that the benefits of forming teams dominate the costs. These benefits
are also higher than the expected monetary reward for an average participant, suggesting
that, in addition to Kaggle points, the non-monetary benefits from peer collaboration are
important. Furthermore, the net benefits from teaming with individuals with high tiers are
higher than that with low tiers. For example, the benefits for an Expert from working with
a Master are $407, about twice as high as working with a Novice ($183). Such a high value
may come from the benefit of learning from high ability peers.
Table 1.7 reports the estimated conditional probability of belonging to an ability level given
a participants tier status (i.e., P r(A|R)). Since competitions that oﬀer higher prizes may
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Table 1.6: Parameter Estimates of Preferences in Collaborations
Team Structure
Novice
Contributor
Expert
Master

Novice Contributor
Expert
Master
151 (0.27)
162 (0.03) 183 (0.31) 220 (0.16)
276 (0.05) 289 (0.05) 310 (0.04)
378 (0.32) 407 (0.04)
552 (0.17)

Note: Numbers represent the point estimates; numbers in parentheses
are the standard errors of the point estimates.
attract more talented individuals, we group the competitions in our data into low- and highprize type, using the average prize amount across competitions as the criterion. There are
77 low-prize and 25 high-prize competitions, with the average prize amount about $9,000
and $76,000, respectively. A low-prize competition attracts about 400 participants and a
high-prize one attracts about 1,200 participants. We estimate the conditional probabilities
for these two types of competitions separately. Results show that Kaggles tier system is in
general consistent with participants true ability. For example, the proportion of individuals
with high ability increases from 33-38% for Novices to 90-94% for Masters. However, the
variation in abilities within each tier is very substantial, implying that tiers are a noisy signal.
This is especially true for Novices, as the proportions of individuals with low and high ability
are both large. Finally, we calculate the unconditional probabilities of each ability type by
summing up the products of the conditional probability and the size of each tier, across all
tiers. They are reported in the rows of Total. In comparison with small-prize competitions,
the proportion of individuals with high ability is larger in high-prize competitions while that
with low and medium ability is smaller, suggesting that high monetary rewards are able to
attract more talents.
Table 1.8 reports the estimated productivity, which is also the average performance (i.e.,
λ(a, a′ )), of each team combination. Estimates in the last column of the table are the
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Table 1.7: Parameter Estimates for Conditional Probability
Private Type

Public Type

Low Ability Medium Ability High Ability
Small Reward Games
Novice
Contributor
Expert
Master
Total

0.41
0.18
0.09
0.03

(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.14)
(0.18)
0.28

0.26
0.47
0.20
0.07

(0.09)
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.16)
0.26

0.33
0.35
0.71
0.90
0.44

Large Reward Games
Novice
Contributor
Expert
Master
Total

0.37
0.24
0.06
0.03

(0.09)
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.21)
0.27

0.25
0.28
0.12
0.03

(0.11)
(0.07)
(0.14)
(0.11)
0.22

0.38
0.48
0.82
0.94
0.51

Note: Numbers represent the point estimates; numbers in parentheses
are the standard errors of the point estimates; numbers in rows of
“Total” represent unconditional probability of each ability type.
productivity of single-member teams, which can be used as the benchmark against the performance from collaborations. There is a strong increasing productivity from low to high
ability single-member teams. Comparing the left columns with the last column, collaborations clearly help improve the team productivity. For example, the predicted performance of
a low-low (high-high) combination is 0.52 (2.12), much higher than that when a low-ability
(high-ability) participant works alone. However, there is a danger for high-ability participants: if they work alone, the predicted performance is 1.82, higher than that if they team
up with medium- or low-ability individuals. This diﬀerence is probably due to the division of
job tasks, as such poor work from a low-ability member can have a substantial impact on the
whole performance of the team. These results imply that the lack of information regarding
the true ability of other participants can become a hurdle for high-ability individuals to form
teams. Therefore, reducing the noise in tier signals may help improve the eﬀectiveness of
collaborations, a result we will show in the counterfactuals.
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Table 1.8: Parameter Estimates for Team Abilities
Team Structure Low Ability Medium Ability High Ability
Low Ability
0.52 (0.02)
0.78 (0.02)
1.62 (0.09)
Medium Ability
0.89 (0.12)
1.77 (0.35)
High Ability
2.12 (0.39)
2
σξ
0.53(0.16)
µ
1313(21.7)

Single
-2.21 (0.34)
-1.07 (0.14)
1.82 (0.17)

Note: Numbers represent the point estimates; numbers in parentheses are the
standard errors of the point estimates.
2
Finally, the estimated variance of the team productivity (δxi
) is 0.53, and the scale parameter

in participants utility function (µ) is 1,313. Both are quite large when comparing with the
predicted team performance and average utility level respectively.
From estimation results, we could recover the transfers τ within each competition. The
average transfer τ from one to another tier across competitions between diﬀerent tiers is
reported in Table 1.9. Lower tiers have to pay a positive transfer to higher tiers when
forming teams, and the magnitude increases as the diﬀerence in tiers increases. For instance,
to form team with a Master, an Expert on average needs to pay $1,449, while a Novice
needs to pay $4,231. This is because a high-ability teammate will greatly improve the team
performance, and other teammates will be benefited from the increased monetary reward
and more importantly the non-monetary rewards. Note that the transfers are much higher
than the average expected monetary rewards in competitions ($39), as the non-monetary
payoﬀs are much bigger than the monetary rewards.
Our model also allows us to recover the choice probability of participants given the transfer in
equilibrium. We find that participants of diﬀerent abilities have diﬀerent choice probabilities
even if they belong to the same tier. For instance, the probability of low ability Novices
teaming with another Novice is 42%, with a Master is 1%, and staying single is 43%. The
probabilities for a high-ability Novice are 6%, 4% and 88%, respectively. A high-ability
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Table 1.9: Average Transfer Between Participants
To Teammate
Paid by
Novice
Contributor
Expert
Master

Novice

Contributor

Expert

Master

0

2701
0

3477
1088
0

4231
3046
1449
0

Note: Transfer for participants with the same tier is 0. Negative values in the upper triangle mean
that participants of lower tier will pay positive transfer to participants in higher tier.

Novice is more likely to stay single, because the loss from splitting points with the other
teammate is large. However, if she can team up with another high-ability teammate, her
team can have a high chance to achieve a top rank and thus win both monetary and nonmonetary rewards. Therefore, she is more likely to collaborate with a Master.
Finally, Table 1.10 reports the model fit in terms of the average percentage of team types
observed in data and that predicted by our model. Overall, the predicted team formations are
highly consistent with the data pattern. The only collaboration that the model significantly
under-predicts is Masters teaming with Masters. Table 1.11 compares the average score
across each type of teams in data and that predicted in our model. The numbers are again
quite close with each other. The model is able to replicate how, for example, by collaborating
with a teammate of the same or diﬀerent tier, a Master is able to obtain an average score
higher than competing alone. Overall, our model is able to predict very well team formations
and performances as observed in the data.
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Table 1.10: Model Fit: Collaboration Probabilities
Team
Tier/Choice
Novice
Contributor
Expert
Master

Single
40.2%
(41.6%)
17.2%
(14.7%)
10.6% (9.5%)
7.4% (7.6%)

Novice

Contributor

Expert

Master

15.8%
(15.7%)

2.4% (3.0%)

1.1% (1.4%)

1.3% (1.4%)

1.0% (0.9%)

0.4% (0.4%)

0.2% (1.4%)

0.1% (0.7%)

0.1% (0.7%)
2.2% (1.0%)

Note: Numbers represent percentage of team type in data; Numbers in parenthesis represent predicted percentage of team type from estimation.

Table 1.11: Model Fit: Team Scores
Team
Tier/Choice
Novice
Contributor
Expert
Master

Single
0.64
0.61
0.82
1.03

(0.68)
(0.68)
(0.82)
(1.11)

Novice

Contributor

Expert

0.77 (0.80)

0.76 (0.79)
0.83 (0.81)

0.95 (0.87)
0.95 (0.89)
1.13 (1.01)

Master
1.32
1.07
1.19
1.43

(1.21)
(1.16)
(1.31)
(1.44)

Note: Numbers represent average performance for team types in data; Numbers in parenthesis
represent predicted average performance from estimation.
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1.7

Counterfactuals

As a platform, the profit of Kaggle relies on the participation of sponsoring businesses on
one side and individual talents on the other side. Kaggle has to provide suﬃcient value
to attract both parties. For individual participants, the value of joining competitions is
captured by the utility function. For sponsoring businesses, they look for the best solution
provided by participants for their business problems. The maximum performance of all
teams in a competition would be a good proxy for such value. In this sub-section, we conduct
counterfactuals using the estimation results to explore how Kaggle can improve the value it
oﬀers to both parties. We focus on two type of policies that Kaggle can implement. First,
Kaggle can change the informativeness of the tier system. Second, Kaggle can manipulate the
competitive pressure by adjusting the point allocation policy. As we have discussed above,
the lack of information can negatively impact the willingness of high-ability individuals to
form teams, and that Kaggle points are of great value to participants, the counterfactual
policies we explore should have substantial impacts on Kaggles business.
We use four measures to quantify the impacts: the average and maximum utility of all
participants, and the average and maximum performance of all teams, in a competition.
The first two measures center around the welfare of participants, while the latter two are
directly linked to the value for sponsoring businesses.

1.7.1

Informativeness of the Tier System

The first counterfactual studies the impacts of changing the informativeness of the tier system. In current practice, Kaggle assigns tiers based on the cumulative Kaggle points a
participant has won in past competitions. This is a noisy signal, as Table 2 shows, since
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individuals who have participated in more competitions are more likely to be assigned a
high tier. Furthermore, past performances may not indicate how good an individual will
be if the current competition requires a diﬀerent skill set. Considering one counterfactual
scenario that Kaggle only uses the number of past competitions an individual has participated to determine the tier. The tier will be less informative about an individuals true
ability than the current practice. In another scenario, suppose Kaggle uses a more sophisticated method to predict the individuals performance for each competition. For example,
Kaggle may assign more weights for past competitions that have similar tasks as the current
competition. It can also incorporate an individuals current job, college majors, and other
relevant attributes as predictors. Doing so the tier status of the individual may vary from
one competition to another, and it will be a more informative signal about the individuals
ability in a competition.
In the counterfactual, we assume the distributions of participants in terms of the true ability
are 1/2, 1/3, 1/6 for Low, Medium and High types, respectively. We also fix the distributions
of tiers as 1/3, 1/4, 13/60 and 1/5, for Novices, Contributors, Experts and Masters, respectively. We assume the total number of participants is 1500 and the total money reward is
$10,000, and Kaggles point allocation policy is before the change. We explore three counterfactual scenarios: no information (e.g., the practice that assigns tier based on the number of
competitions an individual has participated), low information (e.g., assigning tier based on
the cumulative Kaggle points an individual has earned) and high information (e.g., assigning
tier based on the sophisticated method discussed above). The information structure of each
scenario is specified in Table 1.12.
For the no-information scenario, the probability of belonging to an ability type is the same
across tiers. For the low-information scenario, the probability of belonging to the low-ability
type is much higher for Novices and Contributors, while the probability of belonging to the
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Table 1.12: Diﬀerent Information Scenarios (P r(A|R))
Public Type
Novice
Contributor
Expert
Master

No Information

Low Information

High Information

Low Medium

High

Low Medium

High

Low Medium

High

0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50

0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17

0.67
0.58
0.45
0.17

0.08
0.08
0.01
0.58

0.83
0.67
0.18
0.08

0.04
0.04
0.04
0.67

0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33

0.25
0.34
0.54
0.25

0.13
0.29
0.78
0.25

high-ability type is much higher for Masters. Still, there is a high chance that individuals in
each tier belong to the other ability types. For the last high-information scenario, Novices and
Contributors predominantly belong to low ability, Experts to medium ability, and Masters
to high ability. Therefore, the tier status is a more informative signal.
Table 1.13 reports the results from the three scenarios. The first two rows show the percentage of multi-member teams and the percentage of teams that are formed by high ability
members. The results suggest that providing better information on the true ability helps
facilitate collaborations and, more importantly, increase the chance that high ability participants form teams among themselves. For the participant welfare, the average utility of
participants of all types increase from $1,341 under the no-information scenario to $1,511
under the high-information scenario, a 12.7% improvement. The maximum utility among all
participants (who comes from a high ability individual) has improved even more by 21.4%.
For team performance, the maximum performance among all teams (who comes from a team
with two high ability participants) has increased from 3.38 under the no-information scenario
to 3.46 under the high-information scenario, a 2.4% improvement. Although this increase
seems small, it comes from the best performance team among a large number of participants.
Improvement in such a measure is more diﬃcult to obtain. This performance improvement
can bring a high value to the sponsoring business. For example, a small increase in the accuracy of demand prediction can help a firm cut down inventory costs and avoid stock-outs
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and thus significantly improve its profit. Finally, the average team performance has a much
more significant increase by 20.4%.

Table 1.13: Market Outcomes Under Diﬀerent Information Structure
Scenario

No Information

Low Information

High Information

59%
6%
1341
31350
0.49
3.38

65%
10%
1492
35921
0.56
3.44

66%
12%
1511
38087
0.59
3.46

Percentage of Multi-Member Teams
Percentage of High-High Collaborations
Mean Utility
Max Utility
Mean Performance
Max Performance

Overall, the results suggest that improving the informativeness of the tier status can bring
significant value for both sponsoring businesses and participants. This creates a win-win
situation for both sides, which is the key for the success of Kaggles business.

1.7.2

Point Allocation

Our second counterfactual studies how the competition for the non-monetary reward, i.e.,
Kaggle points, aﬀects the participant welfare and team performances. We vary the extent
of competition by adjusting the slope of the point allocation policy. A flat slope means
points are allocated more evenly across teams, while a steep slope puts more weight on
the performance ranking. We use the average points diﬀerence between two neighboring
performance ranks as the measure of the slope, which is equivalent to the average absolute
value of the gradient across the integer ranks. Under the current policy, the slope is 204.
We create a flat slope scenario by setting the slope at 22, and another steep slope scenario
with the slope at 470. We also include the scenario of equal allocation of points across all
rankings, in which the slope will be completely flat and both measures of curvature will be
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0. To make sure that the results only come from the change in the slope of the allocation
function, we fix the total points awarded to all teams in the three scenarios to 7 million.
Figure 1.1 shows the point allocation slope of the 4 scenarios.

Figure 1.1: Point Allocation Slopes

The competitive pressure is higher in the scenarios with a steeper slope. This is because the
allocation concentrates on a few high-ranked teams at the expense of teams at lower ranks.
In Panel (A) of Figure 1.1, stepper slopes have higher concentration of points for top ranks,
while in Panel (B), stepper slopes have less points allocated to lower ranks. When points
are equally allocated, there will be no competition (except for the monetary reward). Since
the curvature of the point allocation slopes represents the extent of competitive pressure
for points, we denote the 4 scenarios by competitiveness for points, i.e., the completely flat
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slope as no competition, the flatter slope as mild competition, the original slope as original
competition, and the steep slope as acute competition.
Finally, to compare the counterfactuals in Section 1.7.1, we also consider the three information scenarios.
Table 1.14 reports the results of the four scenarios. The benchmark scenario is no competition. When the competitive pressure rises, the probability of collaboration among highability participants will increase, as shown in the first two rows in each panel. With no
information, for example, the percentage of multi-member teams has increased from 1% in
the no competition scenario to 68%. These are big increases, suggesting that competition
significantly aﬀects the incentive of collaboration. When compared with the results under
the original competition scenario, as reported in Table 1.13, the increase in collaborations
between high-ability participants however is more moderate.
The last two rows in each panel in Table 1.14 report the mean and maximum performance in
each scenario. Both performance metrics are higher in the acute competition scenario. This
is because the competitive pressure for Kaggle points has increased the probability of collaborations, especially among high-ability participants. These results suggest the importance
of maintaining the competitive pressure through the point allocation for creating value for
sponsoring businesses. Compared with the original point allocation policy results that are
reported in Table 1.13, the last panel of Table 1.14 however suggests that further increase
the competitive pressure does not significantly impact the maximum team performance.
For individual participants, the average utility drops from $2,916-3,106 in the mild competition scenario to $929-1,055 in the acute competition scenario, more than a 60% decrease.
However, the expected maximum utility increases with competitive pressure, from $15,60416,816 in no competition scenario to $65,810-73,028 in acute competition scenario. The
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results indicate that increasing the competitive pressure will hurt an average participants
welfare but improve the top performers welfare. Therefore, such a policy change may negatively impact the incentive of participating in competitions for average participants; however,
it will boost the incentive for top participants.

Table 1.14: Performance Measures under Diﬀerent Point Allocation Policies
Point Allocation

No Competition

Mild Competition

Acute Competition

Information Structure

Measure
No Information

Low Information

High Information

Percentage of Multi-Member Teams
Percentage of High-High Collaborations
Mean Utility
Max Utility
Mean Performance
Max Performance

1.0%
0.6%
3106
16816
-1.21
3.26

4.6%
1.7%
2908
15968
-1.04
3.32

5.4%
2.4%
2916
15604
-1.03
3.34

Percentage of Multi-Member Teams
Percentage of High-High Collaborations
Mean Utility
Max Utility
Mean Performance
Max Performance

5.7%
2.1%
2751
33418
-0.88
3.28

8.6%
2.6%
2833
44855
-0.809
3.33

9.8%
2.9%
2861
48951
-0.763
3.35

Percentage of Multi-Member Teams
Percentage of High-High Collaborations
Mean Utility
Max Utility
Mean Performance
Max Performance

68%
6.8%
929
65810
0.61
3.39

75%
11.9%
1039
68819
0.70
3.44

76%
13.5%
1055
73029
0.71
3.46

To summarize the results from the two counterfactual exercises, we show how improving
the informativeness of the tier status helps create a win-win situation for both sponsoring
businesses and individual participants. Therefore, Kaggle should focus more on such improvement. Increasing the competitive pressure by manipulating the point allocation system
will boost collaboration among participants, and increase the best performance of all teams.
These will benefit sponsoring businesses. An average participants payoﬀ will decrease while
the top performers will increase. If the priority of the platform is to attract more participants,
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it should avoid excessive competition for points. If the priority is the participation of top
talents and sponsoring businesses, a more competitive point allocation system is preferred.

1.8

Conclusions

Collaboration is a common phenomenon within firms and across markets. Two main issues
that are important to the eﬃciency of collaborations have not been fully addressed in the
literature. First, potential participants in collaborations may not fully observe the ability
of others. When payoﬀs are tied with abilities, such uncertainty may impede the incentive
of collaboration. We develop a structural matching model that incorporates the incomplete
information of participants and use counterfactuals to show that, when the public signals
(i.e., tier status) for abilities are more informative, the incentive for collaboration and the
performance of collaboration will both increase. Second, individuals collaborate to compete
against other collaborations. Our model incorporates competition in the payoﬀ function.
Counterfactual results show that the competitive pressure in Kaggles competition will boost
collaboration and improve team performance.
This paper makes both methodological and substantive contributions. Methodologically, we
advance the literature by providing a general framework in modeling large scale one-to-one
matching game that involves numerous participants. By specifying the bilateral matching decision as individuals optimal decision, while imposing the rational expectation and
market clearing constraints, our model captures a complicated market environment where
incomplete information is prevalent, spillover from matching exists, and transfers between
collaborators are unobserved. Substantively, we use counterfactuals to show that increasing
the informativeness of signals for participants true ability and the competitive pressure in a
rank-order tournament will improve the incentive for collaborations, especially among high
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ability participants. This will benefit the team performance. More informative signal will
also increase the payoﬀ for participants. High competitive pressure, however, will benefit top
participants but harm the payoﬀ of general participants. Whether a crowdsourcing platform
such as Kaggle should use a steeper point allocation system thus depends on what is its
priority.
We have made a few simplifying assumptions to keep the model tractable. Future research
should relax these assumptions to further understand the underlying mechanism that drives
collaborations. First, we model collaborations as one-to-one matching. When the collaboration involves more participants, the problem will become more complicated. Recent research
that studies network formation (e.g., Ho and Lee 2017 and Ghili 2018) oﬀers an alternative
way to model such type of collaborations. It also models transfer or price through a Nashin-Nash bargaining framework. Second, our model treats entry of participants as exogenous.
Future research can study how the entry decision may aﬀect collaborations, if more granular data such as click streams are readily available. Last but not least, future research
should further investigate how important economic factors, such as the economy of scale,
complementarity of skills, and moral hazard, separately aﬀect the incentive and outcomes of
collaborations. Currently they are combined in a reduced-form way in our model.
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1.9

Appendix

1.9.1

Calculation of Team Performance Rank

We now derive the probability of team performance rank for a team P r(Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM |Ai , Aj )).The
rank of a team is determined by its own performance and the performances of the other teams.
Since the performance of a team is driven by the true ability of team members, we first need
to calculate team structure M in terms of teams’ true ability. We define a team type t
by the true ability of team members, t = ⟨a, a′ ⟩ for multi-member teams and t = ⟨a, ∅⟩
for single-member teams. Given A types of true ability for participant, we have a total of
T =

A(A+1)
2

+ 2A unique team types.

Given M, we could calculate the percentage of team type P rT (t) with the following equation.

P rT (t) =

∑∑
r∈R

P rR (r) · P rR (r′ ) · P r(a|r, r′ ) · P r(a′ |r′ , r).

(1.15)

r′ ∈R

where t = ⟨a, a′ ⟩, P rR (r) and P rR (r′ ) represent the proportion of participants with signal r
and r′ , P r(a|r, r′ ) represents the updated probability of a participant’s true ability a conditional on her own signal r and her choice of teammate of signal r′ , as defined in equation (1.7)
in section 1.4.3. The team structure M could then be characterized by the propotions of
team type P rT (t) for all t ∈ T .
In section 1.4.2, we assume the performance of a team with type t = ⟨a, a′ ⟩, Y (t) follows
normal distribution N (λt , σξ2 ). The performance of one team Y ∈ YM follows a mixture
normal distribution, with each of the underlying component to be distributed as N (λt , σξ2 )and
the probability of each component to be P rT (t). Based on the property of mixed normal
distribution, the cumulative distribution function of team performance Y under M is defined
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as
FY (y) =

∑

P rT (t)Φ(y, λt , σξ2 ).

(1.16)

t∈T

and the probability density function of Y is defined as

fY (y) =

∑

P rT (t)ϕ(y, λt , σξ2 )

(1.17)

t∈T

We use Y(p) to represent the pth order statistics of Y and P rT (p, t|Y(p) = y) to represent the
probability that pth order statistic is from a particular team type t conditional on the pth
order statistics of Y equals y, the value of P rT (p, t|Y(p) = y) could be derive using Bayesian
Rule
P rT (p, t|Y(p)

ϕ(y|λt , σξ2 )P rT (t)
2
′
t′ ∈T ϕ(y|λt′ , σξ )P rT (t )

= y) = ∑

(1.18)

Then we integrate P rT (p, t|Y(p) = y) over the distribution of order statistics Y(p) and get the
unconditional probability that pth order statistic is from a particular team type t, P rT (p, t)
as

∫
P rT (p, t) =

P rT (p, t|Y(p) = y)fY(p) (y)dy

(1.19)

Finally, the probability that a specific team ⟨i, j⟩ with type t = ⟨Ai , Aj ⟩ ranks the pth ,
P r(Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM |Ai , Aj ) = p) is equal to the probability that pth order statistic is from team
type t divided by the number of teams with the same team type t, which is the total number
of teams M times the propotion of team type t, i.e.,

P r(Z⟨i,j⟩ (YM |Ai , Aj ) = p) =
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P rT (p, t = ⟨Ai , Aj ⟩)
M × P rT (t = ⟨Ai , Aj ⟩)

(1.20)

The challenge to calculate the this probability comes from the complicated form of the
exact distribution of the order statistics Y(p) for mixture normal distribution. We utilize the
property of the asymptotic distribution of the order statistic function for mixture normal
distribution to help alleviate the computational burden. Specifically,

Y(p)

where

p
M

(
)
p
(1 − Mp )
−1 p
M
∼ N FY ( ),
.
M M [fY (FY−1 ( Mp ))]2

(1.21)

is the specific quantile that defines the pth order, F and f are culmulative distri-

bution and density function of Y defined in equations (1.16) and (1.17). We could simulate
values from the this asymptotic distribution and compute the numerical integration of equation (1.19).
Specifically, the procedure of the expected probability calculation is outlined as follows:

1. Simulate S1 random numbers ν1 from the stand normal distribution, and simulate S2
random numbers ν2 from the standard normal distribution.
2. Given the model parameters λ, σξ , compute the proportion of team types P rT (t) in
equation (1.15), then seperately scale P rT (t) × S1 samples of ν1 to be νt = λt + σξ ν1
for each team type t. This gives us the mixture normal distribution of team ability
according to the team structure.
3. Rank-order the above values νt , and numerically compute the quantile function FY−1 .
4. For each rank p, compute the following:
(a) Compute the mean and variance of the asymptotic normal distribution specified
in equation (1.21), and scale the S2 generated standard normal random numbers
ν2 to νp with the calculated mean and variance of Y(p)
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(b) Use the simulated random numbers νp for each team type t to compute the numerical integration in equation (1.19)
(c) Compute the probability for team performance rank in equation (1.20) for each
team type t.

1.9.2

Proof: Existence of Equilibrium

∗
, τ ∗ ) is characterized by the fixed point of the
As expained in the paper, the equilibrium (P rM

system of equations H : (P rM , τ ) → (P rM , τ ). So the existence of equilibrium is equivalent
to the existence of fixed point for H. The proof is done in two steps. First, we show that in
equilibrium transfer is finite so we could restrict the domain of H, (P rM , τ ) to be a compact
and convex subset of the Euclidean space. Second, we show H mapped from (P rM , τ ) onto
itself is continuous. Therefore, we can use Brouwer’s fixed point theorm on H to prove the
existence of fixed point.
Proof. Because P rM is matching probability for participant of R signals and A true abilities
to participants of R signals, the coordinates of P rM is a vector in a vector space of R ×R ×A
dimension. τ is the transfer between participants with diﬀerent signals. The coordinates
of τ is a vector in

R×(R+1)
2

vector space. Because we assume both R and A are finite, the

coordinates of (P rM , τ ) is a vector in (R×R×A+ R×(R+1)
) dimension vector space. (P rM , τ )
2
is a point in Euclidean space of dimension (R × R × A +

R×(R+1)
).
2

Suppose the set of τ is unbounded, ∃r, r′ , s.t. τ (r, r′ ) = +∞, τ (r′ , r) = −∞. ∀a, a′ ,
P rM (a, r, r′ |τ ) = 1, P rM (a′ , r′ , r|τ ) = 0. ∀P r(A|R), P rM (r, r′ |τ ) = 1, P rM (r′ , r) = 0,
market equilibrium constraint is not satisfied. Thus in equilibrium the set of τ is bounded
and there exists a finite number B, s.t. each coordinate of τ is in the finite interval [−B, B].
The set of P rM is bounded and closed because each coordinate of P rM is a probability that
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lies in the unit interval of [0, 1]. We restrict D, the domain of H to be a closed and bounded
subset of Euclidean space. Because each coordinate of (P rM , τ ) is in a closed and bounded
interval, the convex combination of two points in D is still in D, i.e D is convex. Based
on the specification in the paper, each member function of H is continuous, and thus H is
continuous. ∀(P rM , τ ) ∈ D, H(P rM , τ ) ∈ D, because h1 yields a mapping from a set of
probabilities on to itself and h2 comes from the market equilibrium constraint that controls
the boundary of τ . Thus H is a continuous function from a compact and convex set D onto
itself.
∗
By Brouwer fixed point theorem, the fixed point (P rM
, τ ∗ ) exists.
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Chapter 2
Peer Eﬀects in Worker Misconduct:
Evidence from Theft in a Thousand
Restaurants
Co-authored with Tat Y. Chan, Lamar Pierce and Daniel Snow

2.1

Introduction

Performance spillovers from one worker to another are fundamental to operational performance in service, sales, and production environments. Existing work almost uniformly shows
that top employees positively influence peer productivity in settings that include supermarkets (Mas and Moretti 2009), health care (Song et al. 2017), and science (Azoulay et al. 2010,
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Oettl 2012).13 These positive peer eﬀects are driven by multiple mechanisms that include direct assistance, production complementarities, knowledge transfer, and social processes such
as peer pressure and behavioral norms.14
Although each of these mechanisms is cited in studies involving a productive behavior and
outcome, it seems likely that these same peer eﬀect mechanisms would also apply to costly
behaviors such as theft, fraud, sabotage and shirking. Indeed, evidence from non-firm settings
suggests that the mechanisms behind positive productivity peer eﬀects also generate positive
peer eﬀects in misconduct.15 Athletes appear to cheat more when connected with unpunished
cheaters (Palmer and Yenkey 2015, Gould and Kaplan 2011). Similarly, crime, tax evasion,
and underage drinking are amplified by the behavior of peers (Bayer et al. 2009, Kremer and
Levy 2008, Luttmer and Singhal 2014, Alm et al. 2017). The limited evidence from firms is
consistent with these results.16 Ichino and Maggi (2000) show positive peer eﬀects in shirking
among automotive workers in one firm, while Dimmock et al. (2018) find similar results in
financial-service career networks. What these few studies do not address, however, is a key
mechanism that is likely to moderate productivity and misconduct peer eﬀects—managerial
oversight. Although it seems quite intuitive that working with a generally high-theft peer
might normalize and enable misconduct on average, it is important to recognize that this
13
Tan and Netessine (2019), as an exception, argue that peer eﬀects can have an inverse U-shape and
thus be negative in some ranges of peer ability. Also see related work on peer eﬀects among managers and
entrepreneurs (Hasan and Koning 2017, Chatterji et al. 2019).
14
Exceptions include cases where employees are incentivized to compete with or sabotage their peers
(Siemsen et al. 2007, Chan et al. 2014a;b, Bandiera et al. 2005).
15
In the interest of clarity, we use the terms “positive peer eﬀects” and “positive spillovers” in this paper to
refer to positive correlation between coworkers’ behaviors regardless of the valence or normative propriety or
impropriety of that behavior. This may be thought of as amplifying of behavior across coworkers. Following
this logic, “negative peer eﬀects” and “negative spillovers” describes negative correlation between coworkers’
behaviors, or a dampening pattern. We refer to “productive peer eﬀects” and “peer eﬀects in misconduct” to
describe the valence of the behavior under examination.
16
Mohliver (2019) shows misconduct peer eﬀects at the firm level that imply employee-level eﬀects. Related laboratory experiments show how peer behavior and outcomes can influence peer cheating and other
misconduct (Pascual-Ezama et al. 2015, Gino et al. 2009, Gino and Pierce 2009). Also see Bandura (1965),
Cialdini and Trost (1998), and Moore and Gino (2013) for discussions of normative bad behavior.
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interaction occurs within a larger organizational context. Indeed, a worker’s bad behavior
on a given day might produce the opposite eﬀect. If higher daily levels of misconduct in the
organization increase the likelihood of managerial detection, then high peer misconduct might
incentivize lower misconduct in the focal worker in a given time frame. This presents two
theoretical predictions about how peers may be expected to aﬀect coworker misconduct in
operational settings. On one hand, being staﬀed on a given day with a peer who steals more
on average might justify, normalize, and enable higher individual misconduct—a positive
“peer eﬀect”, as in Mas and Moretti (2009). On the other hand, a peer’s higher misconduct
levels on a given day might incentivize a worker to reduce cheating to avoid managerial
detection and resulting punishment, what we term “strategic peer response.”
In this paper, we attempt to disentangle the positive peer eﬀects and negative strategic
peer responses in misconduct. We do so in an important operational setting—US casual
dining restaurants (Pierce et al. 2015, Tan and Netessine 2014; 2019, Tan and Staats 2016).
These restaurants are characterized by table service and moderate prices and account for $269
billion of the $766 billion US restaurant market.17 Theft is a common problem in restaurants,
and although there are not precise figures available on the magnitude of losses from theft,
the National Restaurant Association estimates that employee theft represents 4 percent of
restaurant food costs (Sweeney and Steinhauser 2010). While theft and illicit behavior are,
by their very natures, diﬃcult to measure, our unique setting allows us to directly observe
daily worker staﬃng, sales productivity, and revenue theft estimates for 83,153 servers at
1,049 restaurants from 34 chains over seven years.18 Variation in daily server staﬃng, and
thus peer assignment, allows us to examine whether working with high-theft peers (compared
17

Maze, J. 2017. "Restaurant sales to hit $799B in 2017" Feb 28, 2017. https://www.nrn.com/salestrends/nra-restaurant-sales-hit-799b-2017
18
Our data unfortunately do not allow us to measure inventory losses, which are also important components
of employee theft.
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with low-theft peers) on a given day indeed increases a focal worker’s theft in the same way
that the (positive) productivity literature suggests it would.
We implement a specific identification strategy that derives peer-eﬀect estimates from both
ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) methods. This strategy serves
two purposes. First, the IV method, which uses the average daily theft of the peer on days
in which the two workers are not co-staﬀed as an IV for daily peer theft, addresses Manski
(1993)’s two classic peer-eﬀect estimate biases: (a)the reflection problem and (b) correlation
in the residual terms across peers in the regression analysis. Second, as we show, using simulations, the diﬀerence between OLS and IV models can shed light on the strategic interaction
between workers on a given day. These simulations show that for positive peer-eﬀect models,
OLS can only produce smaller parameter estimates than IV models if the residual terms are
strongly negatively correlated. This would imply that workers endogenously reduce their
theft on days in which peers choose to steal over their normal level. Our combined results
therefore both address two key statistical biases and also use the magnitude of the estimated
bias to identify negative strategic peer response.
Our unbiased IV estimates show that working with generally high-theft peers increases a
server’s theft likelihood and magnitude, which is consistent with the extensive productivity
peer-eﬀects literature and the few papers on worker misconduct spillovers. The magnitudes
of our coeﬃcients imply peer eﬀects of 4 percent in theft count and 2.7 percent in theft
value from the average theft levels of peers. Although these marginal eﬀects appear small
in magnitude, the implication for firms is significant because of the reflection eﬀect of the
endogenous peer eﬀect coeﬃcient. An increase in one individual’s theft level will have a multiplicative eﬀect over group theft levels through the endogenous coeﬃcient across multiple
peers. We show through simulation that reflection eﬀects in an average restaurant substantially increase the impact of a high-theft worker. Doubling a single worker’s average theft
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amount implies a 76 percent increase in an average restaurants total theft, while doubling all
workers’ theft produces an increase of 550 percent. We do not observe the the nonlinearity
that Tan and Netessine (2019) find. Our significantly smaller OLS estimates indicate a negative correlation in the daily residual terms of peers in the regression models, however, which
implies that workers reduce theft in response to higher than normal peer theft on that given
day. Although we cannot identify if these correlations are due to collusion or to independent
adaptation to observations of peer behavior, they are consistent with workers responding to
the increased threat of detection of higher daily restaurant losses.
We support this monitoring mechanism argument by comparing model estimates in a subset of restaurants before and after they adopted an IT-based theft-monitoring system. The
system, which notifies managers of suspiciously high clusters of possible theft-related transactions, raises the risk that management will investigate high-theft days. We find that the
biased OLS estimates become smaller and the negative correlation in the residual terms
becomes larger in magnitude following monitoring adoption. This suggests that under a
stronger monitoring regime, workers are more likely to reduce theft in response to higher
peer theft on a given day.
Finally, we provide evidence for the information and social norms mechanisms by examining
new employees, showing that positive theft peer eﬀects on new employees are strongest in
the first months of employment and disappear after the fifth month. Although these results
cannot precisely separate each mechanism, they are consistent with an imprinting mechanism
in which new employees are most vulnerable to the positive and negative influences in their
environment (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013).
Our paper contributes to four main streams of literature. First, it adds to the growing
literature on people-centric operations. Relatively few papers have examined peer eﬀects
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(Chan et al. 2014a, Tan and Netessine 2019) or other coworker interactions (Pierce et al.
2019, Moon et al. 2018) in operational settings, with related work studying learning from
peers (Song et al. 2017, KC et al. 2013, Chan et al. 2014b, Siemsen et al. 2008, Yin et al.
2018, Valentine et al. 2018, Tucker et al. 2007) and the value of staﬃng heterogeneity (Aksin
et al. 2015, Kesavan et al. 2014, Huckman and Staats 2011) and team experience (Huckman
et al. 2009). Ours is the first to study peer eﬀects in theft. This research also contributes to
work on operational losses, which include not only theft (Pierce et al. 2015) but also broader
categories of shrinkage (DeHoratius and Raman 2008; 2007) and other operational risks (Xu
et al. 2017).
Second, this paper contributes to a growing literature on behavioral misconduct and unethical
behavior in field settings. As Pierce and Snyder (2015) note, only a few papers objectively
measure individual employee misconduct in operational settings (e.g., Nagin et al. 2002,
Pierce and Snyder 2008, Pierce et al. 2015, Bennett et al. 2013, Balafoutas et al. 2013, DerflerRozin et al. 2016, Olken 2007). Our paper takes a behavioral eﬀect commonly studied in
the lab (Gino et al. 2009) and demonstrates its generalizability to an operational setting. In
this way, our paper parallels recent field work on peer eﬀects in other behaviors such as tax
compliance (Alm et al. 2017) and fraud (Edelman and Larkin 2014)
Third, we add to a growing debate on the role and eﬃcacy of monitoring in operational
settings. Although substantial evidence shows how monitoring and other managerial oversight can improve compliance (Staats et al. 2016, Baker and Hubbard 2004) and reduce
misconduct (Nagin et al. 2002, Pierce et al. 2015), other work explains that such monitoring
can have negative eﬀects on motivation and performance (Bernstein 2012; 2017, Anteby and
Chan 2018, Ranganathan and Benson 2019). Our work suggests that the eﬀects of managerial monitoring can extend beyond the monitored worker to coworkers. Monitoring that
18

See related work on social networks and misconduct (Yenkey 2015; 2018, Aven 2015, Cohen et al. 2010).
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reduces theft in the average worker will have an amplified eﬀect as that reduction spills over
to coworker behavior through peer eﬀects.
Finally, we add to a large empirical literature on peer eﬀects in firms (Herbst and Mas
2015) with two contributions. Our paper identifies misconduct peer eﬀects in an operational
setting, which is important because, as our results show, direct managerial oversight provides
an additional peer-based mechanism that counters the positive peer eﬀects in both this paper
and prior work. Additionally, this study makes a methodological contribution, demonstrating
that the use of both biased OLS and unbiased IV methods can do more than correct for
reflection problems; it can also inform on collusion and other strategic interactions between
peers on a given day.

2.2

Empirical Setting

The industry context for this study is a labor-intensive service operation–the US casual
dining restaurant segment. Some examples of restaurants in this segment (not necessarily in
our sample) include Applebee’s, Buca di Beppo, Johnny Rockets, and Red Robin. Customers
of restaurants in this segment receive table service from waitstaﬀ, who typically take orders,
deliver food, and process payment.
Staﬃng in our setting almost always involves more than one server in a given shift. Ninetyfour percent of shifts in our sample involve two or more workers. In informal interviews
conducted for this research with front-line service employees at casual dining restaurants,
waitstaﬀ reported a high degree of interaction with other servers and service staﬀ. Each server
with whom we spoke expressed, in one way or another, the inevitability of interacting socially,
financially, and even sometimes romantically with other staﬀ members. These interactions
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often occur at choke points, such as cash register terminals and order windows, and also
occur in kitchen areas, in employee meetings, and after closing.
Theft by servers and others in this segment is a significant problem, although its precise
magnitude is unknown. A significant portion of theft likely comes from unapproved comped
meals given for free to customers and through employee consumption of food and beverages.
A small number of studies have examined restaurant employee theft. Victor et al. (1993)
use survey-based data on peer reporting of theft in fast-food restaurants although unable to
observe it directly. Detert et al. (2007) find employee food theft to be associated with storelevel characteristics, such as number of managers and abusiveness of managerial supervision.
Pierce et al. (2015) utilize a subsample of the data in the present paper with the first
large-scale study of direct observations of individual theft. In that (and this) paper, the
identification of employee theft is based on servers not reporting an item’s sale or removing
an item from the restaurants IT system after customers have paid.
Although there are many ways in which restaurant employees may steal, we focus on three
types that are observable in the operating data generated by restaurants point-of-sale (POS)
systems. Restaurants in our sample are managed using a common POS system that tracks
each employee’s orders, sales, and job category. When a customer places an order, or a
“ticket,” with a server, that server enters the information into a touch-screen terminal. Order
information is stored in the systems database and is passed to a display in the kitchen. After
the customer pays and leaves, the server closes out the ticket.
The three POS-based “scams” in our data are common in the industry, even appearing in
how-to tell-all books about theft (Francis and DeGlinkta 2004), and are observed using theft
detection algorithms provided by the POS system provider. The first type is called the
“wagon-wheel scam” in which, following customer payment, the server transfers an item from
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that bill in the POS system to the bill of another customer who ordered the same item. That
bill is reprinted after the customer leaves and the server keeps the diﬀerence by taking cash
from the terminal. The wagon wheel can be applied to cash and credit card transactions,
with the latter achieved by increasing the tip amount by the transferred amount to maintain
the total credit card bill. The second theft technique involves “comping,” or refunding a
customers meal in the system after they have already paid but before the ticket has been
closed. The third involves voiding a transaction as erroneous after the customer has already
paid. When cash is paid, the server keeps all or part of the payment rather than depositing
it in the terminal. For credit card transactions, the server takes cash from the terminal as a
fraudulent tip. The level of flexibility in the POS system that allows for these types of theft
is common in the industry and is meant to allow servers and managers to adjust for entry
errors and changes in customer orders. The detection of this type of theft under normal
circumstances falls to the manager, acting as the restaurant owner’s agent. Considerable
eﬀort would need to be applied in order to detect, investigate, and take action over this type
of theft.
The data were obtained from an IT firm that sold POS systems to 34 restaurant chains with
1,049 locations. The IT system stored information about, among other things, menu items
ordered, times of events, payment types, tip amounts, server identifiers, and an indicator
for a likely theft having occurred in a given transaction. Theft monitoring was an add-on
feature sold to the restaurant chains, costing less than $100 per month per location. Theft
was detected using a set of proprietary algorithms, and subscribers were provided with theft
alerts identifying individual employees who were likely to have stolen as well as the specific
dates and values of these thefts. Although detected theft was only available to subscribers,
it is visible to the researchers for all restaurant-days in the sample. The algorithms were constructed with a strong bias against finding a theft event because false positives (accusations)
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in this context are thought to be very costly. Consequently, our measurements of theft are
likely substantially smaller than actual theft levels in the restaurants, although we have no
reason to believe this under-measurement is biased. Such a bias is unlikely because the standardized algorithm applies equally to all restaurants and servers and because its existence
is never known by servers or managers in restaurants that don’t implement the monitoring
system. Even in restaurants where it is implemented, the algorithm is unknown to servers
and restaurant managers and would thus be diﬃcult to game. Importantly, we are able to
observe these theft events in the data regardless of whether or not the restaurant has adopted
the IT-monitoring system by applying the provider’s theft-detection algorithms. Interviews
with restaurant managers indicated that their use of and response to the monitoring system
varied, although most indicated that they intervened when theft was repeated or substantial.
The particular structure of worker assignment to customers is helpful in identifying the
managerial oversight mechanism because servers are quasi-randomly assigned to customers
in ways that reduce concerns that certain workers choose customers who facilitate theft. As
Tan and Netessine (2014) and Tan and Staats (2016) detail, servers in this segment are
assigned an area of tables, with customers then matched to those tables either through
specific rules or algorithms or by hosts at the front door. Similarly, the fact that customers
do not directly suﬀer from server theft reduces concerns that customer monitoring might
explain any peer eﬀects in theft. In the wagon-wheel scam, where servers transfer drinks in
the IT system, customers still receive the ordered drink and pay for it. Similarly, in falsely
comped or voided tickets, the customer is unaware of the action because they still pay for
and receive their food.
As Tan and Netessine (2019) detail, restaurant servers interact constantly before, during, and
after their shifts, and the relatively small workforce and rotating schedules ensure that workers are intimately aware of their peers’ behavior and personalities. Similar to productivity,
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Table 2.1: Data Set Description
Number of Restaurants
Number of Chains
Number of Employees
Unique Restaurant-Days
Number of Employee-Day Observation
Years of Observations

1,049
34
83,153
806,541
5,731,806
2006-2013

peer theft can be directly observable by peers, either through queuing at the POS terminal or
through comped or voided orders. In addition, workers carry reputations for both productive
and unproductive behaviors, such that directly observing theft is unnecessary to know that
one is working with a high-theft peer (Brass et al. 1998).

2.3

Data and Measures

The data set for this study contains transaction and theft data aggregated to the workerday level. Thus constructed, it contains 5,731,806 unique worker-day observations, covering
83,153 servers working in 1,049 restaurants that belong to 34 chains over an approximately
seven-year period. Figure 2.1 presents all locations for the lower 48 states, with larger circles
representing larger location counts in a given city. Typically, each restaurant will have a
daily staﬃng schedule in which servers are assigned to diﬀerent shifts throughout the day.
For each server, we observe the shift’s start and end times. For each shift, we also know the
sales revenue associated with the server’s transactions. Table 2.1 describes the data set.
Panel (B) of Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of the restaurants across the 34 chains, ranging
from single locations to four large national chains that constitute the majority of our observations. Panels (C) and (D) show the distribution of servers and revenues across restaurants
on a given day.
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Figure 2.1: Location Map for 1,049 Restaurants

Note: Each circle reflects all restaurants in a specific city, with larger circle sizes reflecting more unique
restaurants. Alaska and Hawaii are not shown.
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Our worker-day panel is unbalanced at both the worker and restaurant levels for several
reasons. First, workers rarely stay at a given restaurant location for the entire time that
location appears in the data. Second, restaurants appear in our data only for the period
in which they are using the POS system, such that later adopters enter our data set at
diﬀerent points. We note that all of our models include dummy variables for restaurantspecific week, year, and day of week. In addition, we control for the time of day with four
dummies indicating when the worker started their shift: 3am–9am, 9am–3pm, 3pm–9pm,
and 9pm–3am. We also include unique identifiers for each individual worker (and thus for
each restaurant). These dummies mitigate most potential concerns around an unbalanced
panel. Panel (A) of Figure 2.2 presents the number of restaurants by year in our data.
Turnover is high in our restaurant setting, with the mean worker observable on only 69 days.
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of total tenure (in days) for the 83,153 servers in our data.

2.3.1

Theft Activities

We use two measures of server theft, both of which are calculated at the day level. Theft
count is the number of unique theft occurrences identified for that worker on a given day. If
three transactions on a given day are tagged by the IT system as involving theft, for example,
then theft count will take a value of three. Theft value is the total monetary value stolen by
a worker on a given day. We also observe the manager, who is likely to monitor the server
as well as whether the theft-notification alerts are being sent to that restaurant. We know
the exact date for each observation, which allows us to construct time variables, including
year, week, and day-of-week indicators.

66

Figure 2.2: Descriptive Distributions for 1,049 Restaurants

Note: Figures show descriptive data on the restaurants in our sample.
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Figure 2.3: Tenure in Days for 83,153 Servers

Note: Figure presents kernel density plots for the distribution of total days worked for all servers in the data
set.

In Figure 2.4, we show the distribution of theft activities at the restaurant location level.
Panels (A) and (B) represent the distributions of theft count and theft value across restaurants respectively. Panels (C) and (D) represent the distributions of theft count and theft
value in each day. There is a high degree of variation across restaurants, and the distributions are heavily right skewed. The figures suggest that for most restaurants, identified theft
is rare on any given day (the average daily theft count is 0.5) and of low value ($9.80 per
day). As described above, these figures significantly understate true levels of theft, as they
are constructed to conservatively generate theft alerts. Panel (E), however, presents the
distribution of the percentage of servers identified to have stolen at least once in the data.
On average, 56 percent of servers in a restaurant commit identifiable theft at least once in
the sample.
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Figure 2.4: Theft Activities at the Restaurant Level

Note: Figure presents kernel density plots for the distribution of theft by individual restaurant location.
Dotted lines represent the mean for each variable.
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Figure 2.5 further presents the distributions of theft activities at the server level that are
consistent with the observations in Figure 2.4. Panels (A) and (B) show that over their
employment tenure, the average number of observed thefts by an individual server is about
10 and the total theft value is about $160, implying that the average value involved in each
observed theft is about $16. On a daily basis, however, there is only a 16 percent chance
that a server steals and the average value is just $1.67 per server (see Panels (C) and (D)).
The right skewness in Figure 2.5 also shows that some servers steal with high frequency. For
example, about 1.1 percent of servers stole more than 50 times in the data, and 1.8 percent
have stolen more than $400. Diﬀerent factors could contribute to the total theft behavior
of those servers. First, there may be variation in underlying willingness to steal based on
individual diﬀerences in moral or ethical codes, cognitive ability, or skill at theft (Pierce
and Snyder 2015, Bandura 2014). Second, the individual details of particular restaurant
chains and locations may influence the opportunity for theft. For instance, restaurants that
have more drink items on the menu may be more prone to theft. Also, shift timing may
aﬀect theft behavior. Customers may be more likely to order drinks on weekends, leading
to a situation in which servers working on weekend shifts have more opportunities to steal.
For each of these reasons, our identification strategy will require controlling for observable
diﬀerences in staﬃng schedules. Finally, and of primary interest in this study, theft may also
be influenced by the identity of peers.

2.3.2

Shift Overlaps with Peer Employees

To identify peer eﬀects in theft, we exploit variation in daily staﬃng schedules, a crucial
element in manufacturing and service operations (Green et al. 2013, Batt et al. 2019). If a
server always were to work with the same peers over time, we could not identify peer eﬀects
because of the impossibility of separating each server’s permanent theft level through a fixed
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Figure 2.5: Theft Activities at the Server Level

Note: Figure presents kernel density plots for the distribution of theft by individual servers.
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eﬀect. As most restaurants in our data are open for long hours and have large numbers of
employees, each server is assigned to shifts that vary in work hours and days over the sample
period. This, in fact, is what generates the variation necessary for our empirical analysis.
We first construct for each server the percentage of working days, measured by that individual’s total number of working days divided by the total number of days the restaurant at
which the server works is open. Figure 2.6 shows that on average the percentage of working
days per server is only 8 percent. Very few servers are observed working for the same restaurant over the whole sample period,19 which reflects the high employee turnover rate in the
restaurant industry. The low percentage suggests that it is common for a server to be in the
same shift with new workers. This regularity is responsible for the (useful for measurement
purposes) temporal variation in the pool of peers across working days.
Even though the pool of peers varies over time, a stronger identification criterion is that each
server works over time with diﬀerent pools of peers currently employed by the restaurant. The
logic is this: If variation in peers for a given server were to come only from the restaurant’s
new hires, then the server would otherwise work with the same set of peers and we would
be concerned about a significant selection issue (i.e., who is hired and dismissed by the
restaurant and who is assigned to work with the server on a fixed basis) that could aﬀect
inference of a peer eﬀect. To test whether the stronger criterion applies to the data, we
further construct a measure to quantify the degree of overlap in working schedules between
each pair of servers, on the condition that both are currently working for the same restaurant,
using the following procedure: We first calculate the schedule set, Schedulei , for each server
i. This includes all the shifts in which the server is observed to work in the data. We then
19

Although it is very likely that some servers work in two diﬀerent restaurants in the sample period, we
are not able to identify those employees; server identifiers are numerical and specific to restaurants.
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select all other servers who are also working for the restaurant during the same time period.
For another server j, we then construct the variable Overlapij which is calculated as

Overlapij =

|Schedulei ∩ Schedulej |
|Schedulei |

(2.1)

where |·| denotes the number of elements in a set, and the numerator represents the number of
overlapping shifts. If there is no variation in the daily staﬃng schedule, then the overlapping
measure will be 1 for servers always working in the same shift and 0 for other servers. The
distribution of the overlapping shifts is shown in Figure 2.7. The average is only 20 percent
across all worker pairs. In other words, each server on average only overlaps with other
current servers in the restaurant in 20 percent of shifts, indicating a high degree of variation
in shift assignment.
Figure 2.6: Percentage of Working Days per Server Distribution

Note: Figure presents kernel density plot of the percentage of total days that a given server works at a given
restaurant. This indicates there is substantial variation in employees across time.
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Figure 2.7: Percentage of Overlapping Shift Distribution

Note: Figure presents kernel density plot of the percentage of overlapping shifts for all pairs of coworkers in
the data. This indicates substantial variation in coworkers for a given server.

2.4

Empirical Model and Its Estimation

We build a peer-eﬀect model to investigate how a servers theft is aﬀected by the theft
behavior of peers who work in the same shift. There is, of course, risk of endogeneity in
model estimation here. To address the endogeneity problem, we use an instrumental variables
(IV) approach in the estimation. Later we discuss in detail the validity of the instruments
for peer theft and use a simulation study to demonstrate the sources of estimation bias
when ignoring the endogeneity problem and how the problem can be solved by the proposed
method.
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2.4.1

The Base Peer-Eﬀects Model

We model how an individual servers theft is influenced by peer theft type in the following
way:

Yit = βY−it + αi + γit + ϵit

(2.2)

The dependent variable Yit is the theft by server i on day t. We use the number of times
the server steals (theft count) and the value of money the server steals (theft value) to
measure the extent of the theft on that day. To deal with the highly right-skewed distribution
of both measures observed in the data, we employ a logarithmic transformation. That is,
Yit = log(T hef tCountit +1) or Yit = log(T hef tV alueit +1). We add 1 inside the parentheses
because there are many 0s for both theft count and theft value in the sample.20
The independent variables include the average theft by peers and a set of control variables.
Included is αi , a fixed eﬀect for individual servers (there are 83,153 fixed eﬀects altogether),
which controls for the servers intrinsic preference or ability for theft. In addition, we use a
vector of fixed eﬀects, γit , to control for factors that can have macro impacts on employee
behaviors. These include a fixed eﬀect for each week, each day of the week (e.g., Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday), each year, each manager who oversees the restaurant during the shift,
and the presence of the theft-monitoring technology.
20

We use linear regression instead of other nonlinear (e.g., ordered probit or logit) models that may fit
better with the discrete theft observations in our data because of the large number of fixed eﬀects. Estimating
a nonlinear model (and controlling for the endogeneity issue that we will discuss below) with close to 100K
model parameters is not practical for our computing resources. As Figure 2.14 in the Appendix demonstrates,
the transformed variables are nearly normally distributed, which alleviates concerns about implementing a
linear model.
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The variable Y−it represents the collective theft activity of peers. We use the theft count or
theft value averaged across peers as the measure. That is, let Pit denote the set of peers for
server i on day t, such that the peer theft activities are

Y−it =

Σj∈Pit Yjt
|Pit |

(2.3)

where |Pit | is the count of the peer set. Note that Y−it captures the actual theft behavior
of peers on day t, instead of whether peers have a higher theft type (e.g., higher preference
or ability to steal). We use this specification because each individual servers theft patterns
fluctuate greatly across shifts. The coeﬃcient for Y−it , β, represents the eﬀect of peer workers
actual theft behaviors on the focal servers theft. Finally, ϵit is the unobserved residual term.

2.4.2

Endogeneity Issues

In estimating the peer-eﬀect coeﬃcient β, OLS suﬀers from a classic endogeneity problem.
That is, the unobserved residual term can be correlated with the actual theft behavior of
peers, Y−it . In such cases, the OLS estimate will be biased and inconsistent. This endogeneity
problem can come from two major sources. The first is the classical reflection problem
(Manski 1993). Suppose the true β is positive. If ϵit is positive, then other workers theft
behaviors will increase through a peer eﬀect, thus causing an increase in Y−it over time.
Therefore ϵit and Y−it will be positively correlated.
The second source of endogeneity is that the unobservable ϵs can be correlated across peers.
For example, there may exist some common unobserved factors that will simultaneously
influence the theft behavior of all servers (e.g., there are unexpectedly large numbers of
customers coming into the restaurant, thus making it easier for all servers to steal). Suppose
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the correlation in ϵs is positive. The residual term ϵit will also be positively correlated with
Y−it .
Finally, another potential source of endogeneity, well known in the peer-eﬀects literature,
comes from the potential nonrandom shift assignment for servers, which is similar to the
challenge of endogenous network formation (Jackson 2003). As an example, if a server of hightheft tendency selects or is selected to always work with high-theft peers, OLS regressions
will infer a positive peer eﬀect. This should be less of a concern in our analysis, however,
because we have included the fixed eﬀect αi of every server in Equation (2.2). If the server
continuously has a high likelihood of stealing, it should be picked up by the high estimate of
αi . The residual ϵit represents the deviation from the average theft level of the server. Even
though the shift assignments are not random, αi may correlate with Y−it , but the residual
should not.
In order to investigate how and in what direction OLS peer eﬀect estimates are biased, we use
a Monte Carlo study to examine the first two potential sources of endogeneity. To simplify
the simulation, we use the following peer-eﬀect model that only includes the actual theft
behavior of peers in the shift:

Yit = αi + βY−it + ϵit

(2.4)

In the simulation, we set the true value of β to be 0.3 and assume the residual term ϵit to be
normally distributed, with variance equal to 1. We simulate 100 servers, with each ones fixed
eﬀect αi drawn from a log-normal distribution, with variance equal to 0.25. We then simulate
1,000 shifts, each shift with 3 to 10 individual workers who are randomly drawn from the
pool of servers. We then simulate ϵit for each individual in every shift. To investigate how the
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Table 2.2: Monte Carlo Study Results
Model
OLS
IV

(1)
Scenario 1
0.47(0.02)
0.30(0.03)

(2)
Scenario 2
0.66(0.01)
0.306(0.03)

(3)
Scenario 3
-0.23(0.03)
0.298(0.04)

Note: Table presents peer eﬀect coeﬃcients for regressions from 10,000 simulated datasets, where the
true parameter is 0.3 and the covariance is either 0.15 (Scenario 1), 0 (Scenario 2), or -0.15 (Scenario
3). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. IV estimates are unbiased, while OLS bias depends on
covariance.

correlation of ϵs will bias the OLS estimates, we assume the following scenarios: In Scenario
1, ϵs are independent from one another. In Scenario 2, ϵs are positively correlated, with
covariance equal to 0.15. Finally, in Scenario 3, ϵs are negatively correlated, with covariance
equal to -0.15. With the simulated data, we then run OLS regressions. Table 2.2 reports the
OLS estimates in the first row under the three scenarios.
Under the assumption of independent ϵs in Scenario 1, the second source of endogeneity
does not exist and the bias should come only from the reflection problem. As the true peer
eﬀect β is positive, Table 2.2 shows that OLS will overestimate the peer eﬀect by 56 percent,
consistent with our discussion above.
When the ϵs are positively correlated in Scenario 2, OLS will overestimate the peer eﬀect
even more. Table 2.2 shows that the estimate is about 1.1 times higher than the true peer
eﬀect. This is because, compared to the case with independent ϵs, the residual term has a
higher positive correlation with Y−it in this scenario. However, when the ϵs are negatively
correlated in Scenario 3, Table 2.2 shows that OLS actually underestimates the true peer
eﬀect. Given that the reflection problem in this scenario will bias the peer eﬀect upward,
the result implies that the negative correlation in the ϵs will lead to a downward bias for the
OLS estimates and that the extent of the downward bias can dominate the upward bias due
to the reflection problem.
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To test the robustness of the above results, we simulate the above three scenarios 10,000 times.
Figure 2.8 graphically illustrates the kernel density of the OLS estimates corresponding to
each scenario (see the red region in the diagrams). Compared to the true peer eﬀect, which is
represented by the dotted line set at 0.3, the figure shows that the distribution of simulated
OLS estimates in Scenario 1 (Panel A) and Scenario 2 (Panel B) never overlap with the
true peer eﬀect value, demonstrating the extent of the upward bias. In Scenario 3 (Panel
C), however, the negative correlation in residuals more than oﬀsets the reflection bias and
the distribution of OLS estimates is far below the true β, demonstrating a downward bias
in the estimates. These figures represent that negatively correlated residuals are necessary
to achieve negative OLS bias with true positive peer eﬀects.
We further investigate how the bias of the OLS estimates relates to the correlation of the ϵs.
We conduct a series of simulations by varying the magnitude of the covariance. We fix the
true value of β at 0.3 and gradually increase the covariance of residuals from -0.5 to 0.5. For
each covariance value, we run the simulation 1,000 times.
Figure 2.9 reports the fitted curve of the OLS estimate as the covariance in residuals varies
from -0.5 to 0.5 (the two gray lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals). The dashed
horizontal line represents the true value of β. The OLS estimate is positively biased when
the covariance is 0, which indicates that the reflection problem will cause a positive bias in
OLS estimates when the true peer-eﬀect coeﬃcient is positive. With positive covariance, the
OLS estimate is further upwardly biased. When the negative covariance lies in the range
of -0.06 to -0.05, the OLS estimate is close to the true value of 0.3, indicating that weak
negative correlation in residuals will oﬀset the upward bias caused by the reflection problem.
As negative covariance grows, however, the OLS estimate will be biased downward. The
series of simulations clearly shows that the only way OLS can be negatively biased is with
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Figure 2.8: Monte Carlo Study Bootstrapping Results

Figure shows results from 10,000 simulations for each of three types of residual correlations among coworkers:
none, positive, and negative. Figure indicates that OLS coeﬃcients can only be smaller than IV if residuals
are negatively correlated.
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negatively correlated residuals, when the true peer eﬀect is positive, and that this negative
bias is monotonically growing with the strength of the negative correlation.

Figure 2.9: Correlation & OLS Bias

This figure shows how the OLS estimate becomes more downwardly biased as the negative covariance in peer
residuals increases, while achieving positive bias as the covariance approaches 0. Estimates are generated
from 1,000 simulations for each covariance level, where the true parameter is 0.3.

We also investigate how the relationship between the OLS bias and covariance in residuals
varies with diﬀerent values of the true parameters β. We repeat the above simulation for
nine values of β, from 0.01 to 0.17. Figure 2.10 reports the fitted curves of OLS estimate
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bias as the covariance in residuals varies from -0.5 to 0.5 across the diﬀerent values of βs. We
see a nearly identical relationship between the covariance in residuals and the OLS bias for
each true parameter β; negative covariance will result in downward bias of OLS estimates
and that downward bias grows with the strength of negative correlation. This shows that for
the range of these β values, the OLS bias can be used to compare the covariance in residuals
across diﬀerent unbiased estimates. Comparing the curves for diﬀerent values of β, we find
that the eﬀect of negative covariance on the magnitude of downward OLS bias is slightly
larger for smaller values of β.

2.4.3

21

IV Estimation

To address the potential OLS endogeneity bias shown in Figures 2.8 through 2.10, we construct valid instruments for Y−it that exploit variation in restaurant shift assignments across
time. We start by constructing instruments for the theft of peer j, Yjt . To satisfy the conditions for valid instruments, we need a variable not correlated with ϵit (i.e., the exclusion
restriction) but that has a nontrivial correlation with Yjt (i.e., the relevance restriction). For
each peer j in worker i’s shift t, we find all of j’s shifts that satisfy the following two criteria:
First, the shift must not include worker i. This is because if i and j work together in another
shift s, the reflection problem implies that ϵis will correlate with Yjs , and, if ϵis and ϵit are
serially correlated, Yjs will be correlated with ϵit . Second, we further require that shift s be
at least two weeks before or after shift t. This is because, assuming ϵit and ϵjt are correlated
and that ϵjt and ϵjs are serially correlated, Yjs will still be correlated with ϵit even though j
and i are not in the same shift s. By requiring shift s to be at least two weeks away from t,
the serial correlation will be minimized and thus can satisfy the exclusion restriction.22
21

Figure 2.15 in the Appendix increases the true peer-eﬀect coeﬃcient β in increments to 0.46.
To further test the validity of the instruments, we alternatively use one- and three week windows to
construct diﬀerent IVs in the empirical estimation. We find very similar estimated peer eﬀects, which we
present in the Appendix.
22
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Figure 2.10: Correlation, True Parameter, & OLS Bias

This figure shows how the OLS bias varies with diﬀerent covariances in residuals for true parameters ranging
from 0.01 to 0.17. Each point in each of the nine curves includes 1,000 simulations.
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Next, we take the average of j’s theft in all of the shifts that meet the above criteria. That
is,

Yˆjit =

Σs∈Obsitj Yjs
|Obsitj |

(2.5)

where |Obsitj | is the number of shifts that meet the criteria and Yjs represents the theft in
each shift of j that meets the criteria.
Finally, we take the average of Yˆjit for all of the peers working with the focal server as the
instrument for Y−it in Equation (2.2).

Σj∈Pit Yˆjit
Yd
−it =
|Pit |

(2.6)

The large variation in the daily staﬃng schedule provides an instrument for most of the
observations (70 percent). For those observations for which we cannot find IVs satisfying both
of the above criteria, we drop them in the regression analysis. To be valid, the instrument
must be correlated with the endogenous variable (i.e., relevance restriction). Conceptually,
as Yˆjit in Equation (2.5) is a proxy for the theft propensity of j, it is correlated with Yjt .
Consequently, the instrument Yd
−it in Equation (2.6) is also correlated with Y−it in Equation
(2.2), thus satisfying the condition. As discussed above, the two selection criteria ensure that
Yˆjit is uncorrelated with ϵis .
We estimate the IV model using our simulated data from the previous section, employing the instrument constructed from Equations (2.5) and (2.6). Given the simulated data
construction, our model should satisfy both the relevance and exclusion restrictions. An
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examination of these data shows that it does. We find that in Scenario 1, (ϵs are independ
dent), cor(Y−it , Yd
−it ) is 0.61 and cor(Y−it , ϵit ) is merely 0.001. In Scenario 2 (ϵs are positively
d
correlated), cor(Y−it , Yd
−it ) is 0.48 and cor(Y−it , ϵit ) is 0.002. In Scenario 3 (ϵs are negatively
d
correlated), cor(Y−it , Yd
−it ) is 0.65 and cor(Y−it , ϵit ) is -0.001. We see a similar pattern in our
restaurant data, with a correlation between Yd
−it and Y−it of 0.25 when we use theft count as
the dependent variable and 0.59 for theft value.
We implement a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to estimate peer eﬀects for all scenarios and report them in Table 2.2 (see the second row). In each of the scenarios, the
estimated β is very close to 0.3, demonstrating that the proposed IV method can recover the
true parameter value if it satisfies the relevance and exclusion restrictions. Finally, we test
the robustness of the results by bootstrapping the above three scenarios 1,000 times. The
kernel density of the IV estimates corresponding to each scenario is shown in Figure 2.8 (see
the blue region in the diagrams). All of the estimates are very close to 0.3, with the median
exactly equal to 0.3, in each of the scenarios.

2.5

Regression Results and Analysis

In this section, we provide summary tables of the regression models. We provide both
clustered and block-bootstrapped standard errors at the restaurant-shift level. We report
the F-test statistic of the excluded instrument in the first stage of all IV models. We run
Hausman tests to compare the OLS and IV regression for the average peer-eﬀect model,
where the null hypothesis is that both OLS and IV estimators are consistent. The Hausman
test statistics and P value are reported in each regression table.23
23

Significance level ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, .p < 0.1 for all statistics in this paper.
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2.5.1

Average Peer Eﬀects

We run peer-eﬀect regressions on theft count and theft value, presenting the results in Table
2.3. As discussed in the IV estimation section, we drop all observations for which we cannot
find an IV satisfying the exclusion restriction, restricting our regression sample to 71 percent
of total observations in our data set. We find positive and significant peer-eﬀect coeﬃcients
in both theft count and theft value in our unbiased IV models in columns (2) and (4), with
the coeﬃcient in column (2) implying a 4 percent spillover of theft count to peers such that
doubling the theft count for a coworker would increase the likelihood of theft for each peer
by 4 percent. Similarly, column (4) implies a 2.7 percent spillover. The OLS regression
coeﬃcients in columns (1) and (3), however, are downwardly biased from the IV regression
coeﬃcients. If the only source of endogeneity was the reflection problem, under positive peer
eﬀects OLS estimates would be larger in magnitude than IV coeﬃcients (as demonstrated in
our simulation). The reverse direction of the bias reflects the second source of endogeneity
through a negative correlation in daily error terms. From the Hausman test presented, we
can reject the null hypothesis for peer eﬀects in theft count and theft value that both OLS
and IV estimators are consistent. This diﬀerence in coeﬃcients across the two models implies
that although working with a high-theft peer increases a worker’s theft, that worker’s theft
on days where the peer steals high values decreases.
The validity of our instrument depends on the exclusion restriction not being violated, such
that Yˆjit is uncorrelated with ϵis . Given the construction of our instrument, an exclusion
restriction violation would require two conditions to be true. First, the residuals would need
to be serially correlated within workers for longer than our 14-day window. We test this two
ways. We estimate serial correlation in the residuals for a series of two-day lags from two
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Table 2.3: Average Peer Eﬀect in Theft

Avg Peer Theft Count
Clustered Std. Error
Bootstrapped Std. Error
Avg Peer Theft Value
Clustered Std. Error
Bootstrapped Std. Error
Individual Fixed Eﬀect
Manager Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Year Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Week Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Weekday Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*IT-Monitoring Fixed Eﬀect
Observations
R2
1st Stage F Statistics
Diﬀerence in Estimate
Hausman Test Statistics

(1)
(2)
DV:Server Theft Count
OLS
IV
-0.01∗∗∗
0.04∗∗
(0.002)
(0.015)
(0.003)
(0.020)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4,058,783
0.182

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4,058,783
0.125
1,396∗∗∗
0.05
10.14∗∗∗

(3)
(4)
DV:Server Theft Value
OLS
IV

0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)
(0.002)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4,058,783
0.241

0.027∗∗∗
(0.003)
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4,058,783
0.240
14,260∗∗∗
0.02
86.4∗∗∗

Note: Standard errors, both clustered and block-bootstrapped at the restaurant-shift level, are presented
in parentheses. Significance level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.. Block-bootstrapped standard errors
with 100,000 iterations for IV models, 10,000 for OLS models.
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to 14 days,24 which we present in Appendix Figure 2.15. Although serial correlation exists
with short lags, it is below 0.02 for theft count and 0.005 for theft value at Day 14—the
minimum lag used in our instrument construction—before quickly converging to zero. We
also conducted a Box-Ljung test for each worker’s time series ϵit with lags between 14 and 28
days. We find identifiable serial correlation (at p=0.05) in only 2.2% of all workers for theft
count and 1.6% for theft amount . Collectively, these tests strongly limit concerns of serial
correlation creating an exclusion restriction. We also note that even with serial correlation
of over two weeks, this process would still require word-of-mouth through which a worker
would hear about the actions of peers on shifts she did not work. Although this is certainly
possible, in combination with our low serial correlation, we are confident in the validity of
our instrument.

2.5.2

Economic Significance of Estimates

The magnitude of our peer-eﬀect estimates depends on the average peer theft count and
value. With an average peer theft count of 0.065, for example, doubling the average theft
count will result in a 6 percent increase in the focal worker’s theft count. For an average peer
theft value of 1.26, doubling this will increase the focal worker’s theft value by 2 percent.
The magnitude of these peer eﬀects may seem minor, but they are substantially larger when
accounting for reflection, where the spillover from one worker to the other will be reflected
back and forth over all peers. With reflection, the total impact on theft count and theft
value on all workers is far greater than the magnitude of the peer-eﬀect coeﬃcient itself. In
fact, the total impact of spillover over all workers depends on several factors, including the
number of workers in a shift and the base level of theft of each individual worker free of peer
impact.
24

We use two-day intervals because most workers don’t work on consecutive days.
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To demonstrate this overall impact, we run a simulation for a typical shift of seven workers
in a restaurant. We set the base theft count and value at 0.16 and 1.67 for each individual
worker, which are the average theft count and theft value in our data. For each worker,
we then draw an idiosyncratic random shock from the empirical distribution of residuals
in our regression results. Given the base theft count (value), random shock, and the peereﬀect coeﬃcient, the actual theft count (value) is determined by the system of peer-eﬀect
equations, where each worker’s theft is aﬀected by the average peer theft, while at the same
time each worker also aﬀects theft by peers. Thus to calculate the actual theft count (value)
with endogenous peer eﬀects, we need to solve the fixed point of the system of peer-eﬀect
equations. We run the above simulation 10,000 times. On average, comparing to the case
where there is no peer eﬀect, total theft count across all workers increases by 34 percent and
total theft value increases by 200 percent.
We run two other simulations to show the impact of an increase in an individual worker’s
theft has across all peers. In the first, we double one of the seven worker’s base theft count
(value) from the first simulation while keeping the other workers, variables, and coeﬃcient
constant. We solve for the actual theft count (value) for all workers, with 10,000 simulations.
On average, doubling the base theft count of one worker will increase total restaurant theft
count by 20 percent and theft amount by 76 percent, compared to 14 percent increases
without peer eﬀects. Our second simulation doubles all workers’ theft levels, which produces
increases of 150 percent in total theft count and 550 percent in total theft amount.25
These simulations demonstrate that the overall impact of theft peer eﬀects is significantly
larger than the marginal eﬀect implied by the peer-eﬀect coeﬃcient in estimation results and
has substantial implications for overall operational performance.
25

See the Appendix, Section 2.7.4, for an example of this compounding.
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2.5.3

Testing for Nonlinear Peer Eﬀects

To address the possibility of nonlinear peer eﬀects that Tan and Netessine (2019) raise, we
adjust our models to include quadratic terms for peer theft. We rerun both the IV and
OLS models and present results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. Standard errors for IV models are
block-bootstrapped at restaurant-shift level with 100,000 iterations, while OLS models use
clustering.

Table 2.4: Average Peer Eﬀect in Theft Count
(1)
Model
OLS
P eerT hef t
P eerT hef t2
IV
P eerT hef t
P eerT hef t2

Estimate

(2)
Clustered
Std. Error

(3)
Bootstrapped
Std. Error

−0.01∗∗∗
−0.0017

0.003
0.003

0.005
0.006

0.07∗∗∗
−0.06∗∗∗

0.016
0.010

0.021
0.026

Note: Standard errors, clustered or block-bootstrapped at the restaurant-shift level, are presented in
parentheses. Significance level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Block-bootstrapped standard errors

with 100,000 iterations for IV models, 10,000 for OLS models.

We consistently find positive linear coeﬃcients and negative quadratic coeﬃcients, indicating
that the magnitude of the total peer eﬀect increases as the peers’ average count or value of
theft increases. Although these results indicate some concavity over a broad range of theft,
we show in Figures 2.11 and 2.12 that, unlike in Tan and Netessine (2019), the total peer eﬀect
of a given peer is always increasing over our data support, with the dotted line representing
the 95th percentile of average peers’ theft count and value. For both theft count and theft
value, even though the derivative of a focal worker’s theft to average peer theft decreases as
average peer theft increases, the total peer eﬀect increases.
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Table 2.5: Average Peer Eﬀect in Theft Value
(1)
Model
OLS
PeerTheft
P eerT hef t2
IV
Peer Theft
P eerT hef t2

Estimate

(2)
Clustered
Std. Error

(3)
Bootstrapped
Std. Error

0.0028∗
−0.002∗∗∗

0.001
0.001

0.002
0.001

0.029∗∗∗
−0.005∗∗∗

0.004
0.001

0.006
0.002

Note: Standard errors, clustered or block-bootstrapped at the restaurant-shift level, are presented in
parentheses. Significance level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Block-bootstrapped standard errors

with 100,000 iterations for IV models, 10,000 for OLS models.

Figure 2.11: Total Peer Eﬀect in Theft Count

This figure shows how the total peer eﬀect in theft count changes across the data support range of average
peer theft count, based on the non-linear model in Table 2.5. The total peer eﬀect is increasing across the
entire range of our data.
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Figure 2.12: Total Peer Eﬀect in Theft Value

This figure shows how the value of the total peer eﬀect changes across the data support range of average
peer theft value, based on the non-linear model in Table 2.5. The total peer eﬀect is increasing across the
entire range of our data.
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2.5.4

Peer Eﬀect Based on Employee Tenure

Evidence from studies on productivity peer eﬀects shows that new workers are the most likely
to be influenced by peers (e.g., Chan et al. 2014b). To investigate whether peer eﬀects diﬀer
in magnitude for peers with diﬀerent experience, we look at new employees by separately
estimating peer eﬀects in 30-day time windows using our IV model. We identify start dates
based on the first observation of each employee at the restaurant in the data set. If the first
observation for an employee is at least 30 days later than the first of any observation at the
restaurant, we define the employee as new so as to avoid left truncation. We examine the
number of days between any two consecutive observations for a particular employee and find
that over 99% of the observations are smaller than 14 days (two weeks), indicating employees
seldom take a break from work for more than two weeks before returning. In our data set,
84 percent of employees are defined as new employees. We restrict our regression to the 9.4
percent of new employees who stay for at least six full months in order to compare monthly
peer eﬀects across a consistent sample.26 The number of observations we use for estimating
peer eﬀects conditional on tenure is 24 percent of the observations in our main regressions.
The regression results for the 30-day interval models are given in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. In
models predicting theft count, peer-eﬀect estimates are stable and statistically significant for
the first three months of employment before decreasing substantially and losing precision.
Theft value regressions show similar results, with peer eﬀects consistent through the first five
months then nonexistent after that. Collectively, these models support the idea that new
employees are the most vulnerable to the norms and behavior of their peers. We caution,
however, that experience at a given restaurant does not necessarily reflect overall experience
as a server, which likely biases against us finding diﬀerences in our models. We also note that
26

See Figure 2.13 in the Appendix for survival rates for high- and low-theft employees. High-theft employees
are more likely to stay longer.
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Table 2.6: Peer Eﬀects in Theft Count by Month for New Employees Staying Six Months or
More

Avg Peer Theft Count
Clustered Std. Error
Bootstrapped Std. Error
Individual Fixed Eﬀect
Manager Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Year Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Week Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Weekday Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*IT-Monitoring Fixed Eﬀect
Observations
R2
1st Stage F Statistics

(1)
1st Month
0.168∗∗∗
(0.058)
(0.082)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
127,706
0.248
425∗∗∗

(2)
2nd Month
0.128∗∗
(0.062)
(0.086)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
133,458
0.266
378∗∗∗

(3)
3rd Month
0.155∗∗
(0.063)
(0.092)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
136,148
0.274
402∗∗∗

(4)
4th Month
0.093
(0.062)
(0.081)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
137,953
0.288
459∗∗∗

(5)
5th Month
0.041
(0.054)
(0.075)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
138,644
0.284
585∗∗∗

(6)
6+ Months
0.032
(0.058)
(0.056)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
305,492
0.201
1,323∗∗∗

Note: Estimates are from IV models. Standard errors, block-bootstrapped with 10,000 iterations at the restaurant-shift
level, are in parentheses. Significance level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.

Table 2.7: Peer Eﬀects in Theft Value by Month for New Employees Staying Six Months or
More

Avg Peer Theft Value
Clustered Std. Error
Bootstrapped Std. Error
Individual Fixed Eﬀect
Manager Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Year Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Week Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Weekday Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*IT-Monitoring Fixed Eﬀect
Observations
R2
1st Stage F Statistics

(1)
1st Month
0.029∗
(0.018)
(0.022)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
127,706
0.319
2,437∗∗∗

(2)
2nd Month
0.031∗
(0.019)
(0.24)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
133,458
0.316
2,327∗∗∗

(3)
3rd Month
0.032∗
(0.018)
(0.023)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
136,148
0.332
2,550∗∗∗

(4)
4th Month
0.044∗∗∗
(0.016)
(0.024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
137,953
0.344
3,373∗∗∗

(5)
5th Month
0.033∗
(0.017)
(0.024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
138,644
0.363
3,118∗∗∗

(6)
6+ Months
-0.004
(0.01)
(0.014)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
305,492
0.332
13,010∗∗∗

Note: Estimates are from IV models. Standard errors, clustered or block-bootstrapped with 10,000 iterations at the
restaurant-shift level, are in parentheses. Significance level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.

since attrition is endogenous, meaning that those who stay six months or more are diﬀerent
in many ways from those who leave earlier, we cannot easily generalize to all workers.27
27

See the Appendix for regressions including new employees who left before six months.
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2.5.5

Peer Eﬀects Before/After IT Theft-Monitoring Implementation

To examine whether managerial oversight explains the negative correlation in same-day peer
theft, we estimate peer eﬀects before and after restaurants implement an IT-monitoring system that increases the risk of detection (and likely punishment) for theft. If managers are
more likely to intervene when observing high theft levels in a restaurant on a given day, this
could explain the strategic peer response where servers reduce theft when their peers steal
more. To test this, we separately run regressions before and after the IT theft-monitoring
system implementation and compare the bias of OLS from IV regression. We drop all restaurants that never implemented the monitoring system (7 percent of the observations) because
adoption is endogenous and the non-adopters consequently form a problematic control group.
Furthermore, we can exploit the quasi-random staggered adoption rates to diﬀerentiate adoption from simple time trends.28 The results, shown in Table 2.8, provide two sets of results.
First, the true peer eﬀect in the IV regressions is much larger following monitoring adoption.
We note that this does not indicate a higher theft level (which is lower following monitoring
adoption), but rather that peer theft is more dependent on the identity of peers after ITmonitoring adoption. This could be because in the presence of monitoring, theft decreases
more strongly in the absence of high-theft peers. Second, the downward bias in the OLS
coeﬃcient estimates is larger after the monitoring system is introduced, which suggests that
increased managerial oversight increases the same-day strategic peer responses. This supports the idea that monitoring and oversight constrain total theft in the organization, forcing
employees to strategically respond to the misconduct of peers.29
28

Adoption timing is quasi-random because of the way in which the chains introduced the monitoring
system. See Pierce et al. (2015).
29
We present in the Appendix additional analysis with restaurants split by median workforce size. Similar
to the IT monitoring result, small restaurants show less bias in OLS estimates, which is consistent with lower
monitoring. One possible explanation is the frequent absence of a specialized manager in small restaurants,
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Table 2.8: Peer Eﬀect Before/After Theft-Monitoring System Implementation

Avg Peer Theft Count
Clustered Std. Error
Bootstrapped Std. Error
Avg Peer Theft Value
Clustered Std. Error
Bootstrapped Std. Error
Individual Fixed Eﬀect
Manager Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Year Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Week Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Weekday Fixed Eﬀect
Observations
R2
1st Stage F Statistics
Diﬀerence in Estimates
Hausman Test Statistics

DV:Server Theft Count
Before
After
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
OLS
IV
OLS
IV
-0.014∗∗
0.0028
-0.018∗∗∗
0.074∗∗∗
(0.005)
(0.02)
(0.002)
(0.02)
(0.006)
(0.03)
(0.003)
(0.034)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
718,409
0.164

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
718,409
0.215
398∗∗∗

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,082,061
0.095

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,082,061
0.105
1,202∗∗∗
0.092
23.7∗∗∗

0.017
0.75

DV:Server Theft Value
Before
After
(5)
(6)
(7)
OLS
IV
OLS

-0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
(0.002)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
718,409
0.284

0.03∗∗∗
(0.005)
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
718,409
0.371
7,158∗∗∗

0.033
45.3∗∗∗

-0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
(0.002)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,082,061
0.274

0.029∗∗∗
(0.005)
(0.008)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,082,061
0.193
7,808∗∗∗
0.035
61.2∗∗∗

Note: Standard errors, clustered or block-bootstrapped at the restaurant-shift level, are in parentheses. Significance
level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Block-bootstrapped standard errors with 100,000 iterations for IV models, 10,000
for OLS models.

2.6

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper provides the first evidence that the influence of peers in worker misconduct is more
complex than the productivity spillovers identified in studies from operations, economics,
and management. Our service operations setting shows that although high-theft peers indeed
encourage more theft in their coworkers, a second peer influence exists in the form of strategic
peer responses. These strategic peer responses, in the presence of managerial oversight and
monitoring, produce negative same-day correlations in peer theft as workers reduce theft on
a given day when peers steal more. When a coworker steals more on a given day, peers reduce
their own theft, possibly as a response to the increased risk of managerial detection. These
unique dynamics are identifiable because our simulations show that the diﬀerence between
OLS and instrumental variables models reflects the same-day correlation in worker theft.
such that the “manager” is frequently a deputized server. But this explanation is speculative, and others are
reasonable as well.
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(8)
IV

Our monitoring explanation is supported by the increased size of this diﬀerence following
adoption of an IT-monitoring system that raises the risk of theft detection.
What are the implications of our findings? First, we confirm that peer eﬀects in misconduct
are important in the same ways as the productivity peer eﬀects well-established in prior work.
Few studies have shown this in employees (Ichino and Maggi 2000, Dimmock et al. 2018),
with none that we are aware of at the scale or level of detail as the present study. This field
evidence in a service operations setting is important because it validates long-held beliefs in
the behavioral ethics literature that “bad apples” have a broad influence on an organization
beyond the direct outcomes of their own unethical actions (Gino et al. 2009, Kish-Gephart
et al. 2010, Treviño and Youngblood 1990, Moore and Gino 2013, Pinto et al. 2008, Brass
et al. 1998). We note that the organizational costs of bad apples may be even greater if
peer eﬀects dynamically increase coworker misconduct traits through learning processes or
changes in norms as in Chan et al. (2014b) or Hasan and Koning (2017).
Second, our identification of the importance of reflection eﬀects highlights how even small
peer eﬀects in dyads can multiply, resulting in very large organizational implications. An
unethical employee may aﬀect many peers simultaneously, who in turn will aﬀect others.
It is this contagion or normalization of corruption that can generate astounding levels of
misconduct within organizations (Pinto et al. 2008).
Third, our results suggest that managerial oversight not only reduces average misconduct
levels (e.g., Pierce et al. 2015, Nagin et al. 2002), but also can constrain daily escalation in
bad behavior among peers. Oversight, such as monitoring, changes the calculus for employees
because it positively ties the risk of detection to the misconduct of peers. It is this strategic
peer response that we observe in our biased OLS estimates. In settings where low levels of
misconduct are acceptable but higher ones expose the firm to substantial risk of loss, the
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eﬀects we identify may shorten periods of peak misconduct, instead smoothing these costly
behaviors across time.
Fourth, we provide further evidence that new employees are particularly vulnerable to the
norms and behaviors of their coworkers. Firms must consider carefully with whom to staﬀ
new workers, given the potential of peers to shape worker behavior. These results also
support the importance of successfully onboarding new workers through both formal training
and mentoring processes (Cable et al. 2013).
Finally, we provide an important methodological contribution by demonstrating how the
biases in standard OLS peer eﬀect models can be used to reveal strategic interactions among
peers in a given shift or day. Although scholars have long understood the importance of
correcting for these biases (Manski 1993), our simulations show that the magnitude and
direction of the biases can also reveal mechanisms that shape peer interactions.
We acknowledge that we are unable to precisely separate the many mechanisms through
which workers’ misconduct influences peer behavior. These mechanisms, which include social
pressure, shame, helping, coordination, knowledge transfer, and others, are well established in
prior work on productivity, but we are not able to diﬀerentiate them in our particular setting
with the data available. Our evidence on new workers provides perhaps the best attempt
at this, but there are reasons to believe new workers would be most strongly influenced by
all of these. The peer eﬀects identified in our models may also persist across multiple days,
but such persistence will not bias our estimates because of the two-week window in our
instrument, which we demonstrated was suﬃciently long to eﬀectively eliminate any serial
correlation.
One challenge of our large-scale operational setting is that it is not a randomized experiment.
Consequently, although the setting is important and generalizable, we are unable to control
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for either the hiring process or the staﬃng decisions, and, as we show in the Appendix,
attrition is correlated with theft levels. As we note earlier, because our regressions control
for the identities of focal and peer workers, these are unlikely to present major biases in
our estimation. The one concern would be if managers were strategically staﬃng workers
based on both their average theft levels and their vulnerability to peer influence. Unlike in
productivity studies, however, this bias would work against our results. Endogenous staﬃng
presents a problem for productivity peer-eﬀect models because managers might strategically
staﬀ their best workers with those most likely to benefit from these star coworkers, thereby
biasing estimates upward. If such endogenous staﬃng is present in our study, managers
would instead likely staﬀ the highest theft employees with those who are least likely to be
influenced, biasing our estimates downward. So, if anything, our estimates would be smaller
than the true eﬀect.
Finally, we emphasize that the magnitude of our eﬀects has significant implications for firms
seeking to reduce misconduct among teams of workers. Our coeﬃcients imply spillovers of
between 2.5 percent and 4 percent, which, although smaller than prior estimates of productivity peer eﬀects (Herbst and Mas 2015), are still important in low-margin industries, such
as our restaurant setting. As we demonstrate, even small-magnitude coeﬃcients have major
implications for organizations due to each worker having multiple peers and the reflection effects between them. One weakness in interpreting our estimate magnitudes is that our theft
measures represent only a small portion of the likely theft occurring in these restaurants
because the data provider’s forensic algorithms are necessarily conservative. Furthermore,
our data cannot detect an equally, if not more, important type of theft occurring in parallel—
inventory theft. Yet if our peer-eﬀect estimates apply equally to these hidden types of theft,
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as well as to other important types of misconduct in service settings, such as sexual harassment and abuse, then even small increases in peer misconduct can have considerable
implications for organizations.
How can managers apply our results to operations management? The first clear and important implication is that “bad apples” with high levels of misconduct are even more costly
than their individual behavior. They also propagate a culture of misconduct, increasing
the bad behavior of those around them. Managers must recognize that removing such highmisconduct workers from their organization is of paramount importance when that misconduct is contagious to peers, and that the continued employment of these workers cannot be
justified by their contributions being greater than their individual bad behavior. This is an
important implication because managers commonly must evaluate this trad-eoﬀ on a variety
of antisocial or illegal behaviors. Second, our results emphasize the importance of matching
new or other easily influenced workers with those whose contributing and prosocial behavior
will generate productive peer eﬀects rather than those of misconduct. If high-misconduct
employees cannot be separated from the organization, isolating them can potentially mitigate the peer eﬀects in misconduct observed in this paper. Our paper also implies that
although monitoring can’t stop theft, it can constrain it on a given day. But even with
eﬀective monitoring, the worst employees will still have a strong influence on peers.

2.7
2.7.1

Appendix
Instruments Using Diﬀerent Exclusion Windows

For robustness, we construct three sets of instruments by varying the length of time window,
separately excluding coworker observations within one week, two weeks, and three weeks of
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the focal worker observation. We run the original IV regression using these three sets of
instruments. The results are shown in Tables 2.9 and 2.10. We find very similar peer-eﬀect
estimates.

Table 2.9: Average Peer Eﬀect in Theft Count
Model
Estimate Clustered Std.Error
IV(1 Week)
PeerTheft
0.046
0.010
IV(2 Week)
Peer Theft
0.042
0.015
IV(3 Week)
Peer Theft
0.045
0.017

Table 2.10: Average Peer Eﬀect in Theft Value
Model
Estimate Clustered Std.Error
IV(1 Week)
PeerTheft
0.027
0.0031
IV(2 Week)
Peer Theft
0.027
0.0032
IV(3 Week)
Peer Theft
0.025
0.0043

2.7.2

Peer Eﬀects in Productivity

To measure productivity peer eﬀects in our setting, we run our OLS and IV models on
employee tip amount, sales revenue, drink sales, and add-on sales. Tip amount is a measure
of service quality, since customers have wide discretion in how much to tip servers for a given
meal. In practice, however, variance is low for tip amount. Drink sales represent a significant
portion of restaurant profits since they have very low marginal cost and thus high margins.
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Table 2.11: Peer Eﬀects in Theft with Alternative Clustering
DV:Server Theft Count
(1)
(2)
OLS
IV
-0.01∗∗∗
0.04∗∗
(0.0018,0.0021)
(0.015,0.019)

Avg Peer Theft Count
Avg Peer Theft Value
Individual Fixed Eﬀect
Manager Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Year Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Week Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Weekday Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*IT-Monitoring Fixed Eﬀect
Observations
R2
1st Stage F Statistics
Diﬀerence in Estimate
Hausman Test Statistics

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4058783
0.182

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4058783
0.125
1396∗∗∗

DV:Server Theft Value
(3)
(4)
OLS
IV
0.007∗∗∗
(0.001,0.0015)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4058783
0.241

0.027∗∗∗
(0.003,0.007)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4058783
0.240
14260∗∗∗

0.02
86.4∗∗∗

0.05
10.14∗∗∗

Note:Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The first number represents standard error clustered
at restaurant shift level. The second number represents standard error clustered at restaurant level.
Significance level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.

Table 2.12: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Regression
Variable
Theft Count Mean
Theft Count SD
Theft Value Mean
Theft Value SD
Tipping Mean
Tipping SD
Revenue Mean
Revenue SD
Drink Sales Mean
Drink Sales SD
Add-on Sales Mean
Add-on Sales SD

Focal Server
0.06
0.60
1.14
18.13
4.0
17.8
43.2
204.0
8.3
10.6
7.0
8.6

Avg Peer
0.07
0.35
1.35
11.6
4.1
9.3
43.1
101.5
8.8
8.3
7.4
7.1

Note: Descriptive statistics for productivity measures for both dependent variable (Focal Server) and
instrumental variable (Avg Peer).
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Add-on sales are also important for restaurants because of their high margins. Consequently,
each of these four measures represents a diﬀerent dimension of employee performance that
might impact operational performance. Since not all restaurants in the data set recorded
drink sales, tipping, and add-on sales, we must drop these restaurants in the regressions.
The OLS and IV regression results are shown in Tables 2.13 (tipping), 2.14 (revenue), 2.16
(drink sales), and 2.15 (add-on sales), with standard errors clustered at the restaurant-shift
level.30 In each case, estimated peer eﬀects are positive, although only add-on and drink
sales are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Given that add-on and drink sales
represent the most important components of profit margins for restaurants, these positive
peer eﬀects are important for operational performance and are consistent with results from
Tan and Netessine (2019).
We also note that the OLS estimates are not significantly smaller than IV estimates, as was
the case with our theft peer eﬀects models. This is consistent with the idea that the large
negative same-day correlations in theft among coworkers might reflect strategic responses to
managerial oversight. Productivity is encouraged and not something that must be hidden
from management, such that we would not expect much smaller OLS parameters than IV
ones. We caution, however, that without strictly larger OLS estimates, we cannot definitively
argue against negative same-day correlations in errors, and emphasize that the insignificant
Hausman tests may reflect two countervailing biases that produce indistinguishable coeﬃcients.
30

See Appendix Table 2.11 for results with restaurant-level clustering.
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Table 2.13: Average Peer Eﬀect in Tipping
DV:Server Tip
OLS
IV
0.008
0.03
(0.03)
(0.08)
4058783
4058783
0.190
0.188
45.13∗∗∗
0.022
2.2

Avg Peer Tip
Observations
R2
1st Stage F Statistics
Diﬀerence in Estimate
Hausman Test Statistics

Note:Standard errors, clustered at the restaurant-shift level, are presented in parentheses. Significance
level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.

Table 2.14: Average Peer Eﬀect in Revenue
DV:Server Revenue
OLS
IV
0.048
0.059
(0.05)
(0.06)
4058783
4058783
0.207
0.206
59.62∗∗∗
0.011
0.14

Avg Peer Revenue
Observations
R2
1st Stage F Statistics
Diﬀerence in Estimate
Hausman Test Statistics

Note:Standard errors, clustered at the restaurant-shift level, are presented in parentheses. Significance
level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.

Table 2.15: Average Peer Eﬀect in Add-on Sales

Avg Peer Add-on Sales
Observations
R2
1st Stage F Statistics
Diﬀerence in Estimate
Hausman Test Statistics

DV:Server Add-on Sales
OLS
IV
0.20∗∗∗
0.169∗∗∗
(0.005)
(0.029)
3769578
3769578
0.652
0.647
151.3∗∗∗
-0.031
1.17

Note:Standard errors, clustered at the restaurant-shift level, are presented in parentheses. Significance
level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 2.16: Average Peer Eﬀect in Drink Sales

Avg Peer Drink Sales
Observations
R2
1st Stage F Statistics
Diﬀerence in Estimate
Hausman Test Statistics

DV:Server Drink Sales
OLS
IV
0.20∗∗∗
0.19∗∗∗
(0.02)
(0.04)
3769578
3769578
0.558
0.556
280.4∗∗∗
-0.01
0.08

Note:Standard errors, clustered at the restaurant-shift level, are presented in parentheses. Significance
level:∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.

Table 2.17: Peer Eﬀects in Theft Count by Month for All New Employees

Avg Peer Theft Count
Individual Fixed Eﬀect
Manager Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Year Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Week Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Weekday Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*IT-Monitoring Fixed Eﬀect
Observations
R2

(1)
1st Month
0.125∗∗∗
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
985,136
0.154

(2)
2nd Month
0.10∗∗∗
(0.03)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
569,481
0.192

(3)
3rd Month
0.122∗∗
(0.05)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
365,177
0.225

(4)
4th Month
0.121∗∗
(0.06)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
247,899
0.257

Note:Standard errors, clustered at the restaurant-shift level, are presented in parentheses.

∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.

(5)
5th Month
0.120∗
(0.07)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
169,968
0.280

(6)
6+ Months
0.032
(0.05)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
305,492
0.201

Significance level:∗ p<0.1;

Table 2.18: Peer Eﬀects in Theft Value by Month for All New Employees

Avg Peer Theft Value
Individual Fixed Eﬀect
Manager Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Year Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Week Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*Weekday Fixed Eﬀect
Restaurant*IT-Monitoring Fixed Eﬀect
Observations
R2

(1)
1st Month
0.048∗∗∗
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
985,136
0.201

(2)
2nd Month
0.042∗∗∗
(0.008)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
569,481
0.232

(3)
3rd Month
0.035∗∗∗
(0.01)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
365,177
0.269

(4)
4th Month
0.043∗∗∗
(0.015)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
247,899
0.315

Note:Standard errors, clustered at the restaurant-shift level, are presented in parentheses.

∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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(5)
5th Month
0.027
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
169,968
0.35

(6)
6+ Months
-0.004
(0.01)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
305,492
0.33

Significance level:∗ p<0.1;

Figure 2.13: Survival Probability for High- and Low-Theft Workers

Figure shows raw survival data for all high- and low-theft workers, defined by whether their average daily
theft value is below or above the median worker.
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2.7.3

Count Data and Linear Model

In Figure 2.14, we show the distribution of theft count after logarithmic and demeaning transformation. The distribution after transformation is close to normal, which could alleviate
concerns of applying a linear model to discrete count data.

Figure 2.14: Distribution of Theft Count After Transformation

2.7.4

Calculating Total Impact of Peer Eﬀects

Here we use a toy numerical example to show that the endogenous peer-eﬀect coeﬃcient in
our model has a multiplier eﬀect on the overall outcome because of the reflection structure in
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peer eﬀect equations. To simplify the analysis, we use a group of two workers i, j. Suppose
that without peer eﬀects, each worker’s intrinsic theft level is αi , αj . With β as the peereﬀect coeﬃcient, the real theft level (Yi , Yj ) should be the solution to the system of Equations
(2.7).


 Yi = βYj + αi


Yj = βYi + αj

(2.7)

Solving the equation, we have






 Yi  

=
Yj


βαj +αi
1−β 2
βαi +αj
1−β 2




(2.8)

Now suppose the intrinsic theft level of worker i, αi increases by an amount of ∆. Solving
′

′

Equations (2.7) again, we have the new theft level (Yi , Yj ) as








′

 Yi  
 ′ =
Yj

βαj +αi +∆
1−β 2
β(αi +∆)+αj
1−β 2




(2.9)

Comparing the theft levels as shown in Equations (2.8) and (2.9), the increase in theft level
′

for worker i is: Yi − Yi =

∆
.
1−β 2

′

The increase in theft level for worker j is: Yj − Yj =

β∆
.
1−β 2

With a peer-eﬀect coeﬃcient β < 1, we could clearly see that the increase of worker i′ s
theft level is larger than ∆, and that the impact of i′ s increase in intrinsic theft level on j
is larger than β∆. This is caused by the reflection structure in peer-eﬀect Equations (2.7);
an increase in i′ s theft value will have impact on j through the peer-eﬀect coeﬃcient β, and
because i′ s theft level is reflectively aﬀected by j ′ s theft level, the increase in j ′ s theft level
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will be reflected back on i′ s own theft. As a result, the overall increase in real theft level
β+1
( 1−β
2 ∆) is larger than the case without the endogenous peer eﬀect (∆).

The overall eﬀect of such endogenous peer eﬀect increases with the size of the peer group
because the reflection exists in any pair of individuals in the peer group and the number of
bilateral relationships, which is

n×(n−1)
2

for a group of n individuals, increases the size of the

peer group. In summary, the interpretation of the endogenous peer-eﬀect coeﬃcient in our
model should account for the reflection structure, which results in a multiplier eﬀect on the
observed outcome, and such multiplier eﬀect increases the size of the peer group and the
peer-eﬀect coeﬃcient.

2.7.5

Clustered Standard Errors and Block Bootstrapped Standard
Errors

For robustness, we block bootstrap standard errors for the main peer-eﬀect regressions. For
the regression on theft count, the block-bootstrapped standard error increases by 31 percent from the clustered standard error. For the regression on theft amount, the blockbootstrapped standard error increases by 50 percent from the clustered standard error. The
peer-eﬀect coeﬃcients are still significant with the larger block-bootstrapped standard error.

2.7.6

Serial Correlation Test

We conduct serial correlation tests on residuals to understand whether our two-week window
is suﬃciently long to establish instrument exogeneity. We first estimate the autocorrelation
coeﬃcient between residuals ϵit and ϵi(t-k) , with lags k = 2, 4, · · · , 14 from the IV regressions
on theft count and theft value. We use the incremental value of 2 days because the average
time between two consecutive shifts for a focal worker is two days in our data. Figure 2.16
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Figure 2.15: Correlation, True Parameter, & OLS Bias

This figure shows how the OLS bias (OLS - IV estimates) varies with diﬀerent covariance in residuals for
true parameters ranging from 0.06 to 0.46. Each point in each of the nine curves includes 1,000 simulations
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shows the decreasing trend of the autocorrelation coeﬃcient over time. Within 10 lags, the
auto correlation coeﬃcient is 0.03 for theft count and 0.02 for theft value. From lag 10 to
lag 14, the decreases to 0.02 for theft count and 0.005 for theft value before converging to
zero. This suggests that even if a focal worker were aware of peer behavior during shifts
she did not work, and this word-of-mouth changed her behavior that day, that behavioral
change would be unlikely to carry forward two weeks into the future to violate the exclusion
restriction.
We also conducted a Ljung-Box test for each worker’s time series ϵit with lags between 14
and 28 days, since these days represent data from which we build our instruments. We
find that only 2.2% (theft count) and 1.6% (theft value) of all workers demonstrate any
serial correlation with a p value less than 0.05. This further alleviates concerns that serial
correlation from our instruments might violate the exclusion restriction.

2.7.7

Peer Eﬀects Based on Restaurant Size

We also explored possible diﬀerences in peer influence between large and small restaurants,
splitting our sample based on the number of median employees at that restaurant in a week.
We run the average peer eﬀect regressions separately for large and small restaurants, with
results shown in Table 2.19.
The IV estimates show much stronger peer eﬀects in large restaurants than in small restaurants. Comparing the bias of OLS estimates with IV estimates, we find that the downward
bias is also larger in large restaurants than in small restaurants. This indicates that the negative correlation in daily error terms is higher in large chains. This finding could be explained
by the monitoring attention diﬀerence in large and small restaurants. In small restaurants,
workers usually occupy multiple roles (bartenders, to-go server, etc.) due to small scale
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Figure 2.16: Auto Correlation Coeﬃcient Over Time
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Table 2.19: Average Peer Eﬀect Small Restaurant VS Large Restaurant
Model
Theft Count
Small Restaurant

OLS

IV

-0.012
0.02
(0.0019) (0.015)
Large Restaurant
-0.003
0.14
(0.005) (0.05)
Theft Value
Small Restaurant
0.01
0.02
(0.001) (0.003)
Large Restaurant
0.005
0.06
(0.002) (0.009)
Note:Standard errors, block-bootstrapped at the restaurant-shift level, are presented in parentheses.

limiting specialization. As a result, managers in small restaurants could take other roles in
addition to monitoring the servers and thus have less attention for monitoring. In our data,
65% of servers in small restaurants have worked as managers, while the percentage is 44%
in large restaurants. Why then are peer eﬀects larger in large restaurants?
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Chapter 3
“The Company We Keep”: Endogenous
Network Formation and Peer Eﬀects in
Customer Churn
Co-authored with Yulia Nevskaya

3.1

Introduction

Recent trends in information technology, such as the increase in Internet speed, the market
maturity of smart connected devices, and the growth of social media, have a significant impact on making individual consumption and preferences visible to other people and facilitated
the popularity of many products with built-in social components. On social media platforms,
users’ “likes” and “following” of brands are visible to their friends. In socially-connected products, such as fitness services and massively multiplayer games, real-time interactions with
peer consumers are greatly responsible for the mass appeal and product growth. At the same
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time, researchers and practitioners got unprecedented access to data on social interactions
between consumers in the process of adoption and consumption of products and services.
The growth of socially connected products and the access of data led to an increased desire
to measure and understand peer eﬀect in the consumer decision process as well as to eﬀectively utilize social connections to improve marketing strategies. However, in many empirical
applications, researchers do not have direct information on social connections, thus need to
infer connections from observational data on joint consumptions. The social connections
recovered from such method are fundamentally endogenous because consumers’ selection of
peers is part of the social interaction that simultaneously aﬀects the outcomes of interest,
such as product adoption, consumption intensity, and customer churn.
Understanding consumer churn behavior is of paramount importance to companies as lost
customers hurt revenue streams and are expensive to replenish. Equipped with an in-depth
understanding of churn behavior, managers can craft eﬀective retention campaigns (Ascarza
et al., 2017). In a wide range of products and services consumed in a socially connected
manner, consumer’ decision to churn are frequently observed together with peers’ churn. In
the literature, peer churn has proven to be a powerful predictor of customer churn (e.g.,
Benedek et al., 2014; Han and Ferreira, 2014; Backiel et al., 2016). However, to leverage
the full potential of social connections in retention campaigns, marketing practitioners have
to move beyond the predictive power of social connections and toward isolating causality in
churn behavior, where more work is needed (Ascarza et al., 2018).
In the meantime, marketing academic researchers have been focusing mostly on peer eﬀect
in product adoption rather than on peer eﬀect in product use and churn (e.g., Risselada
et al., 2014, Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004; and others). Notable exceptions include
Yang et al. (2006) who studies television content consumption by spouses and Hartmann
(2010) who proposed an empirical structural model of demand with social interactions for
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repeat purchases. Nitzan and Libai (2010) was among the first empirical studies focusing on
social eﬀects in customer churn behavior for products of subscription nature; they estimate
a proportional hazard model to describe the eﬀects in an undirected network of consumers
who use a common cellular service provider. Further, Haenlein (2013) looks at the social
eﬀect in customer retention in the same industry and stresses the importance of measuring
interactions with directed network.
Following the literature on identification of peer eﬀect (Manski, 1993; Moﬃtt, 2001; Yang
et al., 2006; Hartmann et al., 2008; Hartmann, 2010; Nair et al., 2010; and others), we
recognize the challenges that identification of peer eﬀect presents. First, the peer network
structure and the strength of connections depend on individuals’ inherent characteristics and
preferences. Homophily, a tendency to build stronger relationships with people of similar
tastes, background, and so forth is widely documented (Kandel, 1978); evidence for interpersonal complementarity, colloquially known as “opposites attract”, is also available (Dryer and
Horowitz, 1997). In other words, peer relationships are endogenous. The inherent individual
characteristics that aﬀect tie formation are often unobserved by the researcher but known
to consumers and their peers. Those unobserved characteristics might factor not only into
selection of peers but also into consumer’s decision to churn. As a result, the estimates of
the peer churn eﬀect on consumer’s decision will be biased if her selection of peers is not
accounted for. Second, peer’s choice is not exogenous as consumers are simultaneously aﬀecting each other, which gives rise to the “reflection problem,” as originally termed in Manski
(1993). Again, it leads to the biased estimate of the peer eﬀect if simultaneity is ignored.
Finally, there is an issue of unobserved contextual eﬀects, i.e. the peers can be aﬀected by
some common churn drivers that lead consumers to abandon the product. These unobserved
(to the researcher) common drivers can manifest as peer eﬀect if not controlled for.
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The approaches to tackle endogeneity issues in measuring peer eﬀect in linear-in-means
models with continuous outcomes are extensively covered in the literature (e.g., Manski, 1993;
Moﬃtt, 2001; Bramoulle et.al, 2009; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, 2013). In discrete
choice settings, Hartmann (2010) introduced a demand model with social interactions to
explore the behavior of peers buying rounds of golf. The author tackled the simultaneity
problem through directly modeling decision making under peer influence with a static game
of complete information and solved correlated unobservable problem by utilizing panel data
structure. Similar panel data method was utilized in Nair(2010) to tackle endogenous doctor
networks to study peer influence in prescription choices.
The distinguishing nature of consumer churn from repeated purchase and prescription decisions that are studied in previous literature is that the churn decision is observed only
once for each consumer. Therefore, in this domain a researcher could not utilize panel data
structure to account for correlated unobservables when studying peer influence. To tackle
the peer network endogeneity, we model the process of network formation process and the
decision to churn at the same time. We utilize the structure of the formed network to recover
the individual-specific unobserved characteristics that simultaneously factor in the churn decision. This approach is in line with the developing stream of literature in economics that
pairs empirical models of peer eﬀect with network formation models (Goldsmith-Pinkham
and Imbens, 2013; Blume et al., 2015; Graham, 2015; Hsieh and Lee, 2016; Griﬃth, 2019
and others).
The network formation process is modeled as a simultaneous-move static game. Agents decide on the relationship strengths with others, which are captured by a continuous variable.
The continuous strength measure represents the actual relationships more precisely than binary measure of who is connected with whom. Further, it helps the researcher to drastically
reduce the computational burden typically associated with the estimation of simultaneous
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discrete-choice games in general and network formation games in particular, which are prone
to multiple equilibria and might be diﬃcult to bring to data if the number of peers is sufficiently large (Ellickson and Misra, 2011). The unique Nash equilibrium to the network
formation game is guaranteed following mild regulatory conditions in Griﬃth (2019). We
specify the empirical churn model as a static simultaneous-move game of incomplete information, where consumer’s utility from continuing product use is aﬀected by the consumer’s
expectations about the continued use by her peers. The unobserved individual characteristics
recovered from the network formation game serves as a correction for peer eﬀect endogeneity
caused by correlated unobservables through entering the utility function as otherwise omitted variable. We control for the common contextual eﬀects by including a rich set of time
and network fixed eﬀects.
We apply the specified model framework of peer network formation and churn to the online
gaming industry, which is fast becoming one of the most important industry in the entertainment sector.
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Many online games have strong social features: gamers enjoy the game

together with their peer gamers for most of the time. One gamer’s churn may possibly lead
to her peer gamers’ churn. Thus it is crucial for gaming platforms to understand gamers’
churn behavior under peer influence. Peer relationships in online gaming networks are likely
endogenous decisions. The less seasoned gamers might tend to connect and play more with
other novices with little experience of playing online games in the past, due to lingo barrier
and limited prior exposure to gaming culture. At the same time, the “novice to gaming”
characteristics can also explain the correlated early churn of these gamers. Our model could
address the endogeneity in peer relationships that may causes bias in estimating the causal
peer influence in churn.
31

Massively multiplayer online role-playing games alone generated the revenue of roughly 19.9 billion U.S.
dollars worldwide in 2016; more than 53 million people in the U.S. played online games at least once a month
in 2016, and around that time 59% of the U.S adults over the age of 50 admitted to playing them (Statista,
2019).
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We find significant evidence of peer connections being explained by the unobserved heterogeneity, in addition to observables, such as an in-game experience level and in-game demographics. Further, estimation of the peer eﬀect model demonstrates that the unobserved
gamer characteristics have statistically significant power in explaining consumers’ churn decisions as well. We show that, in our empirical setting, omitting the recovered unobserved
gamer characteristics would lead to underestimation of the magnitude of peer influence on
churn.
Based on the estimated models, we run simulation studies to investigate how churn dynamic
in the peer network is aﬀected by composition of gamer characteristics. Our analysis shows
that given the estimated consumer preferences, the gaming platform would see lower average
churn rates from policies that could induce more balanced peer networks, i.e. networks not
dominated by popular gamers.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. From the methodology perspective, our empirical
model addresses the issue of social network endogeneity in the identification of peer eﬀect
in consumer churn. The model framework could be easily apply to other empirical settings
in marketing where the network structure could be constructed and consumers’ churns are
aﬀected by peers. From the substantive perspective, this paper provides insights on how
gamers form peer networks and how the churn dynamics is related with the peer network
structure. Our simulation studies provide implications on how gaming platforms could design
policies to induce peer networks that suﬀer less from high peer related churn rate.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe the empirical setting of our
study, including the online game itself and the observational data we use. Section 3.3 presents
the model and the estimation approach. In Section 3.4 we discuss our estimation results.
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Section 3.5 lays out the analysis of the network structure and its relationship to consumer
churn rates. We conclude in Section 3.6.

3.2

Empirical Settings

In this section we describe the empirical setting of the online game, the data we observe and
use, as well as our approach to measuring the strength of relationships between peers.

3.2.1

The Product

For this study we use individual-level data collected directly from a server of the World of
Warcraft (WoW ), a massively multiplayer online role-playing game, from January 2006 to
January 2009 (Lee et al., 2011). We use data from January to July of 2006 for main analysis.
To play the game, a consumer creates an avatar who represents her in the virtual environment
and completes in-game tasks. During the time period covered in the study, gamers can
progress through experience levels from 1 to 60 by playing the game. The fantasy world
of the game is vast and consists of many lands and territories (gaming zones) the avatars
can travel to. Some gaming zones oﬀer tasks more appropriate for certain experience levels.
In the gaming environment, the gamer can see, interact and cooperate with other gamers
represented by their avatars. Avatars can join guilds, which are self-organized communities
of gamers who get together to complete in-game tasks and socialize within the game (Nardi,
2010). The WoW is a high-involvement game as avatars32 in our data spend on average 12.5
hours per week consuming the game content.
32

We will use the terms “avatar”, “consumer” and “gamer” interchangeably. To our knowledge, a small
share of consumers manage more than one avatar. However, diﬀerent avatars connected to one account
cannot be played simultaneously. Due to data limitations, we can’t trace multiple avatars to a particular
consumer (however, the game developer can easily do it). For this reason, the average time spent playing
the game presented here might be underestimated and we might treat some consumers as churned if they
drop using one of their avatars.
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In total, we observe 18,471 unique avatars. Once a gamer logs onto a WoW server, we
observe her experience level, the gaming zone she appears in, and the guild she belongs to.
The gamer’s status is updated every 4-5 minutes, until she logs oﬀ. There are 96 unique
guilds and the gamers are observed in 87 gaming zones.
Gamers at early experience levels typically do not join guilds or interact much with other
gamers. In contrast, the gameplay at the higher experience levels is socially oriented as
gamers get team-based tasks and develop social connections over time. Therefore, early
churn might be less a function of social factors and more about intrinsic preferences for
the core mechanics of the game. For that reason, in our analysis we focus on experienced
gamers at level 30 or higher. Guilds of gamers are evolving over time and we restrict our
attention to fully functioning guilds that have at least 50 members. As such, we have 2,444
unique avatars and 23 unique guilds observed for 30 weeks which results in 307 guild-week
observations.
Based on observing avatars’ co-locations across time and gaming zones, we construct each
gamer’s peer network. Our premise here is that those co-locations in time and space reveal
gamer’s social connections. We calculate the average number of gamers observed in a zone at
the same time. In Figure 3.1, each circle represents a zone, the larger the size, more unique
gamers are observed gaming simultaneously at that zone. The Y-axis represents the number
of unique gamers. We rank the zones by their size along the X-axis. At any zone, the average
number of gamers occupying the zone is under 50, and in majority of zones, it is under 10.
We argue that it is highly likely that gamers appearing in the same zone consistently for a
duration of time are gaming peers, which means they know each other and are gaming side
by side. Next, we describe how we use guilds and the co-location information across time to
define peer relationships and measure the strengths of relationships.
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Figure 3.1: Number of gamers playing together in a zone

3.2.2

Peer Definition

We utilize the fully functioning guilds that are highly socially organized to construct peer
relationships of gamers. Guilds often manage guild members-only events to promote interactions among its members. They also host homepages that show the information of members
and the planned guild events. In the data, we find that more than 86% of gamers in our
data belonged to a guild at least once and gamers at advanced experience levels belong to
a guild at almost any time. Since the guilds account for the majority of social interactions
of the gamer on the platform, and each gamer can be a member of only one guild at a time,
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we define a gamer’s peers as other gamers in the same guild. It is possible that gamers may
develop peer relationships with gamers in other guilds. From our knowledge of the game,
such peer relationships are infrequent. It is infeasible to model the network formation process
if we include both within-guild and out-of-guild peer relationships as the network size will
grow extremely large. Thus we treat the guild as unit of network and restrict our analysis
on peer networks within the guild.
In Figure 3.2 we provide some descriptive statistics for the guilds we observe in our data.
The descriptive statistics are computed at the guild-week level. Panel (A) displays the
distribution of the average experience levels across guilds. We see that the majority of guilds
have an average experience level between 50 and 55, but there are guilds with lower and
higher average experience levels as well. Similarly, Panel (B) displays the distribution of
standard deviations of gamers’ experience levels in each guild. It shows that in addition to
the variation in average levels across guilds, we also have a strong variation in levels within
guilds. Both across-guilds and within-guild variation in gamers’ observed characteristics are
necessary for identifying the social network generation process, which we will explain in
detail later. Further, we look at the amount of time per week a gamer spends playing the
game. Panels (C) and (D) show the distribution of means and standard deviations of gaming
time across guilds. Again, we observe variation both within and across guilds. Next, we look
at the number of days the level 60 gamers(the maximum possible level in our observation
window) spent gaming at the level. That time could signify additional experience and status.
Panels (E) and (F) show large variations in average experience beyond level-60 across guilds
and large within-guild variations.Panel (G) presents the distribution of the number of gamers
across guilds. We see that the smallest guild has around 50 gamers, while the largest guilds
reach 250 members. The network size in our data is suﬃciently large for identification of
the unobserved gamer characteristics from the network formation process and the variation
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of network sizes across guilds will aid in identification. The details will be explained later in
in Section 3.3.1.

3.2.3

Relationship Strength

In our study, a gamer is socially connected to all other gamers in her guild, but with varying
strength. We measure the strength of relationships using a continuous scale. The continuous
scale arguably allows for more precise measurement, as it does not embody the restrictive
assumptions of a zero/one peer definition, which is important for inference in empirical
studies of social influence (Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, 2013). A gamer’s relationship
strengths with others are revealed through her choice of whom to game with and the gaming
time they spend together. In other words, gamer i must have a strong relationship with
gamer j if gamer i is observed spending a lot of her time with gamer j relative to with other
gamers in the guild. At the same time, gamer j might not have a strong relationship with
gamer i if j is observed spending more of her gaming time with other gamers than with i.
As such, the social ties are directed.33
We use the following principles to construct a formal measure of tie strength. First, we
capture the duration of joint gaming. The longer the duration two gamers are observed
together in the same zone, the more likely they have a stronger connection. Second, we
adjust the duration in the same zone by the intensity of interactions: two avatars who game
in a zone with no other avatars present are likely to have a stronger tie than if they were
surrounded by many other gamers. Third, we include the frequency of joint gaming. If
two gamers are consistently observed gaming together across diﬀerent zones in a period of
time, they are likely to have strong connections. These three principles jointly rule out the
conditions that two gamers are not familiar with each other and are observed in the same
33

In this paper, we use relationships and ties interchangeably
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Figure 3.2: Guilds: descriptive statistics

zone by chance. Let gij denote the directed tie strength from gamer i to gamer j, which
represents the how strong the connection between i and j is from the perspective of j. Based
on the above principles, we define gij as follows:

gij =

∑

N ij
∑ zd

d∈D, z∈Z

ik
Nzd

,

(3.1)

k∈Kzt : k̸=i
ij
where D is the set of time periods (days) in a week; Z is the set of gaming zones; Nzd
is

the duration of time when both gamer i and gamer j are observed together in zone z in
period d; Kzd is the set of gamers observed together with i and j in zone z in period d.
ij
By normalizing the duration of gaming Nzd
by interactions with other gamers at the same

time and place, described by the denominator in Equation 3.1, we capture the intensity of
interactions between gamers i and j. For each pair of gamers i and j, the intensities are
aggregated over all zones and time periods to produce a measure of tie strength gij . The
denominator in the above equation is generally diﬀerent in value for gamer j ̸= i. As a result,
gij ̸= gji , i.e. the ties are directed.
Next we describe the variations in peer tie strength and guilds composition that we observe
in the data. In Figure 3.3, we show a distribution of strengths of all ties in two guilds.
We find strong variations of gamers’ tie strengths within each guild , and strong ties are
relatively rare. We also observe that gamers in Guild 2 on average form stronger ties than
in Guild 1. The across guilds variation in average tie strengths show that guilds have
heterogeneous levels of social interaction. Such variations will facilitate identification of the
network formation process. Next, we look at the variation in tie strength at individual level.
In Figure 3.4, we show the distribution of peer tie strengths for two gamers who belong to
the same guild (Guild 2). We observe that gamers form strong ties with a small number
of peers while forming relatively weak ties with the rest majority of the peers. Gamer A
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has significantly strong ties with more gamers in the guild than gamer B. At the same time,
gamer B forms very strong ties with a smaller number of peers, but those ties are stronger
than the strongest ties of gamer A’s. In summary, we find variation in tie strength at both
guild level and individual level.

Figure 3.3: Relationships profiles (out-links) in two guilds

We now turn to discussing the drivers of variations in tie strength. First, we look at the
explanatory power of gamers’ observed characteristics, such as experience level and gaming
time. In Figure 3.5 we visualize the the distribution of tie strength among gamers in one
of the guilds as a series of heat-maps. In the heat-map, both X-axis and Y-axis represent
the same rank ordered gamers in the guild. For a guild of N gamers, the heatmap consists
of a grid of N × N squares, each of which represents the tie strength from i on the X-axis
to j on the Y-axis. The tie strength is represented by the color intensity: stronger ties
are in darker colors and weaker ties are in lighter colors. In Panel (A), we order gamers
randomly. We see that darker squares representing stronger ties are randomly scattered on
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Figure 3.4: Relationships profiles (out-links) of two gamers
the heatmap. In Panel (B), we rank gamers by their experience levels, in the ascending
order. The dotted horizontal and vertical lines represent the highest possible level of 60; the
squares in the upper-right portion of the plot are connections between gamers who reached
level 60 (those gamers are ordered by the time they spent at that level which corresponds
to their additional experience and status). In contrast to the random scattering pattern
of Panel (A), we observe that stronger ties are now clustered closer to the 45-degree line,
which indicates that gamers are likely to form stronger connections with others of similar
experience levels. In Panel (C), we order gamers by their total gaming time in the week, in
the ascending order. We observe that stronger ties are clustered in the upper-right corner:
naturally, gamers with more gaming time form stronger connections with other gamers who
also play longer hours.In Panel (D), we use days at level 60 to diﬀerentiate gamers who have
reached level 60 by their experience and order these players by the number of days spent
at level 60. Gamers who have not reached level 60 are randomly ordered. For gamers who
have reached level 60, we find larger concentration of stronger ties with gamers who have
also reached level 60 than with gamers who have not.
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The analysis above demonstrate the explanatory power of observed gamer characteristics in
tie strength. However, we see that the observed characteristics can’t fully explain the patterns of connections. There are darker squares located further away from the 45-degree line.
These squares represent gamers forming stronger connections with others whose observed
characteristics are diﬀerent from theirs. Thus there likely are some individual characteristics
observed by gamers but not by the researchers that drive tie formation.

3.2.4

Churn Behavior

More than 21% of gamers churn at some point during the 6-month observation period in
our data.34 On average, 11% of gamers in a guild churn each week. In Figure 3.6, we show
the distribution of the churn rates across guild-weeks. Clearly, there is strong variations in
churn rates for diﬀerent guilds and weeks.
Next, we present some descriptive evidence consistent with the possibility that peer eﬀect
in churning is present in our data, i.e. we show that gamers’ churn is correlated with peer’s
churn. Such correlation is a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for the existence of
causal peer eﬀect. To assemble the evidence, we look at churned gamers and separate their
peers into two groups: the peers who also churned and the peers who did not. We find that
churned gamers have statistically significant stronger ties with their churned peers than with
their non-churned ones. Specifically, the average tie strength with the churned peers is 0.58
versus 0.22 with the non-churning peers.
This positive association between tie strength and joint churning behaviors could indicate the
existence of peer eﬀect, but can also be explained, at least in part, by the endogenous peer
34

Our dataset does not include account management records, therefore we do not have information on
when the subscription expired for subscripton-based customers. We assume that the churn event happens
at the end of the last gaming session provided the avatar is not observed back in the game for 1 year.
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Figure 3.5: Relationship heat-map as a function of observed gamer charactersitics
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of churn rates across guilds.
connections and common contextual shocks. Peer connections are driven by some intrinsic
gamer qualities that might not be observed by the researcher. As we demonstrated above,
there likely are some individual gamer characteristics observed by peers but not by the
researchers, since the observable attributes of gamers can’t fully explain the pattern of peer
ties. These unobserved characteristics might also explain gamers’ churn at certain experience
levels of the game (earlier or more advanced ones). This correlation between the unobserved
gamer characteristics may confound with the causal peer eﬀect in churn decisions. Also,
events unobserved by the researcher, such as an introduction of a new game by a competitor,
can lead to spurious peers eﬀects as churning around the same time is not explained by social
influence but by the the common shock instead. In the following sections, we describe the
empirical peer network formation game that helps us recover the unobserved peer qualities
and discuss our approach to dealing with the common shocks and the issue of simultaneity
in churn decisions which is the third major concern in measurement of peer eﬀect.
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3.3

Model and Estimation

To measure the peer eﬀect in churn and tackle the issues associated with endogeneity of peer
eﬀect, we proceed in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate an empirical game of peer
network formation. In this game, gamers jointly decide on the strength of their connections
with peers in their guild. This stage helps us recover the unobserved gamer characteristics
that aﬀect both formation of the ties between peers and might aﬀect their churn decisions. In
the second stage, conditional on the observed peer connections and recovered unobservables,
we estimate a model of gamer churn under peer eﬀect.

3.3.1

Network Formation Model

Model Specification

In this section, we present an empirical structural model of peer network formation in a
guild. Our network formation model is based on the recent developments in Griﬃth (2019),
who studies social network formation among schoolgirls in India. In the model, gamers
simultaneously decide on the tie strength with each peer in their guild. Gamer receives utility
from her relationships with peers. That utility is determined by gamer’s own characteristics,
the characteristics of her peers, and the tie strengths.. Gamers incur cost in each tie since
establishing connections requires eﬀort. Each gamer has a fixed budget constraint on the
total cost of establishing the ties. Under that budget constraint, the gamer trades oﬀ between
forming ties of diﬀerent strengths with diﬀerent peers and maximizes her utility from her
ties.
We now describe the model formally. Let S be the number of observed guild-weeks. For each
guild-week s (s ∈ S), matrix Xs contains gamers’ characteristics observed by the researchers
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in that guild-week. The dimensions of matrix Xs are Is × K, where Is is the number of
gamers and K is the number of observed characteristics. We assume that ties and observed
gamer characteristics are independent across observations.
We use as = {ais }, a vector of length Is to represent individual-specific unobserved characteristics of all gamers in s. Note, that while matrices Xs are observed in data, vectors
as are to be estimated from the network formation game. Unobserved characteristics of
gamer i are assumed to be independent of the observed characteristics of all gamers in s,
E [ais |Xks ] = 0 ∀ k, s, as well as uncorrelated with the unobserved characteristics of other
gamers, E [ais |ajs ] = 0 ∀ j ̸= i ∀ s. For identification purposes, their conditional variance is
set to σa2 = 1.
Finally, we use matrix Gs = {gijs } with dimensions Is × Is to represent the structure of the
peer network. Each element gijs represents the directed tie strength from i to j in guild,
as defined in Section 3.2.3. Since the ties are directed, matrix Gs is not symmetric, i.e.
gijs ̸= gjis .
For gamer i, the utility of establishing a tie with strength gijs with gamer j is defined as:
α β f (Xis ,Xjs ,ais ,ajs )
uijs = gijs
gjis e
,

(3.2)

where f (Xis , Xjs , ais , ajs ) is a function of observed and unobserved characteristics of gamers
i and j to be defined later in the section; α and β are parameters to be estimated, with
the specification 0 < β < (1 − α) < 135 . This Cobb-Douglas utility function is capable of
capturing the complementarity of ties: the utility gamer i receives when forming tie with
gamer j is also determined bygjis ,the tie strength jdecides to form with i.
35
The restrictions ensure the concavity of the utility function to establish the equilibrium existence and
uniquness. See Griﬃth (2019) for a detailed discussion.
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The total utility for gamer i is the sum of the utilities she derives from all her ties with peers:
∑
Uis (Gs , Xs ) =
uijs . Simultaneously with other gamers, gamer i maximizes her total
j∈s,j̸=i

utility by deciding on her peer tie strength profile, described by vector gis = {gijs }, under
the budget constraint on her total eﬀort in establishing ties with peers:
max Uis (Gs , Xs ) s.t.
∑
cijs gijs ≤ Mis ,

(3.3)

j=1:Is : j̸=i

where cijs denotes the costly eﬀort for gamer i of forming tie with gamer j. The cost
cijs is assumed to vary between ties and be mean-independent of individual observed and
unobserved characteristics, E [log cijs |Xks , aks ] = 0∀k, s. The term Mis denotes the budget,
or endowment, of eﬀort for gamer i.
The budget constraint, which is binding at the optimum, ensures that agents in the model
make trade-oﬀs when deciding on their connection profiles: if gamer i decides to increase her
tie strength with gamer j (gijs ), then she must decrease her tie strength to some other gamer
k (giks ). In this simultaneous-move setting, the connection strategy of gamer i depends
on the connection strategy of gamer j. Further, as each gamer makes trade-oﬀs under her
budget constraint, the connection strategy of gamer i is aﬀected by connection strategies of
all other gamers in the guild. Griﬃth (2019) formally proves that the game’s strictly positive
Nash equilibrium, that is, the equilibrium where all agents make non-zero linking decisions
(gijs > 0 for all i and j), is unique.
Next, we define function f (·) that enters utility specification in Equation 3.2:

f (Xis , Xjs , ais , ajs ) = γ1 Xis + γ2 ais + δ1 Xis Xjs + δ2 Xis ajs + δ3 Xjs ais + δ4 ais ajs + γ3 Xjs + γ4 ajs .
(3.4)
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The specification allows the utility of the tie between gamers i and j to be determined by the
k
observed gamers’ characteristics, Xis = {Xisk }, Xjs = {Xjs
}, the unobserved characteristics

ais , ajs and the interactions between these variables. Vector γ = {γn ; n = 1, ..., 4} contains
parameters that describe the eﬀects of the two gamers’ characteristics on the utility of the tie.
Parameters δ = {δn ; n = 1, ..., 4} measure the interaction eﬀects. In our empirical setting,
gamers’ observed characteristics include level, total gaming time, and the number of days
spent at the last available level of 60.

Estimation and Identification of the Network Formation Model

This section describes the estimation strategy and oﬀers an informal discussion of identification for the empirical network formation game. We refer the reader to Griﬃth (2019), who
provides formal analytical proofs of identification.
We start by deriving the equation to take to data for estimation. Given that gamers maximize
their utility by assembling their connections profiles and the eﬀort budget constraints are
binding at the maximum, the necessary conditions for the Nash equilibrium of the network
formation game are:
∂Lis
α−1 β f (Xis ,Xjs ,ais ,ajs )
= αgijs
gjis e
− cijs λis = 0, ∀ i, j ̸= i
∂gijs

(3.5)

∂Lis
= Mis − Σj̸=i cijs gijs = 0, ∀ i,
∂λis

(3.6)

where Lis are Lagrangian functions and λis are Lagrange multipliers (s = 1, ..., S, i = 1, ..., Is ).
To linearize Equation 3.5, we rearrange the terms and then apply the log transformation:

log gijs =

log α
β
f (Xis , Xjs , ais , ajs ) log λis log cijs
+
log gjis +
−
−
1−α 1−α
1−α
1−α
1−α
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(3.7)

To simplify the expression, we redefine variables and parameters in 3.7 to get:

g̃ijs = α̃ + β̃g̃jis + f˜(Xis , Xjs , ais , ajs ) − λ̃is − c̃ijs ,
where g̃ijs = log gijs , α̃ =
f (Xis ,Xjs ,ais ,ajs )
1−α

log α
,
1−α

λ̃is =

log λis
, c̃ijs
1−α

(3.8)

= log cijs and the function f˜(Xis , Xjs , ais , ajs ) =

= γ̃1 Xis + γ̃2 ais + δ̃1 Xis Xjs + δ̃2 Xis ajs + δ̃3 Xjs ais + δ̃4 ais ajs + γ̃3 Xjs + γ̃4 ajs .

Equation 3.8 is a linear regression where the unobserved cost of building social ties, c̃ijs ,
serves as an error term.36 Here we explain the endogenous variables in equation 3.8. First,
the right-hand-side variable gejis , the log of the tie strength of gamer j to gamer i, depends
on the left-hand-side variable geijs , the log of the tie strength of gamer i back to gamer j,
through the specification of the utility function. For that reason, explanatory variable g̃jis
is correlated with the error term c̃ijs , since the (log-transformed) tie strength g̃ijs depends
on the (log-transformed) cost of building ties, c̃ijs . Second, since the term λ̃is represents the
(log-transformed) shadow value of additional eﬀort endowment, the term λ̃is depends on the
(log-transformed) cost of establishing connections, c̃ijs .
To eliminate endogenous variable λ̃is from Equation 3.8, we take advantage of the “panel”
structure of the data: gamer i is observed making connections across all gamers j ̸= i in
guild s. The typical “within-i” transformation for panel data will eliminate from Equation
3.8 all terms not varying between j, including endogenous λ̃is , which varies with i only.
For g̃ijs , the “within-i” transformation will subtract the mean of g̃iks across all k ̸= i from
i
g̃ijs : ġijs
= g̃ijs −

1
Σ g̃ .
Ns −1 k̸=i iks

The “within-i” transformation for other terms is defined

36

If one assumes that, in addition to the regulatory conditions stated in Section 3.3.1, cijs is distributed
log-normally in guild-week s, then the error term c̃ijs is normally distributed. It is worth noting that the
normality assumption for the error term is not required for estimation.
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analogously. After the transformation, Equation 3.8 becomes

i
i
+ f˙(Xis , Xjs , ais , ajs ) − ċiijs ,
ġijs
= β̃ ġjis

(3.9)

where:

i
i
i
f˙(Xis , Xjs , ais , ajs ) = δ̃1 Xis Ẋjs
+ δ̃2 Xis ȧijs + δ̃3 ais Ẋjs
+ δ̃4 ais ȧijs + γ̃3 Ẋjs
+ γ̃4 ȧijs .

(3.10)

Equation 3.9 will be taken to data for estimation. There are two types of parameters to
identify in this network formation model: 1) the (transformed) parameters of the utility
function, which are common across all networks, Θ = {β̃, γ̃, δ̃}, and 2) the vectors of latent
gamer characteristics A = {as : s = 1, ..., S}, one vector for each network. For identification,
it is crucial to observe a reasonably large number of independent networks and for each network to be well-populated. The variation in the gamers’ exogenous characteristics, coupled
with the across-guilds variation in the generated network outcomes identifies the parameters
of the utility function. The model relies on agents making connection decisions across a
large number of peers in a single network to identify the latent characteristics of gamers.
It can be inferred that a gamer who has stronger “in”-ties compared to other gamers with
comparable observable characteristics must have higher unobserved ajs , conditional on the
identified parameters of the utility function.
i
in Equation 3.9 remains endogenous, for the reasons noted above. We use
The variable ġjis

instrumental variables arising from the tradeoﬀs the gamers must do, due to the budget constrain on eﬀort, to assemble their connection profiles. The intuition for the instrumentation
strategy is the following: gamer j’s linking choice to gamer i depends on her alternative options of linking with other gamers k, k ̸= i, j. Naturally, the utility of j’s alternative options
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depends on the characteristics of those other gamers. Therefore, the mean characteristics
of gamers k, k ̸= i, j in guild-week s, as well as interactions of those characteristics with
characteristics of gamer j can be used as relevant37 instruments for the endogenous variable
i
ġjis
:

[

zijs

]
∑
1
i
i
= Xis Ẋjs
, Ẋjs
,
[Xks , Xis Xks , Xjs Xks ]
Ns − 2 k̸=i,j

(3.11)

The exogeneity assumptions for the model are satisfied when the costs of establishing connections are mean independent from all other individual-level covariates in Equation 3.9
(E [log cijs |Xks , aks ] = 0 for ∀k, s), the unobserved gamer characteristics are mean independent from the observed ones (E [ais |Xks ] = 0 for ∀k, s), and the unobserved characteristics
are uncorrelated (E [ais |ajs ] = 0 for ∀j ̸= i in ∀s). With these assumptions, the model
e δ̃1 , and γ̃3 , are
parameters describing returns to utility from the observed characteristics, β,
identified. The rest of the parameters in Θ, δ̃2 , δ̃3 , δ̃4 and γ̃4 are identified to scale. With
fixing the conditional variance of unobserved gamer characteristics (E [a2is |Xks ] = 1 for ∀k
and E [a2is |ajs ] = 1 for ∀j ̸= i), all model parameters, including the unobservables A, are
identified absolutely.
The network formation model is estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM).
The details for the estimation procedure are shown in Appendix 3.7.1

3.3.2

Peer eﬀect Model of Churn

In this section we specify a peer eﬀect model, in which a gamer’s decision to churn is a
function of her own characteristics, her peers’ characteristics, her connections to the peers,
and her expectation over peers’ probability to churn. The function includes observed gamer
characteristics as well as the unobserved characteristics recovered from the estimation of
37

We refer the reader to Griﬃth (2019) for the algebraic demonstration of relevancy of the suggested
instruments.

138

the network formation game. These recovered unobservables will be used as explanatory
variables to control for endogeneity in peer connections. We also address the “reflection”
problem by modeling the equilibrium in the simultaneous-move game of peer churn decisions.
Finally, in this model we control for the unobserved aggregate shocks by including a set of
time and guild fixed eﬀects.
We first write down the utility of continuing the use of the game for gamer i in guild-week
s = (t, m), where t ∈ T denotes a week and m ∈ M denotes a guild, as follows:

Uis (α, Θ, κ|Xs , as Gs ) = θ1 [Xis , ais ] + θ2 [X̄is , āis ] + κT + κM + αP̄j̸=i,s + ϵis ,

(3.12)

where vector of coeﬃcients θ1 captures the eﬀect of gamer i’s own observed and unobserved
characteristics on her gaming utility; vector θ2 measures the eﬀect of peers’ characteristics;
κt and κm are vectors of week and guild fixed eﬀects, respectively; coeﬃcient α captures
the eﬀect of peers’ churn on gamer i’s utility of product use; variable P̄j̸=i,s is the weighted
average probability of other gamers to churn in guild-week s:

P̄j̸=i,s =

∑

Pjs gijs

(3.13)

j,j̸=i

where weight gijs is the tie strength between gamers i and j, which is the outcome of the
network formation game. The weights capture diﬀerent impacts from peers, the larger the
tie strength i has for j, the stronger the influence j will have on i. X̄is and āis , representing
the weighted average of peer’s observed characteristics and unobserved characteristics, are
defined in similar way as P̄j̸=i,s . Finally, ϵis is the idiosyncratic shock to the utility that
follows the Gumbel distribution. We denote the non-random part of the utility as Vis and
normalize the utility of churning to 0. Then the probability of churning for gamer i in
guild-week s is:
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Pis =

1
1 + eVis

(3.14)

In Hartmann (2010), the author uses a coordination game of complete information to study
golfers’ purchase decisions under peer influence. Complete information assumption applies
to the oﬄine setting of golfing and the relatively small real world golfer peer network size.
In our empirical setting where peer gaming network is virtually formed online and network
size is large, gamer may not have complete information on her peers’ churn decision because
there may exist random shock that is private information to her peers. We assume that
the distribution of random shock is common knowledge to gamers. As such, we formulate
a simultaneous static discrete game of incomplete information. The incomplete information
implies that gamers react to their rational beliefs about their peers’ churn rather than are
able to coordinate their churn decisions directly. This incomplete information approach also
aids computationally as the large number of observed decision-makers is hard to handle in
the complete information setting.
We combine the churn probability of each individual i into a system of simultaneous equations.
We use Cs to denote the churn profile in guild-week s, {Xs ,as } to denote matrices of observed
and unobserved characteristics, and Θ = {α, θ1 , θ2 , κT , κM } to denote parameters to be
estimated. The system of equations can be written down as follows:

Cs = F(Cs |Xs , as , Gs , Θ)

(3.15)

The equilibrium to the game is characterized by the fixed point to the system of simultaneous
equations.
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To estimate the peer eﬀect model, we use the mathematical programming with equilibrium
constraints (MPEC) approach (Su and Judd, 2012). We estimate parameters Θ by maximizing the log-likelihood of observed choices subject to the constraint described by the system
of simultaneous equations F in Equation 3.15. The MPEC approach provides the benefit of
being computationally light and assumes that the equilibrium played in the data is the one
that maximizes the likelihood of observed choices (Ellickson and Misra, 2011).

3.4

Results and Analysis

In this section, we present and discuss parameter estimates for the network formation model
and the model of peer eﬀect in churn.

3.4.1

Estimation Results for the Network Formation Model

The ultimate goal for the estimation of the network formation model is to recover the unobserved individual-level parameters A = {as : s = 1, ..., S} which can play a role in defining
peer ties in the data. Nevertheless, we find it useful to briefly discuss the estimated coeﬃcients of the utility function in the network formation game, as they provide insights into
the drivers of social connections in our empirical setting. The estimates for the network
formation model are shown in Table 3.1.38
The utility of building social ties takes the Cobb-Douglas functional form. Coeﬃcient β̃
measures how the strength of connection oﬀered by gamer j aﬀects gamer i’s utility of linking
with j. The estimate of β̃ is positive and significant, indicating that the connection between
two gamers is complementary in generating utility: a gamer prefers to build a stronger tie
with a peer who oﬀers a strong reciprocal connection.
38

As explained in Section 3.3.1, not all coeﬃcients in Equations 3.2 and 3.4 can be estimated.
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Table 3.1: Estimated parameters of the network formation model
Variable

Parameter

i
Connection oﬀered by gamer j, ġjis

βe

i
Observable gamer j’s characteristics (Ẋjs
):
experience level

γ
e31

gaming time
time spent at level 60
Unobservable characteristics:
gamer j’s unobservable, ȧijs
interaction ais ȧijs

Estimate

0.970 (0.015)

γ
e32
γ
e33

–0.026
(0.023)
0.140 (0.014)
0.020 (0.016)

γ
e4
δ̃4

0.890 (0.021)
0.006 (0.002)

i
Interactions of observable charactersitics of gamers i and j (Xis Ẋjs
):
1
experience levels
δe1
0.080 (0.005)
2
gaming times
δe1
0.012 (0.008)
3
times spent at level 60
δ̃1
0.030 (0.006)

Interaction of observables of gamer i with unobservables of gamer j (Xis ȧijs ):
experience level of i × aj
δ̃21
–0.790
(0.050)
2
gaming time of i × aj
δ̃2
–0.830
(0.014)
time spent at level 60 of i × aj
δ̃23
–1.010
(0.016)
i
Interaction of unobservables of gamer i with observables of gamer j (ais Ẋjs
):
1
ai × experience level of j
δ̃3
–0.014
(0.021)
2
–0.011
ai × gaming time of j
δ̃3
(0.010)
0.003 (0.012)
ai × time spent at level 60 of j
δ̃33
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The rest of the estimated coeﬃcients measure the eﬀects of observed characteristics (X)
and unobserved characteristics (a) of two linked gamers, i and j, on the utility that focal
gamer i derives from her directed link with target gamer j. The specification in Equation
3.10 allows for continuous interaction eﬀects (Jaccard et al., 1990; Aiken and West, 1991)
between gamers’ observed and unobserved characteristics, in addition to the main eﬀects.
For estimation, we standardized the observed characteristics (experience level, time spent at
level 60, and gaming time) so that they all have the mean of zero and the standard deviation
of one. This standardization helps in interpreting the results. First, it brings the observed
and unobserved characteristics to the same scale; hence, we can directly comment on their
importance in driving utility. Second, by centering at zero, we can meaningfully interpret the
main eﬀects of target gamer j’s characteristics as applying to focal gamer i with an average
level of her own characteristics.
First, we look at how target gamer j’s gaming experience explains her peers’ utility of
connecting to her. We find that the eﬀect of one standard deviation increase in gamer
j’s experience level on the utility of focal gamer i with an average experience level is not
statistically diﬀerent from zero (coeﬃcient γ
e31 ). However, the eﬀects of the interaction of
gamers’ experience levels is positive and significant (coeﬃcient δe11 ). A positive coeﬃcient on
the interaction term indicates that individuals generate higher utility when forming links with
peers who have similar levels of characteristics: gamers with above-average experience prefer
to link with other gamers of above-average experience, while gamers with below-average
experience prefer other gamers of below-average experience. We also find that gamer i’s
response to gamer j’s experience is not being moderated by i’s unobserved characteristics
(coeﬃcient δ̃31 ). Substantively similar results, for both main and interaction eﬀects, are
found for the amount of time gamer j spent at level 60, which is an additional measure of
experience, as reflected in coeﬃcients δ̃13 , δ̃23 , and δ̃33 . These findings imply that gamers do
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not necessarily prefer linking with more experienced gamers, but instead prefer games with
similar experience levels.
Gaming time of target gamer j has a significant power in explaining the linking choices of
focal gamer i: gamers with more gaming time get linked with more (positive and significant
coeﬃcient γ
e32 ), which is an expected result. This eﬀect is not being moderated by gamer
i’s own gaming time or her own unobservables (coeﬃcients δe12 and δ̃32 are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero).
Now we turn to discussing the eﬀects of target gamer j’s unobservable characteristics aj on
focal gamer i’s utility of linking to j. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
the unobservable captures gaming traits such as sociability and prior exposure to gaming ,
both of which are preferred peer characteristics in online gaming. These gaming traits could
not be completely reflected in the observed in-game level and gaming time.
First, we find that j’s unobservables have a statistically significant and positive eﬀect on i’s
utility (coeﬃcient γ
e4 ) and that this eﬀect is positively and statistically significantly moderated by gamer i’s own unobservables (coeﬃcient δ̃4 ). Taking into account the larger magnitude of the main eﬀect (e
γ4 ) and the modest magnitude of the interaction eﬀect (δ̃4 ), the
finding suggests that gamer i with average levels of observed characteristics X prefer to
link to a peer with a higher aj , though some mild homophilic tendencies are present for
unobservables a.
Next, the eﬀect of j’s unobservables is strongly and negatively moderated by i’s own observables (experience level, gaming time, and time spent at level 60). This indicates that gamers
with high aj are preferred by peers with little experience or less gaming time. It is possible
that a focal gamer i with a low experience level (or one with less gaming time) generally
has less resources and therefore peer j’s “better” gaming traits, if i links to j, would bring
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an important enhancement to i’s gaming experience. As focal gamer i accumulates more
experience or gets more gaming time, the peer gamer j’s “better” gaming traits will be substituted by i’s own resources in producing enjoyment from gaming. On the other hand, the
eﬀect of interaction of focal gamer i’s own unobservables a and target gamer j’s observables
X (coeﬃcient γ̃3 ) is not significant. This indicates that target gamers with a high experience
level and more gaming time are preferred by focal gamer i, no matter what her own a is.
This result shows that the observed characteristics and unobserved characteristics aﬀect tie
formation diﬀerently.
To understand whether unobserved characteristics are an important driver of peer ties, we
compare the magnitudes of coeﬃcients for observed and unobserved characteristics. The
magnitude of coeﬃcient γ̃4 , the main eﬀect of j’s unobserved characteristics on i’s utility,
is significantly larger than the magnitude of any coeﬃcient in set γ̃3 , which describes the
eﬀects of j’s observables. Specifically, one standard deviation increase in gamer j’s gaming
time increases gamer i’s utility by 0.14 while the same increase in gamer j’s unobserved
characteristics provides a larger bump of 0.89. Similarly, the eﬀect of the interaction of
gamer i’s observed characteristics with gamer j’s unobservables (set of coeﬃcients δ̃2 ) has a
substantively larger eﬀect than the interaction of i’s and j’s observables (set of coeﬃcients
δ̃1 ). This indicates that the unobserved characteristics aj have a larger explanatory power
than any of the observed characteristics Xj , in our empirical setting.
The findings above suggest that it is important to account for the unobserved, or unmeasured, individual characteristics. First, ignoring them would lead to misunderstanding of
the network formation process. Second, the findings also have a direct implication for understanding peer eﬀect in churn, which is our ultimate goal. As gamers tend to link stronger to
individuals with higher a, those individuals display a higher measure of peer relationship in
the peer eﬀect model (Equations 3.12 and 3.13). If the unobserved a plays a role in churn
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behavior in any way, the estimate of the peer eﬀect in churn would be biased if we were to
omit a from the peer eﬀect model.

3.4.2

Estimation Results for the Model of Peer eﬀect in Churn

We show the estimation results for the model of peer eﬀect in churn specified in Section 3.3.2
in Table 3.2, column Model 1. The estimated parameters enter the utility of gaming (using
the product) and therefore a positive coeﬃcient indicates a negative eﬀect on probability of
churning.
We start with noting that the statistically significant estimate α = −11.00 confirms that a
higher expectation for peers’ churn, denoted by P̄j̸=i,s in Equation 3.12, has a negative impact
on gamer’s probability of continued gaming, and will increase the probability of churning.
Next, we find that probability of churn is increasing in gamer’s own experience level but
decreasing in her own gaming time. Gamers devoting a larger amount of time to the game is
likely to enjoy the game more, and thus are less likely to churn. After controlling for gaming
time, the higher the experience level, the more likely the gamer is to churn. Gamer’s own
amount of time spent at level 60, the highest experience level at the time of data collection,
does not explain churn, as the coeﬃcient is smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant. Peers’ observed characteristics have no statistically significant eﬀect on the focal
gamer’s churn.
Gamers with higher own unobserved characteristics a are more likely to continue gaming. In
other words, unobserved a have a statistically significant negative eﬀect on churn probability.
This finding is consistent with the explanation that unobserved heterogeneity we are capturing is related to attitudes to gaming, or “gamer traits.” Given that observables X (after
the transformation performed for estimation) and unobservables a are on the same scale,
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Table 3.2: Estimation results: Parameters of gaming utility
Variable

Model 1: With unobserved a

Model 2: Omitted a

-11.00 (0.59)

-8.03 (0.40)

experience level:
gamer’s own
peers’, weighted

-1.25 (0.04)
-0.09 (0.10)

-1.16 (0.04)
0.19 (0.09)

gaming time:
gamer’s own
peers’, weighted

1.18 (0.03)
-0.01 (0.07)

1.01 (0.03)
0.22 (0.07)

time spent at level 60:
gamer’s own
peers’, weighted

0.02 (0.05)
-0.02 (0.06)

0.17 (0.05)
-0.14 (0.07)

0.19 (0.09)
-0.32 (0.26)

N/A
N/A

Peers’ churn
Observed characteristics X:

Unobserved characteristics a:
gamer’s own
peers’, weighted
Guilds and time fixed eﬀects are included.
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the larger magnitude of parameters for observed characteristics indicates that they are of
higher importance in explaining utility from gaming. The unobserved heterogeneity, found
to be strongly driving network formation, is less important in explaining churn, but it does
have a statistically significant impact. We note that this finding is specific to the empirical
context we study and the unobserved heterogeneity might be less or more important in other
industries.
We now turn to discussing the consequences of omitting unobserved heterogeneity a from
the peer eﬀect model in our empirical setting. From the estimation results for the network
formation model, we found that gamers strongly prefer linking to peers with higher a, with
some mild homophilic tendencies present. Therefore, gamers display tighter connections
to peers with lower churn tendencies, conditional on other characteristics being similar. If
we were to omit a from the peer eﬀect model, we expect that the bias in the estimate of
peer influence would occur as follows. Gamers with lower unobserved a, who tend to churn,
are linked tighter to non-churners than to churners, given the findings from the network
formation model. The observed churn of gamers with lower a is being driven by the omitted
unobserved a, but the failure to include a leads to the underestimation of the eﬀect of peer
influence as the peer eﬀect and the eﬀect of unobserved a are of opposite directions.
We re-estimate the peer eﬀect model without controlling for the unobserved characteristics a.
The estimation results are shown in Table 3.2, column Model 2. The peer eﬀect coeﬃcient
α is smaller in absolute magnitude compared to the estimate from the model with unobservable aincluded (column Model 1), as expected. Therefore, the omission of the unobserved
characteristics a will impose a bias in peer eﬀect estimate in our empirical setting. In terms
of the model fit, our model has 90% hit rate on predicting individual gamers’ churn.

148

In the next section, we perform analysis of the relationship between the peer network structure and the sensitivity of gamers to churn under influenc e of peer’s churn.

3.5

Analysis of the Eﬀect of Network Structure on Churn

In this study, we show that peer connections play a role in aﬀecting gamers’ churn. Given
that the peer eﬀect in churn is strong, it is of great interest to managers to understand how
the structure of peer network aﬀects the peer network’s churn profile. It is often possible for
a firm to manage the structure of connections through rules and recommendation algorithms,
especially for online gaming and similar industries where the social platform is controlled by
the firm. In our empirical setting, the structure of the generated network is determined by
gamer characteristics. We run a series of simulation studies where we change the composition
of gamers’ characteristics in a guild and generate both the network structure and churn profile
based on the estimated network formation model and the peer eﬀect model of churn.

3.5.1

Distribution of Ties and Churn

In the first simulation study, we are interested in how variance in gamers’ characteristics affects the generated network structure, i.e. tie strength between individuals, and subsequently
the churn profile in the network. We focus on unobserved individual characteristics.39 These
characteristics, unobserved or hard to measure for each individual, can be managed by a firm
in aggregation. In our empirical context, where unobserved characteristics likely represent
“gamer traits” indicating significant (prior) exposure to online gaming, the game developer
can signal through advertising messages if the game is for gaming novices, hard-core gamers,
or both.
39

Observables X have less explanatory power in network generation in our empirical context.
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We simulate a series of S = 60 networks (guilds) with N = 50 number of gamers in each as
follows. The tie formation in each network is guided by the utility function with parameters
we estimated and presented in Section 3.4. For each network, we fix the observed characteristics X to a common set of values while changing the unobservables a. We draw the
observables X from the standard normal distribution (resembling the transformed variables
in our data). The vectors of unobservables as , one for each guild, are drawn from the normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance δs2 (s = 1, 2, ..., S). The variance δs2 is increasing from
0.6 to 1.5. To complete the simulation, we draw one set of individual costs of establishing
connections c and the individual budgets of eﬀort M from the lognormal distribution. As
a result, simulated guilds share the matrix of observables X, vector of costs c, and vector
of eﬀort budgets M , but have diﬀerent vectors of unobservables as . Using the estimated
parameters from the network formation game, we compute the series of generated networks
Gs = {gijs }. Next, using the computed ties between peers, gijs , we simulate the churn profile
Cs for each simulated network. The churn profile is the fixed point in the system of equations
of the peer eﬀect model described by Equation 3.15.
Our next step is to measure each gamer’s connection profile in terms of diversification of
ties, i.e. to measure how evenly gamer i distributes connections between all her peer gamers
j ̸= i in a guild. First, for each pair of gamers i and j, we compute gamer j’s share of all i’s
out-directed connections and denote it pijs :

pijs =

gijs

(3.16)

Σk∈Gs ,k̸=i giks

As such, for each gamer i, we have vector pis = {pijs , j ̸= i}, where all its N − 1 elements
sum up to 1. In a perfectly balanced connection profile, each peer j gets an equal share of
i’s connections, i.e. all elements of vector pis are equal to
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1
.
N −1

Second, to describe how

diversified each gamer’s connection profile is, we use Shannon’s entropy, defined as:

Eis = −

∑

piks lnpiks

(3.17)

k̸=i

The larger the entropy Eis , the more balanced gamer i’s connection profile is, and the more
evenly she distributes the ties across her peer gamers. Finally, we compute the average
entropy Ēs across all gamers in guild s (s = 1, 2, ..., S).
We plot the standard deviations of unobservables as and the corresponding average guild
entropies Ēs for each simulated guild in Figure 3.7. We find negative correlation between
the variance in unobserved gaming characteristics and the entropy of connections in the
network. This indicates that a guild with more diverse gaming characteristics as will have a
more unbalanced connection network. The rationale for this result comes from the network
formation model. Our estimates show that gamers prefer to link with peers possessing higher
a, with some homophilic tendencies present. When there is more variation in unobserved
characteristics in a guild, gamers with more desirable characteristics will be getting stronger
in-ties at the expense of gamers with less desirable characteristics.
Our ultimate goal is to establish a relationship between the structure of the network and its
churn profile. We plot the average churn probability (across all gamers) for each simulated
guild against network entropy in Figure 3.8 and observe negative correlation between the
two.
As discussed above, higher network entropy indicates more balanced distribution of connections, thus we find that guilds with more balanced networks have lower average churn
probability. The rationale behind this result comes from the peer eﬀect model of churn.
Churn profile is the solution to the system of equations implied by peer eﬀect model. Each
gamer’s willingness to churn generates a positive impact on her peer’s willingness to churn
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Figure 3.7: Connections entropy and the variance of gamers’ unobserved characteristics in
a network.

Figure 3.8: The relationship between connections entropy (induced by the variance in
gamers’ unobserved characteristics) and average churn rates in networks.
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and, due to the reflection, the gamer’s own willingness to churn will also be positively impacted by her peers. The reflective peer eﬀect of churn thus travels back and forth among
gamers and the magnitude of peer eﬀect depends on how strong the connection is between
two gamers. In a balanced network, no gamer has a strong impact on the other gamer
because connection strength is relatively evenly distributed among peer gamers. Suppose
one gamer has a strong willingness to churn because of some random shock, the impact of
his churn over peer gamers will be mitigated by the other gamers who are not expected to
churn. On the contrary, when we have an unbalanced network in which strong connections
are formed among certain gamers, the churning gamer will have strong impact on his “close”
peer gamers and other gamers’ decision could not mitigate such impact because they are
not as “important” as the churning gamer. These gamers, who are strongly impacted, will
further have positive impact on the other peer gamers with whom they have strong connections. Thus the impact of one churning gamer will be amplified through strong connections,
and gamers of strong connections will have higher churn probability. Overall, gamers in an
unbalanced network will have higher average churn probability. At the same time, since
impact from peers is stronger among peer gamers with stronger connections and weaker for
those who share weaker connections, the standard deviations of churn probability for an unbalanced network will also be higher than for a balanced network, making the former much
less predictable, on average. The positive correlation between average churn and standard
deviations of churn in a network is shown in Figure 3.9.

3.5.2

Impact of Popular Gamers’ Churn

In this analysis we focus on the impact of popular gamers who are strongly preferred by
other gamers in the guild. We simulated a series of guild networks that diﬀer in network
entropy, as in the previous subsection. Next, we compute the attractiveness (to her peers)
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Figure 3.9: Relationship between the average and the standard deviation of churn rates in
networks of diﬀerent structure.
measure for each gamer as the sum of shares the gamer occupies in her peers’ connections.
We denote that measure Ais :
Ais =

∑

pkis

(3.18)

k̸=i

Based on the attractiveness measure Ais , we define popular gamers in guild s as ones whose
Ais is higher than that of 90% of all the gamers in that guild.
Next, we assume that the popular gamers receive an exogenous shock that increases their
willingness to churn, e.g. they were targeted by other gaming companies with special oﬀers.
We introduce this exogenous shock into the model by adding an individual fixed eﬀect term
to the peer eﬀect model of churn. This way, popular gamers will receive a constant disutility
from gaming while other gamers will not get this treatment. We then calculate the churn
profile for each guild and compare it with the scenario in the previous section, where none of
the gamers receive this treatment. The comparison of the average churn in a guild between
the two scenarios is shown in Figure 3.10. We see that the average churn probability in
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all simulated guilds increases when popular gamers experience the exogenous shock. The
magnitude of the average churn probability varies with the network entropy. The impact of
popular gamers’ churn is larger in guilds with low network entropy, i.e. in more unbalanced
networks. In these networks, the peer eﬀect of churn from popular gamers cannot be mitigated by other gamers, as the connections between popular gamers and their closest peers
are stronger than in a more balanced network. In a more balanced guild network, i.e. a
network with a larger entropy, the peer eﬀect from popular gamers’ churn will not be as
pronounced, since not that many peer gamers are too “close” to the popular gamer. Since
our definition of a popular gamer is guild-specific, the diﬀerence in the relative attractiveness
of popular gamers and the rest of the gamers varies across simulated guilds. Popular gamers
in the unbalanced guilds are significantly more attractive relative to their counterparts in
the balanced guilds.

Figure 3.10: Impact of a popular gamer’s churn.
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3.6

Conclusion

In this paper we investigate causal peer eﬀect in customer churn decisions in the empirical
setting of an online video game, which is is a typical product in which consumers form peer
networks and their consumption and decision to churn are observed by other consumers.
Understanding peer influence in usage and churn decisions is important for similar socially
connected products because under peer influence, churn may be contagious. The identification of causal peer influence is crucial to firms if they want to design retention campaigns
involving social connections and peer influence.
The main focus of our study was to measure causal peer eﬀect in churn while controlling
for endogeneity in peer ties. The results of our study show that peers establish social ties
in a non-random fashion. In particular, we find that in our empirical setting, certain characteristics of peers, which an outside analyst, or the firm, typically can’t observe, plays a
huge role in determining the formation of peer network. The unobserved individual characteristics also factors in consumers’ churn decisions. We find that ignoring the endogeneity in
peer connections will bias the estimation of causal peer eﬀect. Our two-stage model exploits
the directionality and variation in connection strength between peers and recovers the unobserved consumer characteristics from the network formation process to correct for connection
endogeneity in estimation of the peer eﬀect in churn.
Our research also sheds light on the optimal network composition problem. Many companies are interested in promoting the concept of community and retaining consumers by
employing social connections and peer influence. In our empirical setting, the game developer uses communities of gamers (guilds) to motivate the consumption of the game content
and increase the engagement with the product. It is important for the gaming platform to
understand what structure of network will make consumers suﬀer less from peer influenced
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churn. Our estimation-based simulation analysis shows that a balanced network (i.e., the network without overly popular gamers) has lower average churn rate than a more unbalanced
network and that popular gamer’s churn will generate higher churn rate in an unbalanced
network. We conclude that companies that are capable of inducing certain social network
structure through policies could improve business outcomes if they take the relationship of
network structure and the dynamics of decisions in the network under peer influence into
consideration.

3.7
3.7.1

Appendix
Details of the GMM Estimation

The following assumptions are needed to identify the model, out of which the first three are
[
]
∑
i
i
needed to establish the exogeneity of the instruments zijs = Xis Ẋjs
, Ẋjs
, Ns1−2 k̸=i,j [Xks , Xis Xks , Xjs Xks ]
which are the characteristics of the gamers other than i and j:

1. E [log cijs |Xks , aks ] = 0 ∀k, s;
2. E [ais |Xks ] = 0 ∀k, s;
3. E [ais |ajs ] = 0 ∀j ̸= i ∀s;
4. E [a2is |Xks ] = 1 ∀k;
5. E [a2is |ajs ] = 1 ∀j ̸= i.

We employ a two-step estimation procedure. In the first step, we estimate parameters
Θ1 = [β̃, δe1 , γ
e3 ] using the generalized method of moments. Let vector bijs collect the variables
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[
]
i
i
i
corresponding to the variables Θ1 : bijs = ġjis
, Xis Ẋjs
, Ẋjs
. In the first step, we exploit the
following moment conditions:
′
i
i
i
E[zijs
(ġijs
− β̃ ġjis
− δ1 Xis Ẋjs
− γ3 Ẋisj )] = 0

In the second step, we estimate parameters Θ2 = [δe2 , δe3 , δe4 , γ
e4 ] and the scalar unobservables
A by minimizing the following moment conditions:

′
i
i
i
− β̃ ġjis
− δ1 Xis Ẋjs
− γ3 Ẋisj − δ2 Xis ȧijs − γ4 ais ȧijs )] = 0
ajs (ġijs
E[zijs
′
i
i
i
i
E[zijs
ais (ġijs
− β̃ ġjis
− δ1 Xis Ẋjs
− γ3 Ẋisj − δ3 ais Ẋjs
)] = 0
′
i
i
i
E[zijs
ais ajs (ġijs
− β̃ ġjis
− δ1 Xis Ẋjs
− γ3 Ẋisj − γ4 ais ȧijs ] = 0

subject to the constraint:

ajs (γ4 + δ2 Ei̸=j [Xis ]) = E

i̸=j

[

i
ġijs

−

i
β̃ ġjis

]

(
)
(
)
[ 2]
−δ1 Xjs Ei̸=j [Xis ] − E Xis −γ3 Xjs − E [Xis ] , ∀j, s
i̸=j
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Chapter 4
Utilizing Social Network Structure to
Prevent the Spread of User Attritions
Co-authored with Tat Y. Chan, and Nitin Mehta

4.1

Introduction

Socially connected products and services have become increasingly popular among consumers
and firms have actively responded to the trend. For examples, Nike not only sells sportswear
but also hosts an online social network, Nike Training Club, for users training together and
sharing workouts with friends. Peloton oﬀers expensive in-door treadmills and stationary
bikes along with a subscription service that connects users with their peers in live training
sessions. A recent article by Harvard Business Review40 highlights how companies can build
communities of consumers around its product for “a superior business model”.
40

Source: https://hbr.org/2020/01/when-community-becomes-your-competitive-advantage.
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Consumers enjoy consuming socially-connected products together with peers. Such a peer
eﬀect is positive and bi-directional. In Pelotons case, as a user exercises more, she may
influence her peers to increase their usage, which may further cause the user to increase
usage. This results in a positive social multiplier eﬀect in the usage among peer users.
Furthermore, in an interconnected social network, the increase of exercise of a user can
influence not only her peers but also her peers peers. As such, the peer eﬀect started from
one user can spread throughout the whole network. The extent of the eﬀect depends on ones
position in the network. A user who has many peers holds a central position in the network.
Her increased usage of the stationary bike can have a stronger influence than other users
who have fewer friends.
Businesses that benefit from peer eﬀects in social network, however, could be at risk when a
user leaves the network. Positive peer eﬀects that help enhance the consumption experience
can immediately turn negative, leading to a reduction of consumption and purchases from
the users peers. What makes it worse is that in an interconnected social network the initial
attrition that impacts only a small group of users could spread across the whole network. For
a well-known example, MySpace, once the largest social networking site in the world, lost
over forty million unique visitors in one month in April 2008, and the attrition continued to
exacerbate over time. As of January 2018, Myspace was ranked 4,153 by total Web traﬃc,
and 1,657 in the United States.41 Even for the current industry leader Facebook, which has
overtaken MySpace as the largest social networking site since 2008, it is reported to have
lost over 15 million US users, with the biggest drop-oﬀ among young users, in 2018 and
2019.42 In a market where consumers can easily switch to competitors oﬀerings, it is crucial
for a firm to prevent the spread of such negative peer eﬀects early on because otherwise a
41

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myspace.
Source:
https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-lost-15-million-us-users-in-the-past-two-years-reportsays.
42
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dissolving social network will make retaining current customers a very diﬃcult task. It is
also crucial for the business to understand the heterogeneity of negative peer eﬀect caused
by diﬀerent users in the network such that it could strategically allocate marketing eﬀorts
on users whose attritions could spread to more users.
This paper investigates how a business can prevent the spread of negative peer eﬀects that
are originated from the churn of a user in a socially connected environment. To achieve this
goal, we first need to identify the impacts of the churner on other users, including direct and
indirect peers of the churner in the social network. This is diﬃcult due to endogeneity issues
(e.g. Manski (1999)). It is further complicated by the fact that the impacts of the churner
can be heterogeneous depending on her role in the network. An active user who have many
friends, for example, could have a much stronger impact if she leaves than another user who
rarely connects with other people. We bring in insights from previous social network studies
to infer how the impacts of a churner can diﬀer depending on the network structure and the
churners position in the network.
We use data from an upscale gym in a mid-West city consisting the membership plan choice
and visits of every active user in each month to empirically study the above research questions.
A gym is a typical socially-connected business. Users prefer going to the gym together
with their peers than alone as various studies have documented the benefits of working out
with peers.43 In our empirical context, users usually develop strong relationships in the
gym when they frequently and consistently exercise together with their peers in small-group
fitness classes. Jointly, users form social networks in which both direct and indirect peer
relationships exist. The positive peer eﬀect in exercising and the strong peer relationships
indicate that the attrition of one user can potentially lead to the attrition of her peers, and
further to her peers’ peers in the interconnected user network.
43

https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/why-you-should-work-out-crowd-ncna798936
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We develop and estimate a structural model from the data to examine the decision making
process of users under peer influences inside the gym. There are several unique features in
the proposed model. First, we include the rich network structure in terms of both direct
and indirect relationships, the heterogeneity of the relationship strengths among users in the
structural model. This enables us to capture the heterogeneous gym visits and membership
plan choices patterns across the network. Second, the attrition of a user in the gym can
influence not only her direct peers but also indirect peers through the direct peers, as such
the eﬀects from one attrition can spread to the whole social network. Third, peer eﬀects
in the model can be bi-directional. This implies that the reduction in gym visits of user A
may reduce the propensity of gym visits of user B, and this in turn may further reduce the
gym visits of user A, leading to a negative social multiplier eﬀect. Finally, we capture the
exercising habits of users that are driving the dynamics of gym visits over time. Under these
model features, we show how the equilibrium gym visits and membership plan choices of all
users in each period can be computed as a fixed point in a simultaneous equation system.
The equilibrium outcomes can capture how the attrition of one user influences the decisions
of others users, how the decisions of other users reinforce the negative peer eﬀects among
themselves, and how the influences spread across the network and over time.
Like all other empirical studies, the key identification challenge in our study comes from
the endogeneity of user decisions in the network. Our identification strategy is to utilize
a unique data observation: a significant proportion of users self-reported the reason when
they unsubscribed gym membership for long time. We focus on cases that can be reasonably
treated as churns exogenous to the unobserved factors that aﬀect gym visits and membership
plan choices of other users. The cases are mainly users moving to another city and having
long-term illness or pregnancy. In model estimation, we use these churns as instruments
for the visits of peers that can influence a users visit utility. To capture how the impacts
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of churns may diﬀer across users and over time, we interact the incidences with whether a
churner is a direct or indirect peer of other users, and how long the churner has left the gym,
to construct instrumental variables, and estimate the model using the d method of moments
(GMM). In short, our identification strategy utilizes the temporal and spatial variations in
the social network due to exogenous churns.
We find from the estimation results that, in the social network of adult users, the social
multiplier eﬀect of 1.44. That is, if everyone increases gym visit by one, through bi-directional
peer eﬀects all users on average will increase an additional 0.44 gym visit. The attrition of
one peripheral user (i.e. a user with few direct peers in the network) will generate a 0.4%
increase in total unsubscriptions in 1 month, 1.0% in 6 months, and 2.1% in 12 months. In
contrast, the increase in unsubscriptions caused by the attrition of one central user (i.e. a
user with many direct peers in the network) is 1.4% in 1 month, 4.9% in 6 months, and 12.1%
in 12 months. The results help us quantify the customer life-time value (CLV) of diﬀerent
users. We use simulations to show that, while the CLV of a peripheral (central) user is $1,832
($4,009) over the 12-month period when only considering the revenue generated by the user,
the social CLV after taking account of her impact on other users in the whole network is
19 (38) times higher. These results suggest that the value of retaining a customer will be
severely underestimated using the traditional CLV framework when peer eﬀects are strong
inside the gym.
Using the estimated model, we then conduct a series of counterfactuals to explore how the
gym can use membership discounts to prevent the spread of the negative peer eﬀects due to
a central users attrition. We first measure the marketing budget required to eliminate the
impacts on the churners direct peers, taking account of the loss of the gym visit experience
due to the churn. We assume that the gym oﬀers each of the peers an individual discount
for a premium service packet. This serves as a benchmark case under which the gym can
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put a stop on potential attritions from the beginning. Next, we investigate how, when the
marketing budget is insuﬃcient, or when the level of discounts cannot be set individually, the
gym can eﬀectively mitigate the negative eﬀects by utilizing the information of the network
structure in the gym. We show that selecting users with a high social CLV, which could be
approximated by high centrality in the social network, as seeds to oﬀer discounts is the more
eﬀective strategy. Finally, we show that ignoring the network structure and selecting seeds
from the whole network to oﬀer discounts is less eﬀective than targeting direct peers of the
churner. Using social CLV to select seeds is more eﬀective than using personal CLV.
Our study has two major contributions. From the managerial perspective, we study an
important problem of customer relationship management in a social network setting. We
show how negative peer eﬀects due to the churn of a user can spread to the whole network,
and how a marketing campaign that oﬀers individually-targeted membership discounts can
mitigate the negative eﬀects in a more eﬀective way than other types of campaigns without
using information about the network structure. We also demonstrate the importance of using
social CLV in the customer relationship management. To our knowledge this has never been
done in the previous literature. From the methodological perspective, our peer eﬀects model
can be applied to many other empirical contexts where social networks are important for
users. The equilibrium approach we use to model the correlation of decisions between a
user and her peers captures the complicated simultaneity of peer eﬀects in an interconnected
network.

4.2

Literature Review

Our study lies in the intersections of three fields of research: peer influence and word-ofmouth, network theory and customer relationship management.
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Peer influence has been widely studied in the marketing literature. Nair et al. (2010) find
that physician prescription behaviors are significantly influenced by the behaviors of specialist physicians in their peer network. Tucker (2008) investigates the adoption of network
communication technologies and finds that adoptions of managers who are central to the
communication networks have large impact on the adoptions of employees and that adoptions of ordinary workers have negligible impact. Hartmann (2010) finds significant social
interaction eﬀects among golfer groups such that 35% of customer value is attributable to
customer’s impact on purchase of members in his group. For what are closed to the empirical
context of our study, Uetake and Yang (2019) investigate social interactions of users in a
weight loss program and find heterogeneous peer eﬀects from average and top performers.
Another related study is by Chen (2020), who finds empirical evidence of negative peer eﬀect
in gym visits caused by the churn from a peer. In a diﬀerent context, Chan et al. (2020)
also find that negative peer eﬀects exist in worker misconduct. Our study diﬀers from the
above studies as we structurally model the interdependence of consumer decisions under peer
influence to explain how gym visits and subscriptions among users are correlated in a social
network. The structural model enables us to use counterfactuals to investigate how a firm
gyms strategy could prevent further attritions after a churn occurs.
Our study is also related to the marketing literature on the eﬀect of word-of-mouth on
product adoption. Kumar and Sudhir (2019), for example, study the impact of word-ofmouth seeding strategy. Iyengar et al. (2011) study the eﬀect of opinion leaders on product
adoption decisions in the physician network. Ameri et al. (2019) study similar word-ofmouth eﬀect in online communities. In these studies, peer influence is in one direction from
a particular type (e.g. early adopter) to another (e.g. late adopter). The peer eﬀect in our
study is more general as it exists in both directions: a consumers consumption and purchase
may increase her peers consumption utility, and her peers decisions may in turn also aﬀect
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the consumer. Such a bi-directional peer influence will generate the social multiplier eﬀect.
We provide a structural framework that captures the interdependence of decisions among
consumers in a social network.
In our counterfactuals, we borrow concepts from the literature of network theory to explore
how a firm should target individual customers to mitigate the spread of attritions. In the
computer science literature, researchers have utilized the network theory to explain how
agents behaviors aﬀects each other in a social network (e.g. Wojewnik et al. (2011) and
Rosé et al. (2014)). These studies are mainly descriptive as they cannot pin down the causal
eﬀect. Wojewnik et al. (2011), for example, document that after an individuals churn in a
telecommunication network, more churns are observed in the churners social neighborhood.
The correlated churns could be driven by many unobserved factors and not peer eﬀects.
To establish the causality, researchers in the economics literature have utilized randomized
field experiments. Well-known studies (e.g. Banerjee et al. (2010), Banerjee et al. (2013),
Akbarpour and Jackson (2018), Banerjee et al. (2019)) have shown how information spreads
or new product adoption diﬀuses throughout the network, using concepts from the network
theory. For instance, Banerjee et al. (2013) show that the centrality of the first-informed
individuals about a micro-finance program helps predicting the eventual adoption in social
networks of Indian villages. The key distinction is that the peer eﬀects in our study are bidirectional, while the above studies focus on uni-directional social influences. Bi-directional
peer eﬀects could generate social multiplier eﬀects, thus have diﬀerent managerial implications from uni-directional peer eﬀects. Our identification strategy is also diﬀerent, as we
utilize exogenous churns recorded in the historical data to infer the causality of peer eﬀects.
Finally, the goal of our study is to retain customers, which is an essential component in
the customer relationship management (CRM) literature. In this well-established literature
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(for a review see Jain and Singh (2002)), researchers have mainly focused on the empirical
settings where social networks do not play an important role in the business. The literature
suggests that business should concentrate marketing eﬀorts on consumers with high customer
lifetime value (CLV). When peer eﬀects exist in the interconnected consumer network, the
standard way of calculating CLV that only captures a focal consumer’s value through her
own purchase but ignores the impact on other users’ purchase can be misleading for the
guidance of a firm’s customer relationship management. A few exceptions in the literature
(e.g. Algesheimer and Wangenheim (2006) and Courtney Clare Green and Hartley (2015))
suggest that network metrics such as centrality could be powerful indicators of customer’s
value in a social network, but they only propose the theoretical framework of incorporating
social network in CRM. Our study uses structural model that captures the interdependence
of consumption and purchase decisions in a social network to measure a customer’s social
value. We propose the social CLV metric which is calculated as the revenue stream lost
from the decease in consumption or attrition of other customers if the focal customer were
to churn. We show that marketing strategies based on social CLV could generate diﬀerent
outcomes from strategies based on traditional CLV. In terms of retention management, Hu
et al. (2019) study the contagious switching behaviors of wireless carrier customers. Their
focus is on the strategic learning of peer users. In another study, Ascarza et al. (2017)
use randomized experiments to show that, under network externalities, targeting campaign
that aims at changing the behavior of a group of consumers also aﬀects the behavior of untargeted peers. Our study includes the rich network structure that allows us to compare the
eﬀectiveness of the campaigns targeting diﬀerent individuals based on their relationship to
the churner and the other peers in the network. The goal of our study is to provide insightful
implications for the customer retention problem in CRM, which is important for businesses
that oﬀer socially-connected products or services.
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4.3

Data, Social Network and Peer Eﬀects

Our data comes from an upscale gym in a Mid-West city in the U.S. It oﬀers a variety of
exercise sessions including group fitness, sports training, personal training, Pilates and Yoga.
The data consists of every users plan choice and gym visits from 2011 to 2018 for eight years.
For each gym visit, we observe the time and the attended class.
There are two types of membership oﬀered by the gym: contractual and month-to-month.
The contractual membership has a duration of either 3, 6, or 12 months. For the month-tomonth membership, subscription decision is made at the beginning of each month, and has to
renew every month. In this study, we focus on the latter membership, which covers about 88%
of all purchases in the data. We choose to ignore the contractual membership because there
could be some behavioral factors in the purchase decision. For example, overconfident users
may overestimate future gym visits, or they may “pay not to go to gym” (DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2006)). These factors are unlikely to exist in the month-to-month membership,
as users make purchase decisions only based on the anticipated gym visits in each month.
In our data, users always visit the gym at least once after subscribing the month-to-month
membership.
We exclude users with less than 6 gym visits or less than 3 months of subscriptions in the
analysis. These users are likely trying the gym service under free trials, and they are unlikely
to form any peer relationship with other users inside the gym. For the same reason we also
exclude users who only show up in private training classes. Finally, we remove users who
only participate in sports team training. Their visit and purchase decisions are probably
made by their coach or team manager and not by themselves.
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The final data sample consists of 2,118 unique individuals. Under the month-to-month
membership, they purchase diﬀerent plans with unique coverage of gym services. These
plans include basic group-based fitness training, specialized small group training, Pilates,
and other advanced training classes.44 To simplify the analysis, we categorize all the plans
into the basic plan, which only covers basic group-based fitness training, and the premium
plan, which covers both group-based fitness training and at least one type of the more
advanced training. On average, about 78.8% of users subscribe the basic plan, and the rest
purchase the premium plan in each month.
The price diﬀerence between the two plans is large. The average price weighted by the
observed frequency of purchases is $76.5 for the basic and $348.5 for the premium plan.
Plan prices vary over time. The number of price changes is roughly 3 to 4 times in each year.
The standard deviation of prices is $18.9 for the basic and $175.0 for the premium plan over
the eight years of our data. Users switch between the two plans. The standard deviation of
subscription rate across months is 0.049 for the basic and 0.028 for the premium plan. Price
variations and plan switches are important for us to identify the price coeﬃcient of users.

4.3.1

Network in the Gym

We utilize the information of how users attend the same class to infer peer relationship
inside the gym. We will first describe how we construct variables that characterize the
peer relationship in a social network, and then present some statistics that characterize the
network structure.
Peers. For user i, we compare the joint classes between the individual and each of the other
users in all of the past months. We calculate the median number of joint classes among all
44

Members who purchase the premium plan can always attend group-based fitness training, but those who
purchase the basic plan cannot attend any advanced classes.
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other users. We define user j as is direct peer if the number of classes that j attends with i
is higher than the median. Furthermore, both j and i have to be gym members for at least
three months. The logic behind this classification method is that, first, two users are likely to
be friends if they frequently go to the same class. Second, even though they were not friends
before they became gym members, the relationship is likely to develop if they often meet
each other in the same class. Note that the peer relationship by this definition can be unior bi-directional. User j may be a direct peer for i, but not the other way, if j attends most
of is classes but i does not. They can be direct peers of each other if the conditions for the
peer relationship are satisfied on both sides. Furthermore, the peer relationship may evolve
over time. A new relationship may form as two users begin to exercise together consistently,
and old relationship could dissolve if they reduce their joint visits.45
In the graph theory, each agent is considered as a node in a graph. The direct connection is
represented by a tie pointing from one node to another. The direction of the peer relationship
i → j represents that i is js direct peer in our context. A path is a sequence of ties connecting
two nodes. For instance, for three users i, j, and k, if i → j, and j → k, there is a path from
i to k: i → j → k. The path implies that i is an indirect peer of k through the “friend of a
friend” relationship.
Social Network. The cluster of nodes that are either directly or indirectly connected with
each other and forms an interconnected graph is called a component in the graph theory.
It represents a social network in our empirical context. A network could be constructed in
the following way: start from one user who is not “isolated” (i.e. she has at least one direct
peer), find her direct peers and add them to the network, then find direct peers for each of
her direct peers, then find the peers of her peers peers. The procedure continues until there
45

More details about how to construct the peer relationship between users in the gym can be found in
Chen (2020).
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are no more new users to add. This way, a network is induced from the peer relationship
between users such that any two users in the network are connected by at least one path
and that there are no users in the network who are not connected to others. In this study, a
network provides a complete picture of who is influenced by whom and how peer influences
may spread along paths. Note that the social network can change over time, as existing
users may leave the gym and new users may subscribe a plan and develop peer relationship
with others.
The Strength of Relationship. We use the adjacency matrix Ω from the graph theory to
represent the strength of the relationship with direct peers. For a social network of size N ,
Ω is a N × N square matrix, each element representing the connection strength between two
users. For instance, row i and column j of the matrix, Ωij , shows the connection strength
between users i and j. We set Ωij to 0 if j is not i’s direct peer. If she is a direct peer, we
then calculate the total number of joint classes between i and j, gij , up to the current month.
We then normalize gij among all other users by the following:

Ωij =

gij
Σk∈N ,k̸=i gik

(4.1)

By construction Ωij is between 0 and 1. The value could be aﬀected by an individuals gym
visiting frequency. A frequent user is more likely to have joint classes with other users, and
she is likely to have a high connection strength with other frequent users. The connection
strengths are asymmetric and dynamically changing over time.
Network Structure. Several metrics are used in the graph theory to characterize the
network structure and the role of an agent in the network. Diameter refers to the length of
the longest path inside the network. It captures the extent of the indirect “friend of a friend”
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relationship inside the network. A users role in the network can be represented by the degree,
i.e. the number of direct peers the user has. Centrality is used to represent the importance
of a user in the network. The most commonly used measure for centrality is degree centrality:
users with a higher degree also has a higher centrality. We will use this measure when we
calculate the value of a user to the gym and in the counterfactual exercise.46
As an illustration, Figure 4.1 presents the relationship among users inside the gym in the
month of March 2013. We define all active users in that month to be users who have
subscribed a plan and visited the gym in the past 6 months, but they may continue to
subscribe or stop the subscription in that month. An active user is represented by a node
(red dot) in the figure. A direct peer relationship is represented by a line between two users,
the strength of the relationship by the thickness of the line; therefore the thicker the line,
the stronger the relationship, and the peer direction is represented by an arrow. In that
month, and in all other months in our data, we consistently find two separate networks.
The network with more users in the figure consists of adults and the smaller one consists of
teenagers. This is consistent with what we observe from data: adults usually go to non-sport
group training classes that are mainly attended by other adult users, while teenagers mostly
go to sports training sessions. The isolated nodes in the figure do not belong to any network.
They are either new users or users who only go to private training sessions, and thus are
excluded from this study.
Some Statistics. Table 4.1 presents several network metrics. On average, there are 213
users in the adult network, and 74 in the teenager network, in each month. The adult network
is much larger than the teenager network. Partly because of this, adult users on average have
46

The adjacency matrix Ω embeds the necessary information to calculate the above metrics. For instance,
the degree centrality of a user can be constructed by counting the number of non-zero elements of the
corresponding column. Paths can be inferred from the multiplication of the adjacency matrix. The shortest
path will be the one with the largest product. One can calculate the diameter of the network in a similar
way.
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more direct peers (i.e. degree), but they also have a lower connection strength with their
peers. The average diameter of in the adult network 6.5 means that a user could reach any
other users in the network through indirect “friend of my friend” relationships of fewer than
7 users, indicating that the network is structurally similar to small-world networks. The
teenager network has a smaller diameter.

Table 4.1: Network Statistics
Network Type
Avg
Avg
Avg
Avg

Adult Teenager

Size
Degree
Connection Strength
Diameter

213
15.2
0.07
6.5

74
7.5
0.15
5.1

The degree centrality typically captures the peer influence of a user in the network. A
high degree suggests that the user can influence many direct peers, and there is a strong
implication on targeting policies if a firm intends to take advantage of the social network of
its customers. Figure 4.2 shows that the distribution of the degrees of adult users (in March
2013) is highly skewed. While the majority of users have relatively low degree, and thus
their peer influences may be limited, a few users have a large number of direct peers. For
example, the long right tail of the figure shows that only 8 out of 240 users have more than
50 peers in the gym. Those users hold a central position in the network and we refer them
as “central users”. Those on the left side of the distribution are referred as “peripheral users”.
We show later how their values to the gym are vastly diﬀerent.
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Figure 4.1: Peer Relationships of Gym Users

Note: Figure shows network structures in the gym at March, 2013.
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Figure 4.2: Network Degree Distribution

Note: Figure presents the degree distribution of all nodes of adult network in the gym at March, 2013.

4.3.2

Evidence of Peer Eﬀects

To establish the causality of peer eﬀects in the gym, we use “exogenous” churns as the
treatment in a quasi-experiment setting. They are defined as users who have to leave the
gym for a long time (or never come back) because of the following reasons: moving out of
town, long-term illness or injury, and pregnancy. These factors are unlikely to be correlated
with the unobserved factors that aﬀect the gym visits of other users in the network. In
contrast, other reasons for churn such as favorite trainer leaving the gym, or a user switching
to another gym, are likely to be endogenous.47 We observe 86 unique exogenous churns that
47

Given that these are self-reported reasons when a user stop subscribing membership, one may be concerned that the user may have incentive to mis-report the reason. For example, the user may report she is
moving out of town in order to ask the gym to refund the membership fee. There are two reasons that the
monetary incentive is low. First, the owner of the gym told us that, to maintain good customer relationship,
a member can always cancel the membership and have the refund even before the membership duration
expires. Second, we focus on month-to-month membership. The monetary value for the refund is much
smaller than contractual memberships. Because of these reasons, we believe the bias in the reported reasons
should be insignificant.
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spread evenly throughout the sample period. Each churner has 17.5 peers on average in the
month of churn.
To test the eﬀects of an exogenous churn, we compare the gym visits and unsubscription
behaviors of the direct peers of the churner and other active users in the network during the
month of the churn.48 Note that, in a connected network, the eﬀects from the churn may
spill over to all users. Still, we expect that the eﬀects on direct peers to be larger than that
on indirect peers.
Table 4.2 shows the average visits in five months before and after churns in the adult and
teenager networks, respectively. In both networks, the average number of visits drops after
churns among direct and indirect peers. Furthermore, the extent of visit decrease among
direct peers is larger than indirect peers for both networks (percentage changes are in parentheses). These results provide an empirical evidence on the negative peer eﬀects from user
churns.49
We further investigate how visits change over time after churns. The dynamic patterns are
quite diﬀerent between direct and indirect peers. For direct peers in both networks, the visit
decrease quickly jumps up in the month of churns, reaches the maximum in two or three
months after churns, and then stabilize in later months. For indirect peers, the visit decrease
rises gradually, and continue to grow even after five months. This diﬀerence suggests that
direct peers visit decrease comes sooner than indirect peers because the churner is much
closer to them. The visit decrease of direct peers however will trigger further visit decrease
from their own peers.
48

In the paper, we refer a “churn” as a user leaving the gym for a long time (and the majority never come
back in data), and “unsubscription” as not subscribing any membership plan in a month. The user who
unsubscribes in a month may subscribe again in future months.
49
Because a user is more likely to be direct peers with other users if she visits the gym more frequently,
direct peers of exogenous churners on average have more gym visits than indirect peers.
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The less a user visits the gym due to the churning of her peer, the less utility she gains
from the gym service, and thus it is more likely that she will unsubscribe the membership
plan. We find from data that the average unsubscription rate among active users in the
adult network increases from about 15% before to 22% after peer churns. For the teenager
network, the average unsubscription rate increases from 33% to 47%. We also find a similar
dynamic pattern in unsubscriptions.
We run a regression of the gym visits of a user in each month on the individuals choice
of whether to upgrade from the basic plan to the premium grade, and whether there are
exogenous churns from direct peers in the past 6 months, while controlling for individual
and month fixed eﬀects. The first column of Table 4.3 reports the results. An upgrade of
plans in the current or the previous month is positively correlated with the individuals visits,
suggesting that, after paying a much higher price for the premium service, users will use
the gym service more frequently. Consistent with the results presented in Table 4.2, the
coeﬃcient for an exogenous churn is negative, suggesting a significant negative impact on
the visits of direct peers.
Next, we run a logit regression of the unsubscription decision on whether there are churns
from direct peers, as well as the extent of the reduction in gym visits in the previous month
(relative to the month before). The second column of Table 4.3 shows that the churn of a
direct peer significantly increases the likelihood of unsubscriptions, again demonstrating the
negative peer eﬀect of peer churns. Furthermore, reducing gym visits in the previous month
is positively correlated with the likelihood of unsubscription in the current month. Though
it is not a direct evidence, the result may suggest that the subscription or unsubscription
decisions are made based on a users expected gym visits in a month. This is because reducing
gym visits in the previous month is likely to lead the user to downward adjust her expectation
in the current month.
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Table 4.2: Pre-treatment and Post-treatment Visit Comparison
Adult
Mean(Treatment) Mean(Control)
Pre
17.0
10.8
Post
14.8
9.7
Diﬀerence
2.2(12.9%)
1.1(10.1%)
Teenager
Pre
9.4
5.1
Post
6.7
3.9
Diﬀerence
2.7(28.7%)
1.2(23.5%)

Table 4.3: Regression Result of Consumption and Purchase Decisions
Variables
DV:Visit Count DV: Unsubscription
Upgrade
3.32***(0.47)
NA
Lag Upgrade
1.68***(0.45)
NA
Reduced Visit
NA
0.06***(0.01)
Exogenous Peer Churn
-2.51***(0.33)
0.78***(0.24)
Note: Table presents regression results at individual-period level of all the users. Upgrade, lag upgrade
and exogenous peer churn are indicator variables; reduced visit is a continous variable of visit count
diﬀerence between past two period; NA represents the variable is not in regression; year, month, and
individual fixed eﬀects are included; standard error estimates are presented in parentheses. Significance
level ***p < 0.001,**p < 0.01,*p < 0.05,.p < 0.1 for all statistics in this paper.
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In the following part of this study, we focus on the adult networks. We do not use teenager
networks for estimation because of two reasons. First, potential unobserved shocks may
confound with the peer eﬀect in teenager networks.50 Second, the adult users generate the
most revenue for the gym. The adult network has a much larger population than the teenager
network and users on average pay a higher subscription fee.

4.4

Model

An observation in our model is a user in a month. In this section, we specify how the user
makes gym visits and plan subscription decisions that are conditional on her peers decisions.
We use Nt to represent a network in month t. When there is no confusion for the notation,
Nt also denotes the set of individuals in the network. For other variables, nt denotes the
number of individuals in the network, and Pt the vector of plan prices. For user i, Xit is a
vector of individual-time-specific characteristics, and Xt the collection of Xit for all users.
The adjacency matrix Ωt , an nt × nt asymmetric matrix, represents the network structure.
The timeline of the decision process is the following: at the beginning of the month, the user
has to make her plan choice Dit ∈ {H, L, 0}, where H is the premium plan, L the basic plan,
and 0 the unsubscription choice (but the user can subscribe again next month). The plan
choice will depend on the users expectation of how often she will attend gym classes in the
month. If the plan choice is H or L, the user will make the gym visits decision during the
month. Both decisions also depend on the visits of her peers, because the more her peers
attend classes, the more likely the user will have friends in same classes she attends and, due
to the positive peer eﬀect, the higher utility she will gain from her gym visits. In contrast,
50

Teenagers and their peers are likely teammates and they may share the similar training and competition
schedule. Teenagers’ attrition may be correlated over time if they stop the oﬀ-season training at the gym at
the beginning of the sports tournaments. The unobserved shocks that aﬀect all the teenagers may confound
with the peer eﬀect.
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if the user loses a friend due to the churn, her utility of gym visits will decrease. This will
also reduce her propensity of subscribing a membership plan.

4.4.1

Utility Functions and Choice

Assuming that the user choose a plan d ̸= 0. We first specify the utility function of gym
visits and, under the assumption that the user maximizes the utility, derive the optimal visit
decision. The utility function is the following:

1
UitV (Visit dit |Dit = d, Xt , Ωt ) = (g d (Xit )+βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt Visit jt +eit )Visit dit − (Visit dit )2 (4.2)
2

In the above equation, Visit dit is the number of gym visits of the user in the current month,
and Visit jt is the number of gym visits of the users direct peer j. Inside the parentheses before
Visit dit , g d (Xit ) is a function of the individual-time specific variables which will aﬀect the users
visit preference. Details will be provided in the next section. Peer eﬀects are represented by
the total visits of direct peers weighted by the connection strength, Σj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt Visit jt . If
β > 0, peers visits will have a positive impact on her visit utility. We assume that the peer
eﬀect from j is weighted by the Ωijt , as a reduced-form way to capture two eﬀects: first, the
higher the connection strength the more likely the user will attend the same class with j and
thus the stronger the peer eﬀect will be. Second, the higher the connection strength the more
utility the user will gain when she attends the same class with j. Finally, eit is a stochastic
term representing the unobserved factors that will aﬀect the users visit utility. It represents
the exercising traits or temporal shocks that are not captured by the observed variables Xit .
It can have a general distribution function Fe of which the mean is zero. Under Fe , eit may
correlate with es of other gym users due to various types of common shocks (e.g. a popular
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instructor leaves the gym in a month); however, we assume that eit is uncorrelated with eis ,
for month s ̸= t.51
The negative quadratic term − 12 (Visit dit )2 captures the diminishing marginal utility as the
user increases visits. There are time and energy constraints for every individual. The more
frequent a user goes to the gym, the more energetically and time exhausted one will become,
and thus the marginal utility one gains from additional visits will decrease. The parameter
of this term is normalized to − 21 for the model identification.
Under this specification, the marginal utility per visit conditional on subscribing plan d is
g d (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt Visit jt + eit − Visit dit . We can use the first-order condition to derive
the optimal visit decision as

d
Visit d∗
it = g (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt Visit jt + eit

(4.3)

We now describe the utility function of plan choice. We assume that, at the beginning of
the month, the network structure (Nt , Ωt ) is public information. This implies that everyone
knows it if there is a churner from the gym in the month. A user forms (rational) expectations
regarding the number of visits she will make, as well as her direct peers visits, in the month.
However, the user only knows the distribution of eit , as well as es of her peers, but not the
exact values. Under these assumptions, we specify the expected utility of subscribing plan d
as the expected visit utility deducted by the disutility from paying the price as the following:
51

Under this assumption, the user cannot use ei,t−1 to update her belief of eit . This helps to simplify the
expected gym visits in the current month, when the user makes the subscription decision. Details are below.
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1
Uitd (Dit = d|Xt , Ωt ) = E[(g d (Xit )+βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt Visit jt +eit )Visit d it− (Visit dit )2 ]−αPtd +ϵ̃dit
2
(4.4)
where Ptd is the price of the plan, and ϵ̃dit captures the impact of unobserved factors on the
plan choice. Replace Visit dit by Visit d∗
it in equation (4.3), we can simplify the above equation
as

1
Uitd (Dit = d|Xt , Ωt ) = E[(g d (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt Visit jt + eit )2 ] − αPtd + ϵ̃dit
2

(4.5)

Use the formula E(x2 ) = (E(x))2 + var(x), we can rewrite the above as

1
d
d
Uitd (Dit = d|Xt , Ωt ) = [(E(g d (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt Visit jt + eit ))2 + var(Visit d∗
it )] − αPt + ϵ̃it
2
1
1
= (g d (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ))2 + vard − αPtd
2
2
1
d∗
d
d
+ (var(Visit it ) − var ) + ϵ̃it
2
1
1
= (g d (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ))2 + vard − αPtd + ϵdit
2
2
(4.6)

In the third line of the above equation, vard is the average variance of gym visits under plan
d
d
d across users, and in the last line ϵdit = 12 (var(Visit d∗
it ) − var ) + ϵ̃it . If the user does not

subscribe any plan, her utility is

Uit0 (Dit = 0|Xt , Ωt ) = ϵ0it
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(4.7)

We assume that ϵs are i.i.d. with each other, across months and across users. Furthermore,
they are independent from eit in equation (4.3). Assuming that ϵdit has the standard Gumbel
distribution, the probability that the user subscribes plan d follow the multinomial logit
expression:

Pr (Dit = d|Xt , Ωt ) =

exp( 12 (g d (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ))2 + 21 vard − αPtd )
1 + Σd′={H,L} exp( 21 (g d′ (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ))2 + 12 vard′ − αPtd′ )
(4.8)

We now have the probability function for the plan choice. Note that the decision of the
user is a function of the decisions of all other users. In particular, Pr (Dit = d|Xt , Ωt ) is a
function of E(Visit jt ), which is a function of the subscription and visit decisions of user i if
the user is also a direct peer of user j. Also note that, under the assumption that the user
does not know the exact value of eit when she makes the subscription decision, and that ϵ’s
are independent from eit , Pr (Dit = d|Xt , Ωt ) does not contain eit .

4.4.2

Rational Expectations at Equilibrium

We assume that the user activities are at “equilibrium” under the peer eﬀects, and that
each user makes rational expectations regarding the visits of her direct peers under the
equilibrium. This helps us pin down E(Visit jt ) in equation (4.8) so that we can evaluate
Pr (Dit = d|Xt , Ωt ) in the model estimation. Let Pr (Dit = H|Xt , Ωt ) ≡ ΦH
it and Pr (Dit =
L|Xt , Ωt ) ≡ ΦLit . The following three conditions characterize the equilibrium expectations:

ΦH
it =

exp( 12 (g H (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ))2 + 12 varH − αPtH )
1 + Σd′={H,L} exp( 12 (g d′ (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ))2 + 12 vard′ − αPtd′ )
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(4.9a)

ΦLit =

exp( 12 (g L (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ))2 + 12 varL − αPtL )
1 + Σd′={H,L} exp( 12 (g d′ (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ))2 + 12 vard′ − αPtd′ )

H
E(Visit it ) = ΦH
it (g (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ))

(4.9b)

(4.9c)

+ ΦLit (g L (Xit ) + βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ))

Equations (4.9a) and (4.9b) merely express equation (4.8) for plans H and L. Equation
(4.9c) is the key, indicating the rational expectation about user is visits by other users. Note
that, since the subscription probability functions do not contain eit , we have E(eit |Dit =
d) = 0 under the zero mean assumption. This gives us E(Visit it |Dit = d) = g d (Xit ) +
βΣj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ) in equation (4.9c).
With nt active users in the gym, there are 3 × nt simultaneous equations. Let EYt be the
L
collection of (ΦH
it , Φit , E(Visit it )) of every user, we can express equations (4.9a) to (4.9c) in

a general form as

EYt = F (EYt )

(4.10)

Assuming β is positive and smaller than one. By Banachs Fixed-point Theorem, the solution for EYt exists in the equation system and is unique. This suggests that, given model
L
parameters, we can use the contraction mapping method to compute ΦH
it , Φit and E(Visit it )

for every user. We will discuss how it helps the model estimation in the next section.
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4.4.3

Some Model Properties and Limitations

A few unique properties of our peer eﬀects model are worth noting. First, it is clear from
equations (4.3) and (4.9a)-(4.9c) that the plan choice and visit decisions are correlated with
the decisions of direct peers. A users decisions will also aﬀect other users through her direct
peers. Use equation (4.3) as an illustration, if user A is user Bs direct peer (i.e. ΩBAt > 0),
and user C is user Bs direct peer, but A and C are not peers (i.e. ΩACt = ΩCAt = 0). Suppose
A increases gym visits in a month. This will increase Bs visits (if β is positive) and it will
further increase Cs visits.
Second, a social multiplier eﬀect (Chan et al. (2020)) exists in the model. Suppose user As
visit increases by one due to an exogenous reason. Equation (4.3) shows that the visits of
user B, who sees A as a peer, will increase by βΩBAt . If A also sees B as a peer, the increase
will further increase As visits by another factor of β 2 ΩBAt ΩABT . This will go on until it
converges. As Bs visits increase, her other direct peers will also be influenced, leading to
more multiplicative increases among users in the whole network. Therefore, at equilibrium
the total gym visits can be significantly higher than the original one visit increase from
user A. Similarly, equations (4.9a)-(4.9c) show that the multiplier eﬀect also exists on the
probability of plan subscriptions.
The above properties illustrate positive peer eﬀects; however, negative peer eﬀects also exist
due to the similar mechanism. In the case of churning, suppose user A leaves the gym due
to her moving to another city. Equation (4.3) shows that, for user B who see A as a peer,
the number of visits will decreased by βΩBAt multiplied by the usual visit frequency of A.
Equations (4.9a)-(4.9c) also show that Bs likelihood of unsubscription will increase. This
will cause the increase in the unsubscriptions and decrease in gym visits for other users who
see B as a peer. It will further lead to the negative social multiplier eﬀects, as we discussed
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above, that cause even a bigger increase in the unsubscriptions and decrease in gym visits
for all users in the social network.
While our model captures important features of peer eﬀects, it also has some limitations.
First, we have imposed potentially restrictive assumptions. The strongest one is perhaps
the rational expectations in equations (4.9a)-(4.9c). Under this assumption, every user can
unbiasedly infer the visit frequency and subscription probabilities of all of her direct peers at
the equilibrium, even though we as researchers can only numerically compute the solutions
using contraction mapping. Without such a restriction, however, we do not know what
expectations users form about the activities of their peers, and therefore the model is not
identifiable.
Another limitation is the distribution assumption of stochastic terms in the model. We assume that all ϵs in the plan choice function are independently distributed. One can argue
that there could be temporal correlations within individuals, or correlations across individuals within the network. This assumption helps make the model tractable; however, it is not
necessary for the model identification. The assumption that eit is independent from eit , for
month s ̸= t, is also restrictive. As a user develops habit for exercise, a positive shock in gym
visits this month may lead to more frequent visits in future. To address this issue, we model
the habit formation and the heterogeneity in gym visit behaviors among users. Details will
be provided in Section 4.6.
Finally, we assume that peers directly influence the consumption utility in equation (4.2).
Other mechanisms, such as peer learning in Hu et al. (2019), may also play a role in our
results. Since we could not empirically separate these two mechanisms with the observational
data, the assumption is necessary.
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4.5

Model Estimation

The key parameter of interest is the peer eﬀect coeﬃcient β. For the purpose of doing
policy counterfactuals, we also estimate the price coeﬃcient α and parameters g d (Xit ) inside
the function, which we will discuss in the next section. We use the generalized method of
moments (GMM) to estimate model parameters. Our estimation strategy is to use equations
L
(4.9a) to (4.9c), where EYt = (ΦH
it , Φit , E(Visit it )) represents the predicted probabilities of

plan subscriptions and number of visits of a user from the model. Let Yit = (1{Dit =
H}, 1{Dit = L}, Visit it ) be the observed plan choice and visits. ξit = Yit − EYit measures
the prediction error. For GMM estimation, we have to find a set of instrumental variables Zit ,
with the dimension larger or equal to the number of parameters, such that we can construct
valid moment conditions E(ξit |Zit ) = 0.
The main challenge for estimating our peer eﬀects model is that the right-side of equations (4.9a) to (4.9c) consist EYjt , where j is a direct peer of user i. This causes two
issues. First, EYit does not have an analytical expression, as such we cannot directly calculate the values. To address this issue, we use equation (4.10) to numerically compute
EYt = {EY1t , EY2t , · · · , EYnt t } for all users, using the contraction mapping method as
discussed in the previous section. This is conditional on a given set of model parameters.
As model parameters vary, EYt will change accordingly. Consequently, it cannot be directly
used to form moment conditions. This is the second issue, suggesting that we need to find
instruments for all EYjt , where j ∈ Nt , and j ̸= i.
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4.5.1

Instrumental Variables

For a valid instrument IVjt , it has to be correlated with EYjt and satisfies E(ξit |IVjt ) = 0.
We make use of the observed exogenous churns in our data. When a user leaves the gym,
her peers are directly impacted because their utility from going to the gym will decrease
if peer eﬀect exists. The stronger the connection strength between the churner and the
peer, the more she will be impacted. For non-peer users, their utility will also be indirectly
impacted by the churn through their peers who are directly impacted. The closer the distance
between a user and the churner in the network, the stronger the impact will be. The spatial
characteristics of the network structure will govern the variation of the impacts. Furthermore,
the exogeneity of the churn by definition is independent from the prediction error, thus the
condition E(ξit |IVjt ) = 0 is satisfied.
For each user j ∈ Nt and j ̸= i, to construct IVjt we use the following procedure. For
another user k ∈ Nt and k ̸= i or j, we calculate the shortest distance between j and k. If
the shortest distance is 1, i.e. j is ks direct peer with Ωjkt > 0, we construct a variable Mjkt
as:

Mjkt = 1{Churnkt }Ωjkt

(4.11)

where 1{Churnkt } is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if k churns exogenously in period
t, and 0 otherwise. Recall that Ωjkt is the connection strength from k to j.
If the distance from j to k is 2, i.e. Ωjkt = 0 but there is at least one path k → l → j between
k and j, as such Ωlkt Ωjlt > 0. We choose the path with the largest Ωlkt Ωjlt , implying the
“shortest” path, and construct Mjkt as:
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Mjkt = 1{Churnkt }Ωlkt Ωjlt

(4.12)

If the distance from k to j is larger than 2, we follow the above method and construct Mjkt
by multiplying the Ω’s in the shortest path.
We repeat the above procedure for every user in the network who is neither i or j, then sum
up Mjkt to construct the following variable:

Mjt = Σk∈Nt ,k̸=i,j Mjkt

(4.13)

We construct Mjt for every user j ∈ Nt and j ̸= i. Finally, we construct an instrumental
variable as the following:

IVit1 = Σj∈Nt Ωijt Mjt

(4.14)

This variable captures the impact of the exogenous churns on the visits of user is peers.
If peer eﬀects are positive, the variable is positively correlated with Σj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt )
in equations (4.9a) to (4.9c). Given that we only use exogenous churns, 1{Churn kt } is
independent from prediction errors. Therefore, IVit1 is a valid instrument.
Peer users visits can be impacted by not only churns in the current month but also in the
past months, as evidenced in the reductions of visits and subscriptions in our data which
is shown in the data section. Therefore, we repeat the above procedures for churns in the
month t − 1, to construct another instrument IVit2 . We repeat the exercise for month t − 1,
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t − 2, until t − 5. Our final instruments for Σj∈Nt ,j̸=i Ωijt E(Visit jt ) in equations (4.9a) to
(4.9c) are IVit = {IVit1 , IVit2 , · · · , IVit6 }.
In addition to IVit , we also include individual characteristics Xit and plan prices Pt =
{PtH , PtL } as instruments. Finally, we have Zit = (Xit , Pit , IVit ).

4.5.2

Identification and Estimation Procedure

Identification. The set of instrumental variables Zit = (Xit , Pt , IVit ) indicates from where
the model identification comes. First, the variation in Xit across users and months help
identify the function g d (Xit ). For example, we include gender in Xit . If female users visit
the gym more frequently than male users when subscribing plan d, g d for female in our
model will be larger than that for male users. Second, the price coeﬃcient α is identified
by the variation in Pt . We showed in Section 4.3 that changes in prices are quite frequent
and substantial. One may be concerned about the price endogeneity issue. To mitigate this
concern, we include year fixed eﬀects in Xit to control for the macroeconomic shocks.
The identification of the peer eﬀect parameter β comes from exogenous churns over time.
Suppose we observe the drops in gym visits and plan subscriptions, after a user with many
direct peers in the network leaves the gym, are larger than after another with few peers
leaves, and that the impacts on those closer to the user are significantly larger. This informs
us that β is significantly positive.
Estimation Procedure. There are two stages in our estimation procedure. We start with
a set of trial model parameters Θ0 . Conditional on the parameters, the inner stage uses
contraction mapping to compute
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0
L
0
0
EYit (Θ0 ) = (ΦH
it (Θ ), Φit (Θ ), E(Visit it )(Θ ))

(4.15)

for every active user in every month from equations (4.9a) to (4.9c). We then calculate
ξit (Θ0 ) = Yit − EYit (Θ0 ), and based on that calculate the criterion function value of GMM.
The criterion function of GMM is a continuous and diﬀerentiable function. At the outer
stage, we use the Newton-Raphson method to search for the optimal Θ∗ that minimizes the
criterion function value.

4.6

Estimation Results

In this section, we will first describe how we specify g d (Xit ) which allows for the heterogeneity
in exercise “states” across users and evolves over time. Then we will discuss the estimation
results and provide interpretation for the results.

4.6.1

Heterogeneity in Exercise States

Individual users exhibit diﬀerent gym visit behaviors in our data. Part of the heterogeneity
could be explained by demographics and time factors. Individuals may also diﬀer in their
exercise states or preferences that are unobserved to researchers. Let Rit be a vector of user
is demographics (including gender and age) and year indicators, and Dit be the plan choice.
We specify g d (Xit ) as the following:

g d (Xit ) = γ1 Rit + δ H 1{Dit = H} + Sit
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(4.16)

where Xit = (Rit , Dit , Sit ). In this specification, δ H represents the incremental utility of the
premium plan relative to the basic plan. The first two components on the right side of the
equation captures user heterogeneity due to observed factors in data, and the last component
Sit represents the unobserved exercise state that is heterogeneous across individuals and
across months.
In the marketing and economics literature, researchers typically use latent classes or random
coeﬃcients to model unobserved individual heterogeneity. These two methods are diﬃcult
to be adopted to model Sit . Use Figure 4.1 as a visual illustration. Assuming there are only
two types of S, and there are nt users in the larger (adult) network in the figure. There
will be 2nt unique combinations of spatial distributions of types in the network. Since each
spatial distribution of types will end up with a unique equilibrium of EYt in equations (4.9a)
to (4.9c), we have to compute every EYt for each unique spatial distribution of types in
the model estimation. As a typical adult network in our data has more than 200 users, this
is an impossible task. To allow for heterogeneity in Sit , we use a diﬀerent approach. We
first use a clustering algorithm to investigate in our data how many user segments exist that
exhibit unique gym visit behaviors, and to which segment a user belongs. We then estimate
the model conditional on the assigned segment membership for all users. If the clustering
algorithm can predict the segment membership with high accuracy, our estimation results
will be close to the estimates when one uses a full-blown latent class model.
Using the same data, Chen (2020) adopted the deep embedded clustering algorithm to show
that individual users diﬀer in two main aspects: visit levels and trends. We follow her
approach to model Sit . We first segment users based on the visit level, with the average
monthly visits and the number of months with visits of each user as inputs. Results suggest
that there are three types of visit levels: high, medium and low. We then segment users
based on the visit trend. We use the correlation between visits in the last and current months,
192

the average diﬀerence in visits between the two months, and the average absolute diﬀerence
in visits between the two months, as inputs for the clustering algorithm. Results show
that there are two segments. The first one shows a positive correlation of visits between
two consecutive months, indicating that users in the segment have a consistent trend of
either increasing or decreasing visits over months. We call this segment the “consistent”
type. Another segment exhibits a negative correlation of visits between two consecutive
months, suggesting that users switch between an active state, under which they visit the
gym frequently, and an inactive state, under which they reduce visits or unsubscribe the
membership. This interesting pattern demonstrates that users in this segment are not as
consistent as the first segment in terms of gym exercise. We therefore call it the “on-and-oﬀ”
type.
Combining the visit level and trend segmentation gives us six user segments. Table 4.4
shows some summary statistics of these segments in the adult network. The “Consistent-Low”
segment is the largest one with about half of users. A user in this segment only visits the gym
3.6 times in a month and the average correlations between visits in two consecutive months is
0.12. The second and third largest segments are “Consistent-Medium” and “Consistent-High”
users, respectively. In the latter segment, a user exercises in the gym almost every day. Due
to the high consistency, the average correlation of monthly visits is close to zero. The next
three segments are the “on-and-oﬀ” types with about 15% of users altogether. The average
number of monthly visits of these segments is comparable with the “consistent” type, but
the average correlations between monthly visits are significantly negative.52
52

To investigate the accuracy of the membership prediction, we calculate the silhouette score for each user
based on the segmentation in Table 4.4. The silhouette score ranges from -1 to 1, measuring how similar
an object to its own cluster compared to other clusters. The higher the silhouette score, the better the
clustering performance. We find the scores of all users to be larger than 0, indicating that users are more
similar to other individuals in the same cluster than those in diﬀerent clusters. Most of the silhouette scores
are around 0.6, suggesting that the clustering algorithm works well for the majority of users.
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Table 4.4: Gym Behaviors Clustering Result
Latent Class
Consistent-Low
Consistent-Medium
Consistent-High
On-and-oﬀ-Low
On-and-oﬀ-Medium
On-and-oﬀ-High

Percentage Avg Visit Avg Correlation
46.6%
3.60
0.12
26.7%
12.2
0.12
12.0%
27.4
0.00
7.1%
6.17
-0.05
6.8%
14.0
-0.10
0.8%
25.8
-0.27

Note: Each row represents one gym behavior type; columns 2,3,4 represent the percentage of users, the
average visit, and the average correlations between consecutive visits within each cluster.

Based on the above segmentation, we specify Sit as the multiplication of a time-varying state
variable S̃it and a time-invariant visit level variable λi . That is,

Sit = S̃it · λi

(4.17)

We assume that there are three latent types of λi : λH , λM and λL , corresponding to the
high, medium, and low type in Table 4.4. For state variable S̃it , the value is restricted within
[0, 1], and is changing across months. For the consistent type, the specification is:

S̃it = γ2CN S̃it−1 + (1 − γ2CN )[1{V isitit−1 > V isitit−2 } + S̃it−1 · 1{V isitit−1 = V isitit−2 }]
(4.18)

where γ2CN is restricted between [0, 1], representing the carry-over eﬀect from the exercise
state in the previous month to the current month. 1{Visit it−1 > Visit it−2 } is an indicator
that equals 1 if visit increases in the prior month, and 0 otherwise. When visit increases, the
exercise state of consistent user will further increase by (1 − γ2CN ). When visit remains the
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same, i.e. 1{Visit it−1 = Visit it−2 } equals 1, the exercise state will remain unchanged. The
exercise state will decrease when visit decreases. Under this specification, consistent users
can have an increasing, constant, or decreasing trend of gym visits across months.
For the on-and-oﬀ type, the specification of S̃it is:

S̃it = γ2ON (1 − S̃it−1 ) + (1 − γ2ON ) · 1{V isitit−1 < V isitit−2 or V isitit−1 = 0}

(4.19)

In this equation, γ2ON is the carry-over eﬀect parameter that is also restricted between [0, 1].
It is multiplied by (1 − S̃it−1 ), implying that the higher was the exercise state in the past
month, the lower the exercise state will be in the current month. The state will increase by
(1 − γ2ON ) under two conditions: visit decreases or no gym visits in the prior month. Under
this specification, after an “oﬀ” period with reduced visits, a users exercise state will increase,
switching to the “on” state, resulting in high visits.53
Note that the es in the visit utility function in equation (4.2) is assumed to be independent
across months. Our clustering results demonstrate that there are “consistent” and “on-andoﬀ” visit trends. Therefore, if we do not control for how the exercise states are positively
or negatively correlated between months, our model will be mis-specified and thus our estimation results can be biased. After modeling the two latent trends, however, the concern
regarding the independence assumption will be mitigated.
The evolution of the exercise state also brings interesting dynamics for the eﬀects of exogenous churns. When user k leaves the gym in month t, it can reduce the gym visits of direct
and indirect peers in the same month. Since the majority of users belong to the consistent
53

Because the carry-over eﬀect parameters γ2CN and γ2ON are restricted between [0, 1], as long as the initial
state is restricted [0, 1], under the equations (4.18) and (4.19), all the subsequent states will be bounded
between [0, 1].
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type, the reduction in gym visits will reduce the exercise state of those users, and lead to further reduction in future months. Therefore, the churn does not just cause one-time negative
eﬀects but the eﬀects can aggravate into the future.
The evolution of the exercise state brings an initial value problem since we do not know
what is the exercise state in the first period of our data. To address this problem, we use
T0 = 6 months as initialization periods. We draw S̃i,−T0 from the uniform distribution and,
conditional on model parameters, let it evolve based on the gym visits in each month observed
from data, until month 1 which is the starting month in the model estimation. This way
helps alleviate the initial value problem. As model parameters change during the estimation
process, S̃i,1 will adjust accordingly.

4.6.2

Estimation Results

The estimation results for the adult network are shown in Table 4.5. The peer eﬀect coeﬃcient
in the table is positive and significant at 0.24. To better understand the magnitude of the
peer eﬀect, we calculate the social multiplier eﬀect under the coeﬃcient. We assume that
there is a positive exogenous shock to all active users in the network that increase their gym
visit by one in a month, and calculate the new equilibrium gym visits with peer eﬀects under
the shock. Results show that, on average, users in the network will increase their gym visit
by 1.44 in that month. The additional 0.44 visit comes from the positive and bi-directional
peer eﬀect. Suppose users A and B are peers with each other. The one unit increase in
As gym visit will increase Bs gym visit by 0.24, and vice versa. The 0.24 increase in gym
visits from both users will further increase their peers visits by 0.242 = 0.06. This process
will continue until converges. This is the eﬀect between two users. In the interconnected
social network, both users will be influenced by other peers, and thus the increase will be
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Table 4.5: Model Estimation Result
Parameter
Peer Eﬀect Coeﬃcient β
Premium Plan δ H
Exercise State Level High λH
Exercise State Level Medium λM
Exercise State Level Low λL
Price Coeﬃcient α
Carry-over Eﬀect (Consistent) γ2CN
Carry-over Eﬀect (On-and-oﬀ) γ2ON
Visit Variance (Premium) varH
Visit Variance (Basic) varL
Middle Age (Reference: Young)
Old Age (Reference: Young)
Male (Reference: Female)
Year 2012
Year 2013
Year 2014
Year 2015
Year 2016
Year 2017
Year 2018

Adult Networks
0.24 (0.08)
5.39 (0.74)
43.86 (3.80)
19.27 (3.35)
5.11 (3.43)
-0.28 (0.09)
0.87 (0.12)
0.37 (0.39)
20.2 (7.84)
18.4 (4.40)
1.08 (2.16)
-3.55 (1.26)
-1.11 (0.96)
1.34 (1.51)
1.08 (0.93)
-0.61 (1.37)
0.17 (1.62)
0.44 (1.45)
0.68 (1.11)
1.08 (1.84)

Note: Standard errors clustered at individual level are presented in parentheses; young age: age < 25;
middle age: 25 ≤ age < 55; old age: age ≥ 55
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even larger. In contrast, if the peer eﬀect is uni-directional, there are no feedbacks from the
influenced peers and the magnitude will be much smaller.
The price coeﬃcient is significantly negative, suggesting that the gym can increase subscriptions by running price promotions. The premium plan coeﬃcient is 5.39, indicating that a
user has higher usage utility from the classes covered by the plan. Equation (4.3) also shows
that an individual on average will have 5.39 more gym visits in a month if she switches from
the basic plan to the premium plan. We will use this result, together with the negative price
coeﬃcient, to explore how a gym can eﬀectively mitigate the negative peer eﬀect caused by
an exogenous churn in later counterfactuals.
The exercise state level parameters λs are increasing from low to high user segments. The
carry-over parameters γs are diﬀerent between consistent and on-and-oﬀ types. For the
former, the estimate 0.87 indicates a moderate state persistence: a users exercise state will
decrease from the maximum 1.0 to 0.87 if she does not visit the gym for 1 month, and will
further decrease to 0.43 in 6 months and 0.18 in 12 months if she does not return to the
gym. This indicates that consistent exercise is crucial for retaining the exercise habit. For
on-and-oﬀ types, the carry-over eﬀect of 0.37 (but insignificant from 0). To interpret this
eﬀect, assume that a user was in a high exercise state of 0.9 last month, and she visited the
gym more frequently than the month before. From equation (4.19), the exercise state will
drop down to 0.037 this month. In the next month, her exercise state will be high again,
jump back to 0.37 × (1 − 0.037) + 0.63 = 0.98. Therefore, gym visits of on-and-oﬀ users
fluctuate every month.
For the demographics and year fixed eﬀects, only the coeﬃcient for old age is significant
at −3.55. The insignificance of the other coeﬃcients indicates that, after controlling for
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the latent exercise state types, demographics and years factors are not important factors to
explain the heterogeneity in visits across individuals.
To investigate the model fit, we use the estimated coeﬃcients to simulate the equilibrium
subscriptions and gym visits, and compare with the real data. Figure 4.3 shows the average
subscription probability and visit count in each month, after a churner leaves the gym in
our data in month 1. Overall, the estimated model could recover the observed decreasing
trend of visit count and subscription probability after the churn. Figure 4.4 further breaks
down the visit count by consumer types. It shows that our estimated model could recover
the post-churn heterogeneous visit patterns across users quite well.

Figure 4.3: Model Fit: Average Subscription and Visits

Note: Figure represents model fit for users subscription and visits; X-axis represents month since exogenous churn; Y-axis represents average subscription probability or average visits in each month; solid series
represents data; dashed series represents model prediction.
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Figure 4.4: Model Fit: Visits By Consumer Types

Note: Figure represents average visits broken down by consumer types. X-axis represents month since peer
churn; Y-axis represents average visits in each month; the left figure represents consistent users; the right
figure represents the on-and-oﬀ users; each series represents the average visit count per month for one user
type in data or in model prediction; solid series represents data; dashed series represents model prediction.

4.6.3

Heterogeneity in Peer Eﬀects

We investigate how the negative peer eﬀects of user churns that lead to the decline in gym
visits and subscriptions for other gym users depend on the position of the churner in the
social network. We select from data a month in which there are 228 active users in the adult
network, and compare three scenarios: no churn, one central churner, and one peripheral
churner. Figure 4.5 provides a snapshot of the relationship of the two churners and their
direct peers in the adult network. The central churner on the left has 47 direct peers, while
the peripheral churner on the right has 13 direct peers. There are also more connections
among the central churners peers than among the peripheral churners peers.
To simulate the gym visits and subscriptions of all users in the network, we randomly draw
100 stochastic terms es (see equation (4.2)) for each user from the empirical distribution of
visit residuals from the model estimation results. We simulate the equilibrium gym visits
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and plan choices in the network, using equations (4.9a), (4.9b) and (4.9c), in each scenario,
then calculate the average unsubscription rate and the average gym visits of each user in
each month.
Table 4.6 shows that, compared with the no churn scenario, the peripheral churner generates
a 1% (2%) increase in unsubscriptions in the first six (twelve) months after the churn. The
negative peer eﬀects from the central churner are much stronger, as there is a 5% (12%)
increase in unsubscriptions in the first six (tweleve) months after the churn. The unsubscriptions are accompanied by reduced average gym visits. While the peripheral churner only
reduces gym visits of other users by 0.4 (1.3) in the first six (twelve) months, the drop is 2.4
(5.4) after the central churner leaves.
Table 4.6 also shows that the negative peer eﬀects are stronger in longer term. Figure 4.6
graphically shows the dynamic change in unsubscriptions and visits across months after
churns. The left figure shows that the unsubscription rate of other users increases from
about 12% in the month when the central churner leaves to about 40% twelve months after.
The average gym visits of other users drop from about 12 in the month of churning to about
5 twelve months later. The reason for the continuous exacerbation of the negative peer
eﬀects is that the majority (85%) of users in the gym are the consistent type with positive
state dependence. The decrease in gym visits in the month of the churn will reduce the
exercise state of other users in the next month, leading to a larger reduction in gym visits
and subscription rate in the month after, and the process will roll on for future months.
These findings send out an important warning to the gym: if the negative eﬀects from a
churn are not stopped early on, they will continue and even aggravate, making the problem
much harder to control in the future.

201

Figure 4.5: Churner Comparison

Note: Figures represent the connections between churner and her peers; the red node on the left figure
represents central churner; the orange node on the right figure represents peripheral churner; blue nodes are
the churners’ peers. The directions of connections are omitted in this graph.

Table 4.6: Post Churn Comparison: Central Churner VS Peripheral Churner
Churner Scenario
No Churner Peripheral Churner Central Churner
1M Unsubscription
11.3%
11.7%
12.7%
6M Unsubscription
10.9%
11.9%
15.8%
12M Unsubscription
12.7%
14.5%
24.8%
1M Visit
12.3
12.2
11.9
6M Visit
12.8
12.4
10.4
12M Visit
13.7
12.4
8.3
Note: Each column represents one churner scenario. 1M represents the first month of churn; 6M represents first 6 months since churn; 12M represents 12 months since churn; all statistics are calculated as
average level across users in the network.
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Figure 4.6: Post Churn Comparison: Central Churner VS Peripheral Churner

Note: Figure represents simulated unsubscription rate and average visit per month post churn; the vertical
dotted line represents month of peer churn; each series represents one churn scenario; the vertical bars
represent 95% confidence interval.

We have shown how the negative eﬀects from the central and peripheral churners diﬀer in
terms of unsubscriptions and gym visits. We now quantify the heterogeneous eﬀects in terms
of dollar value to the gym. We bring in the concept of customer lifetime value that captures
the current profit and discounted future profit generated from each consumer in the CRM
literature. Assuming that there is no marginal cost to the gym from each user visit,54 the
traditional way of calculating the CLV of user i in month t focuses on the future revenue
stream the user brings to the gym, which we call it the personal customer lifetime value
(PCLV). It can be calculated as

PCLV it = Σt+T
s=t

1
(P r(Dis = H)PsH + P r(Dis = L)PsL )
(1 − r)s−t

54

(4.20)

We believe this is a reasonable assumption. Most of the costs, including hiring instructors and employees
for other jobs in the gym are fixed costs that do not depend on one user increasing her visits in a month.
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where r is the monthly discount rate, T the total number of periods used for the evaluation,
and other variables are defined in Section 4.4.
While PCLV is useful to measure the value of a user when the choices of users are independent
from one another, it will underestimate the true importance of the user in our interconnected
social network. This is because, as we have shown above, the churn of the user can lead
to reduced subscriptions from not only her direct peers but also other users. Therefore,
we introduce the social customer lifetime value (SCLV), which takes account of not only
the revenue stream a user brings to the gym, but also how her visits can (1) increase the
subscriptions of all other users in the gym and, (2) conditional on subscription, increase the
likelihood that other users will switch from the basic plan to the more expensive premium
plan. To calculate SCLV, we measure the diﬀerence in the total PCLV of all other users in
the network in two scenarios: when the focal user is present (she may or may not subscribe
a plan), and when the user churns. There is no formula like equation (4.20) to calculate
the SCLV. Instead, we have to first numerically solve the probabilities of plan choices and
gym visits of every user in the gym as fixed points in the equation system of (4.9a) to (4.9c),
in the two scenarios. We then simulate the plan choices of users based on the plan choice
probabilities and, conditional on the plan choice, the gym visits by draw the stochastic
terms es in equation (4.2) from the empirical distribution of visit residuals. The procedure
is repeated from month t to the end month T . We fix the monthly discount rate at 1%, and
calculate the values assuming T = 6 and T = 12 months. In the simulation, the set of active
users remains unchanged; therefore, potential churns and newly-joined members in future
months are not taken into account.
Table 4.7 reports the PCLV and SCLV of the central churner and peripheral churner. Because
the central churner visits the gym more frequently and has a higher probability of subscribing
the premium plan, her PCLV is 2.8 to 1.2 times higher than the peripheral churners PCLV
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for T = 6 or 12. The diﬀerences between PCLV and SCLV are very large. For the peripheral
churner, her SCLV is about 12 times of her PCLV in the six-month horizon, further increases
to 20 times in twelve months. The diﬀerences are even bigger for the central churner. Her
SCLV is about 17 times of the PCLV in six months and 39 times in twelve months. In
particular, she is expected to only contribute $4,009 to the gym through her subscriptions in
a year, but the externality she will bring in by increasing the subscriptions of other users is
about $155K. This is about 37% of the total PCLV of all of the 228 gym users. The number
may seem unreasonably high; however, it reflects the large impact on the unsubscription rate
of other users if the user churns, as shown in Figure 4.6.
We calculate the PCLV and SCLV for each user. In 6 months, the correlation between PCLV
and usage level (measured by average gym visits) is 0.94, and the correlation between SCLV
and usage level is 0.56. This indicates that a user with high usage level will almost certainly
have a high PCLV, but not necessarily a high SCLV. The correlation between SCLV and
centrality is stronger at 0.83. Thus centrality is a more important indicator of SCLV than
usage level.
In summary, our results indicate that it is important for the gym to invest on retaining users
who are central in the social network and design strategies to quickly mitigate the negative
peer eﬀects if a user leaves. The comparison of PCLV and SCLV shows that the traditional
CLV metric significantly underestimates the true value of a customer in an environment where
customers are closely connected. While usage level is an informative indicator for PCLV, it
could not fully infer the SCLV. Instead, centrality could better indicate the true value of
a customer. Thus, the marketing strategy that business should invest more in retaining
high consumption users in traditional CRM does not directly apply to socially-connected
business.

205

Table 4.7: Personal CLV and Social CLV
Churner
Short Term(6 Months) Long Term(12 Months)
Personal CLV
Peripheral Churner
566
1832
Central Churner
2147
4009
Social CLV
Peripheral Churner
6933
37533
Central Churner
36324
155112
Note: All statistics are in US dollars.

4.7

Counterfactuals

We have shown the significant impacts from the central churner. This section explores how
the gym can use marketing campaigns to eﬀectively mitigate such impacts. The negative
peer eﬀects start from the central churners 47 direct peers and spread to all other 228 users.
If the gym can oﬀer incentives to the churners direct peers to make up for the loss of the
exercise utility, the eﬀects can be stopped from spreading to the whole network. Furthermore,
since the eﬀects will persist over time, the gym should continue the oﬀer after the month of
the churn. Because of these reasons, we focus on individually-targeted membership discounts
that are oﬀered for multiple months.
Our estimation results show that the premium plan helps increase the exercise utility and thus
gym visits. Therefore, in our counterfactuals the gym would oﬀer discounts for the premium
plan. The oﬀer will target the direct peers of the central churner, starting immediately from
the month of the churn. We first show how the gym can totally eliminate the negative eﬀects
from the churn using individually-targeted discounts that are dynamically adjusted in each
month. This serves as a benchmark for other counterfactual strategies. Then we explore
who should be targeted if the gym does not have suﬃcient marketing budget or discounts
cannot be set individually. Finally, we explore the eﬀectiveness of premium plan discounts if
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the gym does not know who are the churner’s direct peers, and select targets from the whole
peer network.

4.7.1

Dynamic Personalized Discounts on Direct Peers

To totally eliminate the negative peer eﬀects from the central churner, the gym has to oﬀer a
discount set at the personal level in each month such that the expected gym visits in equation
(4.9c) will not change for each of the churners direct peers. If this is the case, the peers peers
will also maintain their gym visits. In the equation, the loss of a friend would diminish the
exercise utility by reducing one with positive connection strenccgth Ω. To make up for the
loss, the counterfactual strategy we explore here is to oﬀer a discount for the premium plan
L
to each of the churners direct peers, as such ΦH
it in equation (4.9a) will increase, while Φit

in equation (4.9b) and the unsubscription probability will decrease. As an individual will
visit the gym more under the premium plan, the expected gym visits in equation (4.9c) will
increase. The discount is set at the level that for each direct peer the expected gym visits
will remain unchanged. Since a users exercise state and her connection strength with other
gym members will change across months, the discount will also be dynamically adjusted.
Specifically, let i be a direct peer of the central churner. In month t, we first calculate the
expected visits in equation (4.9c) for everyone assuming the central churner had not left.
With the churn, we replace the original premium plan price PtH with a trial discounted price
L
personalized for i, P̃itH , and calculate ΦH
it , Φit , and E(Visit it ) from equations (4.9a) and

(4.9c). Since the discounts in this counterfactual exercise will be set high enough such that
all users in the gym do not change their visit levels, we assume E(Visit jt ) for all other users
remain unchanged in the equations, except that the expected visit of the churner is set to
zero. We keep lowering P̃itH from the original PtH , until E(Visit it ) is equal to the original
level without the churn. The personalized discount is set at δit = PtH − P̃itH . It is oﬀered
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specifically for user i and can only be redeemed if the user subscribes the premium plan. We
repeat the exercise for each of the churners direct peers.
In this counterfactual, we design a 6-month targeting campaign, i.e. discounts are oﬀered
for six consecutive months since peer churn.55 We simulate the gym visits by drawing 100
es for every user in each month, from the empirical distribution of the visit residuals from
the model estimation. Based on the simulated visits in one month, we update the exercise
state and connection strength of each user at the end of the month, which will be used to
simulate the plan choices and gym visits in the next month.
Figure 4.7 graphically shows how the average subscription rate and visits of users change
in each month. Given that the outcomes under the dynamic personalized discounts are the
same as when there is no churn, the curves closely overlap on the top of both diagrams. For
comparison, we also simulate the scenario when the gym does not oﬀer any discounts. The
outcomes are depicted as the curves at the bottom of both diagrams. We use these curves
as the benchmark for other counterfactuals which we will describe below.

The total budget for each month is calculated as the summation of all personalized discounts
for the direct peers of the churner. The required budget is $4,220, $3,267, $3,917, $4,224,
$4,553, and $4,499 from the first to the last month. On average, the discount per individual
in a month is $87, representing 22.8% of the original price of the premium plan. The total
revenue for the gym is $223,219 over six months if the churner had not left, and $157,495
if the gym does not oﬀer any discounts after the churn. With the dynamic personalized
55

We only look at 6 months because new members may join the gym and develop peer relationships with
the current users, which will mitigate the negative peer eﬀect from the churner. Our model does not capture
new users joining the gym, thus we cannot evaluate the impact of new users in the counterfactual.
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Figure 4.7: Counterfactual Results: Dynamic Personalized Targeting Campaign

Note: Figure represents simulated equilibrium outcomes across time in three conditions; the left subfigure
represents average subscription rate; the right subfigure represents average visit count; the vertical dotted line
represents the period of exogenous churn; the shaded areas represent periods with discounts; 100 simulations;
bars represent 95% confidence interval.

discounts, the total revenue is $213,450, recovering more than 95% of the loss. The result
suggests that the discounting strategy is eﬀective in mitigating the negative peer eﬀects due
to the churn.
We compare dynamic personalized targeting campaigns that vary in total number of targeted
periods. We find that the total revenue increases with the duration of the targeting campaign.
The details are included in the Appendix section 4.9.

4.7.2

Targeted Discounts with Limited Marketing Budget

In Section 4.7.1, the total marketing budget is about $25K over six months, which can
be a high cost for the gym. In this counterfactual, we investigate how the business can
eﬀectively mitigate the negative peer eﬀects with insuﬃcient marketing budget. The gym
could either oﬀer less discount to all of the targeted direct peers, or select a subset of the
direct peers as seeds and only oﬀer full discounts to the seeds. For the latter strategy, the
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critical question is who should be selected as seeds. We have shown in section 4.6 that users
with high centrality in the network have a stronger impact on plan choices and gym visits of
other users. Therefore, selecting high centrality users as seeds could generate larger network
spillover eﬀect. However, high centrality peers are likely to be active users of the gym and
thus they are less likely to unsubscribe. We find from our simulations that, in the month
when the central churner leaves, the average unsubscription rate for high centrality peers is
5%, while the unsubscription rate of low centrality peers is 25%. If the gym wants to prevent
unsubscriptions caused by the churn, targeting users with low centrality seems to be a better
strategy.
To explore the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent targeting strategies under budget constraint, we
assume the gym has half of the required budget for the dynamic personalized discounts
scenario (i.e. about $12K in total). It also oﬀers discounts for six months. We study four
scenarios. In scenario 1, we oﬀer each of the churners direct peers 50% of the discount
calculated from Section 4.7.1. In scenario 2, we randomly select seeds from the direct peers
and oﬀer them full discounts, until the $12K budget is exhausted. In scenario 3, we rank
individuals by the number of their direct peers, and select users with more direct peers as
seeds. We oﬀer full discount to each of the seeds, until the budget is exhausted. In scenario 4,
we prioritize users with few direct peers to give full discounts, until the budget is exhausted.
Outcomes from the four scenarios, together with the benchmark cases of dynamic personalized discounts and no discounts, are shown in Figure 4.8. Targeting all direct peers with
half of the full discounts and targeting users with low centrality are clearly the least eﬀective.
Indeed the average subscription rate and gym visits under these two targeting strategies are
almost the same as no discounts in each month. The strategy of random seeding generates
a higher subscription rate and visit count; however, it can only recover about one-third of
the loss due to the churn. Selecting users with high centrality as seeds is the most eﬀective
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targeting strategy in terms of recovering the subscription rate and gym visits. The results
indicate that, if there is insuﬃcient marketing budget, the gym should prioritize targeting
users with high centrality to mitigate the negative impacts from churns. In terms of the profit
impact, the total revenue under the strategy of targeting high centrality users is $210,112
over six months. This represents 94.1% of the revenue without the churn, and 98.4% of the
revenue under dynamic personalized discounts in Section 4.7.1, suggesting that the targeting
strategy is eﬀective enough in mitigating the negative impacts from the churn for a business
with limited marketing budget.
In the Appendix Section 4.9.2, we consider the situation where the gym cannot oﬀer diﬀerentiated discounts for targeted individuals. The results show that high centrality seeding is
still the most eﬀective under uniform discounts.

Figure 4.8: Counterfactual Results: Dynamic Personalized Targeting Campaign Under Budget Constraint

Note: Figure represents simulated equilibrium outcomes for dynamic personalized targeting campaign with
budget constraint; the left sub-figure represents average subscription rate; the right sub-figure represents
average visit count; the vertical dotted line represents the period of exogenous churn; the shaded areas
represent periods with discounts; 100 simulations; bars represent 95% confidence interval.
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4.7.3

Select Targets from the Whole Network

In the previous counterfactuals, we utilize the information from the network structure including who are the churner’s direct peers, and how much is the utility loss due to the churn
for each direct peer. In this counterfactual, we consider the situation in which the gym does
not have such information from the network structure. We use the same total marketing
budget as the targeted discounts campaign in Section 4.7.1. Instead of oﬀering personalized
discounts to the 47 direct peers of the churner, the gym selects users from the whole network
as seeds and split the budget evenly. We compare two seeding strategies. In the first strategy,
we rank the users by PCLV and oﬀer discounts to high PCLV users. The second strategy
oﬀers discounts to high SCLV users. We assume the gym selects 47 users in both strategies,
the same number as the targeted discounts campaign in Section 4.7.1. The counterfactual
results are shown in Figure 4.9. High SCLV seeding strategy is more eﬀective than high
PCLV seeding strategy. The total revenue is $197,686 under previous strategy, which is 16%
higher than the $170,603 under the latter strategy. This result suggests that, for a socially
connected business, SCLV is more informative than PCLV in terms of selecting seeds to oﬀer
discounts. However, the revenue under high SCLV seeding is still 7% less than the revenue
when the gym oﬀers personalized discounts to direct peers in Section 4.7.1. It suggests that
the information on the churners direct peers and their connection strength helps improve
the eﬀectiveness of the targeting campaign.
Business may not have the ability to accurately measure the PCLV and SCLV. In particular,
if they can measure SCLV of each user, they would already have the necessary social network
information. Therefore, we also compare two strategies in which the gym uses the number of
gym visits (usage level) to approximate personal CLV and centrality to approximate social
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CLV. The total revenue in high usage seeding strategy is $168,434, which is 99% of the high
PCLV seeding strategy. The total revenue in the high centrality seeding strategy is $193,723,
which is 98% of the high SCLV seeding strategy. The results show that high centrality
seeding is as eﬀective as high SCLV seeding, thus centrality is an eﬀective approximation to
SCLV in terms of selecting targets.

Figure 4.9: Counterfactual Results: Uniform Discounts on the Whole Network

Note: Figure represents simulated equilibrium outcomes across time in four conditions; the left subfigure
represents average subscription rate; the right subfigure represents average visit count; the vertical dotted line
represents the period of exogenous churn; the shaded areas represent periods with discounts; 100 simulations;
bars represent 95% confidence interval.

4.8

Conclusion

In this study, we investigate how a business that sells socially-connected products and services
should design marketing campaigns to prevent contagious customer attritions. Using gym
users as the subjects of our empirical study, we build a structural model that captures
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some unique features of social networks. First, peer eﬀects between two peers in a socially
connected business can be bi-directional. Second, users are connected with each other in
the complex social network. Finally, consumers hold diﬀerentiated positions in the network,
where some are more connected than the others. We utilize exogenous churns in our data
to construct instrumental variables for the endogenous peers gym visits to identify the peer
eﬀects.
Our estimation results show a social multiplier eﬀect due to the bi-directional peer influences.
We also find that the social CLV of a user is far larger than the personal CLV used in the
CRM literature. Users who hold a central position in the network have significantly higher
social CLV than users that are peripheral in the network. We then use counterfactuals to
explore how the gym can use membership discounts to prevent the spread of the negative
peer eﬀects due to a user churn. We show how dynamic personalized discounts on direct
peers of the churner can totally eliminate the eﬀects. If the business has a limited marketing
budget or cannot oﬀer personalized discounts, selecting high centrality users from the direct
peers of the churner as seeds to oﬀer discounts is the most eﬀective strategy. The information
from the network structure is very useful in mitigating the negative eﬀects. Targeting only
the direct peers of the churner is more eﬀective than selecting seeds from the whole network.
Targeting high social CLV users is more eﬀective than targeting high personal CLV users.
We also show that, if the gym could not measure the social CLV, centrality is an eﬀective
approximation to social CLV in terms of selecting who to target.
Our study brings important insights to customer relationship management for businesses
that sells socially-connected products or services. Although this study focuses on preventing
the spread of attritions caused by peer’s churn, our results could be generalized to marketing
strategies for other CRM problems. Business should oﬀer promotions to users with high
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social CLV to increase the long term profitability of the consumer network. Only targeting users with high personal CLV may not generate the large network spillover eﬀect that
benefits other users in the network. This insight is diﬀerent from suggestion from the traditional CRM literature for business without social features. Although this study focuses on
the fitness industry, our modeling approach and findings can generalize to other businesses,
including telecommunication, software, online gaming, and music and video streaming industries. Researchers can adopt the similar methodology to measure the social CLV of
customers and investigate the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent marketing strategies to help manage
the complicated peer eﬀects in a social network where customers are closely connected.
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4.9
4.9.1

Appendix
Dynamic Personalized Discounts with Diﬀerent Months

We compare dynamic personalized discounts targeting campaigns that vary in duration. We
gradually increase the total number of months from 1 month to 6 months and compute the
equilibrium outcomes in each scenario. The comparison of 6 targeting campaigns that vary
in duration is shown in Figure 4.10. It is obvious that the eﬀectiveness of the targeting
campaign in terms of increasing gym visits and subscription rate improves as the duration of
the campaign increases. In terms of the profit impact, the total revenue gradually increases
from $194,145 in the 1-month scenario to $223,219 in the 6-month scenario.
The results show that oﬀering optimal premium discount for direct peers of the central
churner could eﬀectively restore the consumption level and the eﬀectiveness of the campaign
increases with the duration.

4.9.2

Uniform Discounts with Limited Budget

In the previous counterfactuals, the gym oﬀers personalized discounts based on the utility
loss of each user due to the churn. We now consider the situation where a business cannot
oﬀer diﬀerentiated discounts for targeted individuals. We keep use the same total budget
as in Section 4.7.2, and assume the discounts are oﬀered for six months. We consider two
scenarios. In the first scenario, we split the total budget evenly among all direct peers in
each month. In the second, we select users with more than the average number of direct
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Figure 4.10: Counterfactual Results:Dynamic Personalized Targeting Campaign with Diﬀerent Periods

Note: Figures represent simulated equilibrium outcomes across time; the left figure represents average subscription rate; the right figure represents average visit count; the vertical dotted line represents the period
of exogenous churn; the shaded areas represent periods with discounts; 100 simulations; bars represent 95%
confidence interval.

peers as seeds, and spilt the budget evenly among them. The counterfactual results are
shown in Figure 4.11. Selecting high centrality users as seeds and oﬀering them a larger
discount is a more eﬀective strategy than targeting more peers with smaller discounts. The
total revenue is $182,269 under the former strategy, higher than the $175,275 revenue under
the latter strategy. However, this revenue is 14% lower than the revenue when the gym oﬀers
personalized discounts to high centrality users in Section 4.7.2, and about 15% lower than
the revenue when the gym oﬀers personalized full discounts to all direct peers in Section 7.1.
Since uniform discounts does not capture the individual heterogeneity and dynamic changes
in user behaviors, it is a less eﬀective strategy. Still, the results suggest that targeting high
centrality users is important for the business.
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Figure 4.11: Counterfactual Results: Uniform Discounts Targeting Campaign

Note: Figure represents simulated equilibrium outcomes for uniform discounts targeting campaign; the left
sub-figure represents average subscription rate; the right sub-figure represents average visit count; the vertical
dotted line represents the period of exogenous churn; the shaded areas represent periods with discounts; 100
simulations; bars represent 95% confidence interval.
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